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LOKESH CHANDRA

THE FLESH AND BLOOD OF TIME

Time dwells in the depths of the full mind. Deep inside us it interweaves the real and the unreal. Sacred time is the pure becoming, where the time of physics is no longer determinant. It is the flowing onward of the essence of life , a value-centre in many principles of being, as we seek to create newer and ever individualised eyes. The mind renews itself in the intuition of time. It is the laughter of the gods out of which emerge our newest sensibilities of expanding consciousness. It brings a polytheistic instinct in a monotheistic thinking. Time is the big and beautiful of human knowledge that comprises the immeasurable infinite, away from the absolute silence of science concerning the meaning of life. It engulfs man eternally, in a now that has no end. The eternal *(sanātana)* of the infinite Being is Time that upholds *(dharma)* the cosmic and human order, the *sanātana-dharma of India.*

Sanskrit has several words for time. The lexicon *Amarakośa* lists four: *kāla, diṣṭa, aneha*, and *samaya.* The word *kāla* is derived from the root *kal* 'to calculate, enumerate'. In the *Atharvaveda* and *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* it is a fixed or 'right point of time, a space of time,

time'. It also signifies "time as leading to events (the causes of which are imperceptible to man), destiny, fate": from a sanctified time to the notion of destiny. The word *diṣṭa* for time is the appointed or assigned moment, fate, death. But *diṣṭi* is "auspicious juncture, good fortune, happiness" in the phrase *diṣṭyā vardhase* 'you are fortunate, I congratulate you on your luck'. The third word *aneha* 'time' basically means "incomparable, unattainable, unmenaced, unobstructed". It is the enduring and the permanent in change. The fourth word *samaya* 'time' is explained as *samyag eti* "appointed or proper time, right moment for doing any thing, time".

The English word *time* is *tima* in Old English in the sense of 'fit or proper *time*, good time, prosperity'. In Swedish *timme* means 'an hour'. This word is derived from Old Teutonic **ti-mon* which is formed from the verbal base **ti* "to stretch, extend" + the abstract suffix - *mon, man* a suffix that occurs in Sanśkrit words like *kar-mā* (from the root *kar* 'to do') and *dhar-ma* (*dhar* 'to hold'). The word *tide* is from the same root **ti*. The German *Zeit* 'time' is cognate to *tide*. The root *ti* occurs in the Sanskrit *titha* 'time, autumn' in the *Unadi*, and in *tithi* 'a lunar day'. The roots of words for time in Indo-European languages mostly signify 'to stretch, measure' in a temporal application. The Latin *tempus* 'stretch of time' can be from the root *ten* in Latin *ten-dere*, Sanskrit *tan*, Greek *teino* 'stretch'. Russian *vremja*, Slavic **vérmen* is from **vert-men,* Sanskrit *vart-man* 'course'. It is a semantic development from the notion of time as a turning cycle of seasons, etc. The Greek *khronos* is originally 'the comprehensive' from the root seen in the Sanskrit *hṛ* 'to bring together'. The Avesta *yarə* , Gothic *jēr*, English *year* are probably extensions of *yā* 'to go', like the Sanskrit *sam-aya* (*i/aya* 'to go'). The words enshrine man's responses

to the rhythm of time, its constant recurrence, its never-ending rhymes without reason.

The Indo-European languages are the richest in verbal morphology. Sanskrit conjugation is vibrantly alive to tenses and moods, termed *lakāra* by Pāṇini, wherein the initial *la* is from *kāla*. The richness of verbal conjugation in Indo-European accented the memories of the bygone, a keen awareness of the seen, and passion for that to be. The experienced change in terms of duration gives pastness, presentness, and futureness. The flow of time has been grasped in India not only intellectually but also in intuitive terms. In the intuited stream of consciousness past, present and future flow into one another. Such a Being is *tri-saṃaya-vyūha-muni,* the sage who envisions the trinity of time.

The temporal has to become the timeless eternity. As we cannot step out of the timely, we cannot step outside the timeless. The experience of time leads us to the perception that time is not an abstraction of our temporal being, but our temporal being is an expression of Time. In Zoroastrianism, time is absolute reality: Zurwan/Time is the ultimate resolution of Ahura mazda (light, goodness) and Angra Mainyu (darkness, evil). In the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 11.1.6 finite time and being are deified in the single symbol of Prajāpati : Prajāpati is the year. For Indian thought, the realisation of enlightenment is release from cycles of temporality, as historical time is delusion.

The *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* 1.3 speaks of the Divine as: "He is the one who rules over all these causes from time to the soul". In 4.15: "He indeed is the protector of the world in time". The *Maitrī-Upaniṣad* says : *atha ya eṣo 'ntare hṛt-puṣkara evāśrito 'nnam atti sa eṣo 'gnir divi śritaḥ sauraḥ kālākhyo dṛśyaḥ sarvabhūtāny annam*

attīti: "Now, he who has entered the lotus of the heart and eats food is the same as that fire of the Sun which enters the sky, called Time the Invisible, who eats all beings as his food". Time eats all beings *(prāṇināṃ kalanāt kālākhyaḥ sarva-bhūtāni saṃharati)*. Likewise in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* 11.32: *kālo 'smi loka-kṣayakṛt* 'I am *Kāla* the destroyer of worlds'. Its momentariness stands in contrastive nexus to the eternal, unchanging context of our being.

The Sāṅkhya system does not admit any real time. They regard the unit of *kāla* as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. Its existence is linked to the atom and its movement. According to it, *kāla* as a separate entity is a creation of our perceptions. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard it as existing by itself, and as an all-pervading partless substance. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras regard time as the cause of things that suffer change, but not of those that are eternal. Further, it is a substance and is eternal.

According to the Jains, time is that which renders the mutation *(vartanā)* of things possible. Naturally, time is incorporeal, and it has no space-points. In which form did it exist? It is explained that it stood leaning *(pratītya)* on the variable masses of existence. Views differ on whether time is material. That which depends on variable things is not time in general, but only the moment *(samaya)*, the present. It is transitory and vanishes the same moment. It is the duration which an atom requires to cross a space-point.

Buddhism regards time as relative and a circle without beginning or end. A living being forms an endless continuum in relation to time. Life in relation to space and time is represented in the following diagram :



The Buddhists of the Madhyamaka school reject the independent and ultimate reality of time. According to them, it exists as a notion relative to phenomena, which do not exist in the ultimate. Hence it is unreal. It is divided into three components: past, present and future, which exist only in relation to each other. It is devoid of ultimate reality. It does not exist apart from things. Empty time is untenable. It is apprehended from changing entities: *bhāvam pratītya kālaś cet kālo bhāvād ṛte kutaḥ* (*Madhyamaka-kārikā* 19.6). Like momentary things or existential structures (*bhāva*), time too is unreal *(na ca kaścana bhāvo 'sti, kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati)*. Nāgārjuna expounds that the three phases of time *(kālatraya)* are interdependent, have no self-existence, and so are unreal. Candrakīrti, commenting on *Madhyamaka-kārikā* 15.5, says that there is no such thing as invariable, unchanging time which could be

understood in terms of moments and minutes. It has no essence of its own. Nāgārjuna says: "But an enduring time, although manipulatable, does not exist. How could non-manipulatable time be grasped". The *Prajñāpāramitā* accepts that *kāla* has a mundane *(laukika)* and conventional *(sāṅketika)* meaning, but it is not a real *dharma*. To avoid the metaphoric expression *(prajñapti)* of *kāla*, the Buddhist use the word *samaya*. The *Prajñāpāramitā* clearly says that Buddhist texts often employ the word *samaya*, and rarely the word *kāla*. Buddhaghoṣa illustrates the employment of *samaya* by numerous citations from the *Nikāyas* in his commentaries on them. Eliade says: "Time makes possible the appearance and existence of things. It has no final influence upon their existence, since it is itself constantly regenerated".

In the words of the Nobel Laureate Weizsäcker (1952: 163): "Like the limits of space, the modern era had also cracked open the limits of time which the Middle Ages recognized. When geology found fossils of living things 'before the flood' and when it learned to estimate the age of past geological epochs by counting the strata in sedimentary rocks, the calculation of time according to a literal interpretation of the biblical story of creation has to be abandoned". The question of eternity has to be viewed afresh in the plentitude of the real, instead of the poverty of the precisely conceived. Judeo-Christian and Islamic systems are historical religions in relation to other faiths. The manifestation of the cosmic process in the passage of time is circumscribed in them by historic time.

The Judeo-Christian view of a finite cosmos and a time limited to six thousand years has conditioned modern thought. While the infinity of the world has become the symbolical element in natural sciences, eternal time continues to pose problems from the days of Plotinus

and Augustine. According to the Christian interpretation, time is the medium through which the divine purpose finds expression. The eternal now is not a frozen instant, a durationless simplicity but life, divine life, "a god manifesting himself as he is" in the words of Plotinus. Experience of inner composure, vividness to hours passing by unregistered, are a threshold for the comtemplation of eternity. It is vertically related to the horizontal flowing of time.

The modern view of physics is presented by Russell: "A truer image of the world. . . is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, rather than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is". The everlasting, what always was, is, and will be, has to be distinguished from eternity. Eternity touches all time. It transcends time without being separate from it. It is timelessness, in contrast to the sempiternal or everlasting. It is the unity of the multiplicity of relations of precedence and posteriority. Latin metaphysics speaks of eternity as *nunc stans* 'a standing now', and of time as *ninc fluens* 'a flowing now'.

The flow of time as something which continually slips past us, is a notion with respect to a hypertime. In the phrase of D.C. Williams it is "the myth of passage". Events happen to continuants, i.e. to things that change or remain the same. While there are memories of the past, there are no footprints of the future. The asymmetry of the temporal directionality of the universe is a fundamental question. Sanskrit uses *samaya* for flowng time, in conventional worldly sense for protensive events, and *kāla* is the term of the Vaiśeṣikas who regard time as eternal.

Sacred time is crucial to all cultures, from the tribal to the classical. Its context is the unchanging

eternal and its expression is the ever-changing momentary. Ambivalent in its focus, it is timeless in the absolute and timely in relative terms. In the spiritual world it reveals itself as timeless. The realities of life have to merge seamlessly into sanctification by the eternal. The planets and constellations as symbols of the eternal are correlates of human life for the epigenesis of the ultimate. In India, sacred rituals are consecrated by the worship of the nine planets (*nava-graha*) and homage to the twentyeight constellations (*nakṣatra-iṣṭi*). It is a living element that influences actions. So strong was the role of the planets and constellations in the life of India that fire rites to them found a special role in Japanese Buddhism. A manuscript of the ninth century at the Tōji monastery entitled *Goma-ro-dan-yō* illustrates the planets of the week as well as the constellations, along with the fire altars used in their rites (TZ 237:7.815). The Japanese *Daikoku*, translation of *Mahākāla*, has acquired the character of the patron of fortune (*fukujin*), and he is a guarantee of success and good luck. He is venerated as the god of agriculture as well as the specific deity of rice-culture. From Mahākāla of death he has become the Great Time (*mahā* great, *kāla* time). The social elaboration of the temporal symbols constitutes an integral bond with the Eternal.

In Indic religions, Time is personified in the highest form of Deity. Herein time is the bridge from the perceptible to the non-perceptible. *Kāla* or Time is personified as a cosmogonic force in the *Atharva-veda* 19.53-56. In the perennial philosophy of India it is Eternity, the *sanātana-dharma* wherein events and symbols, time-intervals and eternal continuities, are homogeneous and interpenetrative. The Sanskrit root of *kāla* is *kal*, a correlate of *kar* 'to create', for the symbols of time are the innovative structures of creativity. India's time is trans-historic, transcendental. The historic

Buddha Śākyamuni himself has to be transformed from Master into Lord. From an individual in time he became the Eternal beyond time. Time flows without a shore and seeks substance in creativity. The stream of eternal time, with its indivisible links in an unbroken whole, is the holoverse of life.

The apothesis of the Cycle of Time in the complex deity of *Kālacakra* reflects its creativity in human perceptions. *Kālacakra* has lived on in Tibet as the apogée of Tantric revelation. It is the withdrawal of all appearances that melt

Into light and dissolve into myself.
I also melt into light, and then from within
The emptiness of unapprehendability
Again transforms into the aspect of Kālacakra.

As Buddhist monasteries were being destroyed in Central Asia in the eighth century, mind's geometry translated the image of time into *Kālacakra*. Like a wheel (*cakra*), Time (*kāla*) was to be the timeless movement for trampled dreams to become incredible vitality. In *Kālacakra* life and time, hope and history, resolve and resurrection intertwine. We think in time and time lives in us. Man conceives and constructs another time to stand over and contrast with the time in which he has his corporeal existence. This dualism is indispensable to the temporal process of history. The Time To Be, the Other Time transforms the Is into the Ought, to renew humanity in the dreaming unknown.

of his [illegible] readings[46] and hence he could revise the verses time and again[47] till the book was finally lithographed on 5-8-1857 with 108 copies[48] by his patron Sevādāsa Mahant in his lithographic press located at Tirupati.

His son was assigned by Sevādāsa Mahant to compile the yearly almanic (*pañcāṅga*) according to the Solar system, besides reading almanic every day before the God's Image in the assembly hall (*sadas*) of the temple. As a reward he had the temple honour in the form of new clothes on the New Year Day of each year. The author was beside himself out of joy when the Mahant presented new clothes to him also along with his son.[49] Even now the descendants of his family enjoy this temple honour for reading the almanic hereditarily. Many a Vaiṣṇava at Tirupati remember his name with reverence and courtesy. But no one has recorded his life in detail.

IV

The nominal compound *kiṃkara* is derived from the pronoun *kim* and the root *kṛ* with the noun formative suffix *-a* (*-ṭa*) (according to Pāṇini 3.2.21: *diva...kiṃ... dhanuraruhṣu*) meaning 'servant'. The secondary derivative *kaiṃkarya* means 'the office of the servant' or 'servitude'. The word *ratnāvali* means 'necklace of jewels'. Thus *kaiṅkaryaratnāvali* means a jeweled necklace of servitude of the servant. Hence the book *Kaiṅkaryaratnāvali* contains the services of the devotees at the temple of Lord Venkateśvara and other Vaiṣṇava shrines.

B.S.L. HANUMANTHA RAO

THE MAHĀVINAYADHARAS

Several inscriptions from the *stūpa* of Dhānyakaṭaka contains the term *mahāvinayadhara*. One of the records reads[1] : *siddhaṃ theriyāna mahāvinayadhara*. It means monks who were mahāvinayadharas. Another record says[2] : *ye (se)liyānam mahāvinayadharasa,* etc., the meaning of which is *seliyas* who were *mahāvinayadharas*. In the third record the word is read by Hultzsch as *mahāvana* which he has translated as 'the śaila monastery in the great forest'[3]. But in the light of the other two records, *mahāvana* of this record appears to have been either a scribal error or a mistaken reading for *mahāvina*.

In the inscriptions of Nagarjunakonda the word *aparamahāvinaseliyas* occurs frequently. During the sixth regnal year of Śrī Vīrapurusadatta, Bhadanta Ānanda of the Āryasaṃgha of Pannagāma and a master of *Dīgha Majjhima nikāyas* erected a pillar at the *mahācaitya* for the benefit of *aparamahāvinaseliyas*. Bapisiri, queen of Vīrapursadatta erected a pillar during the same reign at the site belonging to the same sect. Another record says that during the 17th regnal year of the same king, Chatisiri, sister of Śrī Chaṃtamūla and the mother-in-law of Vīrapurusadatta built a shrine, surrounded

by a cluster and provided with everything at the foot of the *mahācaitya* of *aparamahāvinaseliyas*. An inscription from site no.9 describes the religious activities of *upāsaka* Chadasiri in the *seṭṭivaravadhamāna* in the *mahānikāya* of the *aparamahāvinaseliyas*. Thus, atleast two *vihāras* at Nagarjunakonda the principal *vihāra* on site no. 1 and the *vihāra* on site no.9 belong to a sect known as the *aparamahāvinaseliyas*.

If the above inscriptions of Dhānyakaṭaka and of Nagarjunakonda are read together, it becomes clear that the *śaila* schools of Āndhradeśa were *mahāvinayadharas* or followers of a Text known as *Mahāvinaya*. There were subsects among the *śailas* - *pūrva, apara* and *uttara* - evidently called with reference to the location of their principal seats - Dhanyakataka, Nagarjunakonda and Jaggayyapeta respectively. The inscriptions noted above suggest that they were called *pūrvamahāvinayaseliyas, aparamahāvinayaseliyas,* etc. But the Nagarjunakonda records dropped *ya* from *mahāvinaya* wheras the Buddhist Texts like *Kathāvatthu* preferred to call these sects merely as *pūrvaśailas* and *aparaśailas* though they were actually *pūrvamahāvinayaseliyas* and *aparamahāvinayaseliyas*. Then the question that arises is : what is the *Mahāvinaya* which the *śaila* sects had followed? So far no attempt has been made to answer the question. The words *mahāvinayadhara* and *aparamahāvinaśeliya* of the inscriptions have been almost ignored. This paper seeks to suggest an anwer to the question and the author does not claim finality for his views.

It is too well known that the *Vinaya* is the Text dealing with the discipline of the Buddhist monks. It was a code of conduct. Each of the Buddhist schools and sects had its own recension of *Vinaya*. The second *saṅgiti* at Vaisali which saw the first schism in the *saṅgha* marks the beginning of the proliferation of the

Vinaya Texts. In that *saṅgiti*, the *saṅgha* broke up into Theravāda and Mahāsaṅghika Schools. From the beginning, Dhānyakaṭaka developed into a stronghold of the Mahāsaṅghikas. The large quantity of NBP were found in the excavations at the place may suggest that Dhānyakaṭaka became the resort of the Mahāsaṅghika emigrants from Magadha and Vaisali. The early inscriptions and sculptures from Dhānyakaṭaka refer to the *vihāras* of Vaisali and to the events in the life of Buddha in that great city. These inscriptions and sculptures may be interpreted as an instance of recollection of their original home by the Vajjian settlers at Dhānyakaṭaka.

There are two traditions about the cause of the schism in the *saṅgha*. One view is that it was precipitated by the ten novel practices *(daśavatthūni)* introduced in discipline by the Vajjian monks. The other tradition is that it was caused by the Five points proposed by a certain Bhikṣu Mahādeva. The Bhikṣu is said to have his residence at Caitya Śaila. It is not difficult to identify the place as early Buddhist writers like Vasumitra actually called Dhānyakaṭaka itself as Caityaśaila. This identification of Caityaśaila with Dhānyakaṭaka is supported by *Kathāvatthu* which attributes the Five Points to Pubbasoliyas and it is too well known that Dhānyakaṭaka was the seat of Pubbasoliyas. Dhānyakaṭaka was therefore the birth place of the Five Points responsible for the rise of the Mahāsaṅghika School and that is possibly the reason for the Mahāsaṅghikas of even distant places like Vaisali to resort to it. It is not unlikely that the Mahāsaṅghikas who had gathered in large numbers at Dhānyakaṭaka and the nearby *vihāras* of Krishna valley prepared their own *Vinaya* and called it *Mahāvinaya* to distinguish it from the Orthodox Text.

The local sub-division of the Mahāsaṅghikas at Dhānyakaṭaka gradually came to be known as Caityakas.

Several of the early inscriptions of the place mention that the *vihāra* complex was in possession of the Caityakas. The sect derived its name from the cult of *caitya* which they had developed. The cult consisted of: (i) the construction of huge *caityas* and (ii) decoration, illumination and worship of *caitya*. It is interesting to note that certain Buddhist sacred symbols, especially the wheel *(dharma cakra)* and *svastika* were harmonised with the architecture of the *stūpas* of this sect. It may be a coincidence that the number of spokes in the wheel base of these *stupas* suggests certain principles and ideas of Buddhism such as *ārya satyas* (4), *pāramitas* (6), *aṣṭāṅgamārga* (8), *daśa balas* (10) and *dvādaśa nidānas* (12). In many early sculptures of Dhānyakaṭaka men and women are found kneeling before the symbols representing the Buddha and their posture suggests the concept of *prapatti* or self-surrender which is typical of Śrīvaiṣṇavism of later times.

The Caityakas were therefore among the earliest of the Buddhist sects who conceived the Buddha as superhuman or *lokottara*, by winning whose grace men are saved. Such a development among the Caityakas is attested by some of the earliest inscriptions recovered from their *stūpas*. The relic casket inscriptions of Bhaṭṭiprolu attribute divine qualities and powers even to the relics of Buddha *(Buddha śarīrāṇi mahanīyāni)*. Inside the *stūpa*, at the mouth of the well from which the caskets were recoverd bricks had been arranged to form a lotus (*padma*), recalling the statement of *Bṛhatsaṃhitā: padmopaviṣṭaḥ piteva jagato bhavati buddhaḥ* - (like the Father of the Universe (Brahmā), the Buddha should be seated on lotus). The Caityakas who derived their name from their religious practices (worship of Caitya) became therefore Lokottaravādins philosophically. Though Lokottaravāda does not figure among the 18 Schools of Buddhism, early writers like Bhāvaviveka and Vasumitra

mention it as a sect of the Mahāsaṅghikas. Lokottaravāda is therefore a recognised branch of the Mahāsaṅghikas and it is identical with Caityavāda.

The Lokottaravādins too had their own redaction of Vinaya which gained popularity as *Mahāvastu*. Without giving scope for any doubt or ambiguity, the Text describes itself as *ārya mahāsaṃghikānāṃ lokottaravādinām madhyadeśikānām pāṭhena vinayapiṭakasya mahāvastu ādi*. The statement is translated as "*Vinayapiṭaka* according to the Text of the Mahāsaṅghikas who declare the Buddha as Lokottara." On the basis of its language (mixed Sanskrit) and style, the composition of *Mahāvastu* is placed between the Pāli canon and the *Vaipulya* (Mahāyāna) *Sūtras*, that is about 200 B.C. and that was the time when the Caityakas were in possession of Dhānyakaṭaka Vihāra. Setting the life of Buddha against the mythological background, the *Mahāvastu* clearly brings out the superhuman or *lokottara* nature of Buddha. In this respect especially, the *Mahāvastu* closely resembles the Brahmanical *Purāṇas* and it was the time when the *Purāṇas* were being compiled. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that *Mahāvinaya* of the inscriptions was the *Vinaya* of the Lokottaravādins which was no other than the *Mahāvastu*.

In the later inscriptions of Dhānyakaṭaka, the word *caityaka* was given up in preference to *śaila*. Some scholars think that the Śaila Schools were the sub-divisions of the Caityakas. But some writers used the words *caitya* and *saila* interchangeably giving the impression that there were no basic differences between them. The Caityakas were called the Śailas probably because they spcialised in the construction of huge Caityas resembling hills *(śailas)*. The Śaila School appears to have been dominant among the Āndhra Buddhists *(Āndhakas)* as Ramatirtham, Ghantasala *(Kaṇṭakaśaila)*,

Allur, Vengi, Dhanyakataka and Nagarjunakonda are known from inscriptions as its centres. The adjectives *pūrva*, *apara* and *uttara* which qualify the word *śailas* were purely geographical terms. However the monks especially of Dhānyakaṭaka and Nagarjunakonda described themselves as *pūrvamahāvinayaśeliyas* and *aparamahāvinayaśeliyas* respectively. The inscriptions appear to have abbreviated the words into *purvamahāvinaśeliyas* and *aparamahavinayaśeliyas* whereas literature further simplified the terms to *pūrvaśailas* and *aparaśailas*. This seems to be the reasonable explanation to the term *aparamahāvinaśeliyas* of the Nagarjunakonda records. The *Mahāvinayadharas* were therefore the masters of *Mahāvastu*, the *Vinaya* of the Lokottaravāda subdivision of the Mahāsaṅghikas.

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3. Ibid. pp.52-53.
4. E.I.,XX, no.c 1, p.17.
5. Ibid. c 2, p.19.
6. Ibid. E1, p.21.
7. Ibid. xxxv, p.9.
8. H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism,* Ch.1.
9. Nalinaksha Dutt, I.H.Q., vii, p.733.
10. *Studies in Indian Epigraphy* (J.E.S.I.) I, pp. 60 ff.
11. A.R. for 1959-60, no. 59, p.50.
12. Ibid. no. 54.
13. *2500 Years of Buddhism,* pp.41-44.

14. De La Valley Poussin, 'Five Points of Mahadeva and *Kathavatthu*', J.R.A.S., 1910, pp.413-23.
15. Burgess, *Buddhist Stupas of Amaravati and Jaggayyapeta,* etc., p.24.
16. E.J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought,* App., ii, p.287.
17. Ibid. p. 173.
18. The word occurs in different forms : *Cetikiya* (E.I., xv., no.55); *Catikiyanam* (Luders List, no. 1248); *Jadikiyanam* (Ibid, no. 1244).
19. E.J. Thomas, op. cit.
20. Nalinaksha Dutt, *2500 Years of Buddhism,* p. 118.
21. E.I., ii, pp.323 ff.
22. Rae, *South Indian Buddhist Antiquities,* p. 9.
23. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Points of Controversy,* Int., xxxvi.
24. H.Kern, op.cit., Ch. i.
25. Haraprasada Sastry, Calcutta Review, Sept., 1930, pp.44 ff. The *Vinaya* status of *Mahavastu* has been recognised by the Tibetans and the Nepalese. In several respects the Tibetan *Vinaya* resembles the *Mahavastu* whereas in the Nepalese Canon, the *Mahavastu* occupies the place of *Vinaya*. Kern, op.cit.
26. Winternitz, A *History of Indian Literature,* ii, pp.230 ff.
27. Ibid.
28. E.J. Thomas, op. cit.

SWATI GANGULY

A STUDY ON THE CHINESE BUDDHIST TEXT OF THE ABHIDHARMADHARMASKANDHAPĀDAŚĀSTRA

The *Abhidharma* is the third part of the *Tripiṭaka*. It deals with the doctrines taught by the Buddha in a detailed and systematic manner. The early Buddhist school of the *Sthaviravādins* had seven *Abhidharma* treatises[1] which were rejected by its new branch of the school of the *Sarvāstivādins*. Seven new texts on *Abhidharma* were composed by the *Sarvāstivādins*. These texts are available only in Chinese translations[2], with the exception of the fragmentary text in Sanskrit of the *Saṅgītiparyāya* and the *Dharmaskandha*[3]. The seven texts of the *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma* are generally known as the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*, the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, the *Prakaraṇapāda*, the *Vijñānakāya*, the *Dhātukāya*, the *Dharmaskandha*, and the *Prajñaptiśāstra*. Among these texts, the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* is regarded as the principal *Abhidharma* text of the *Sarvāstivādins*, and the other six texts are mentioned as the six *pāda* supplements. However a colophon by Ching-mai (664 A.D.) says that

"the *Dharmaskandha* is the most important of the *Abhidharma* works and the fountain-head of the *Sarvāstivāda* system"[4]. Modern Scholars are of opinion that the *Dharmaskandha*, known as the *Abhidharmadharmaskandhapādaśāstra* (hereafter *ADPS*) in its Chinese version[5], has some special characteristics in its treatment of the doctrines that indicate the process of the systematization of the study of *Abhidharma*[6]. Besides, all important aspects of the fundamental principles of the school of the *Sarvāstivāda* are detailed in the *ADPS*.

The Text of the ADPS

The *ADPS* is the fifth of the six *pāda* works of the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the *Sarvāstivādins*. According to Yaśomitra and Bu-ston[7], the original text was composed by Sāriputra. The Chinese source[8], however, mentions Maudgalyāyana as the author of the text. The text was translated in Chinese by Hsüan-tsang in 659 A.D. Takakusu mentions that the other *pāda* works like the *Saṅgītiparyāya* quote from this text[9]. The *Saṅgītiparyāya* in its form and matter seems to be a primitive *Abhidharma* text[10], but it was not composed earlier to the *Dharmaskandha* as the latter is quoted in it. Thus the *Dharmaskandha* in its original form may be regarded as the earliest work of the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the *Sarvāstivādins*. The original text of the *ADPS* was probably composed 400 years after the *Parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha[11].

The *ADPS* is arranged in 12 fasciculi *(chüan)* and 21 chapters *(p'in)*. At the end of each *Chüan*, the text is mentioned as belonging to the *Sarvāstivāda* school. No Tibetan translation of the *Dharmaskandha* is available.

The Dharmaskandha Fragment in Sanskrit

A manuscript from Gilgit, No. 4737 *Bauddhāgama*[12] preserved in the Scindia Oriental Museum, Ujjain, consists of three fragmentary texts. The transcription of the fragments was published by Sudha Sengupta[13]. Part I of the fragments was identified by Jikido Takasaki[14] as a fragment of the *Dharmaskandha* on the basis of the Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang mentioned as the *ADPS* in this paper.

Sheets of the fragmentary *Dharmaskandha* written in Sanskrit have pages marked from 3 - 20 and 26. Pages 3 - 17 explain the various terms of *pratītyasamutpāda.* The fragment begins with a concluding part of the definition of *avidyā.* Pages 17 - 20 have discussion of *Śikṣāpāda* (fundamentals of the instructions) of an *upāsaka.* In page 26, the four Immeasurables *(apramāṇa),* specially *maitrī* (friendship) and *karuṇā* (compassion) are given. A recent study[15] has shown that the fragmentary *Dharmaskandha* probably belongs to the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* school and not to the *Sarvāstivāda* school. It is argued that the arrangement of the topics in the Chinese version and the Sanskrit fragment is quite different. For example, the *pratītyasamutpāda* is dealt with in the Chinese version in the 21st chapter in the end of the work, the *Śikṣāpadāni* in the very beginning of the work, and the *apramāṇāni* in the 12th chapter of the work. All these do not match with the arrangements in the fragmentary text. On the other hand, the literal quotations in the fragmentary text from the *Ekottarāgama* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, may point out the belonging of the fragmentary text[16] to the Mūlasarvāstivāda school. Probably the original text of the *ADPS* translated by Hsüan-tsang was a different or a revised version of the fragmentary text of the *Dharmaskandha.*

4. [Objection:] The usages of the sages like Vyāsa are valid as valid usages, so where is the need for other grammars to establish their validity. The phrase 'after seeing many grammars' can be taken to mean 'after seeing the same grammar for many times'[18].

[Answer:] In order to justify the vedic usages which are not mentioned by the trinity of sages, they (Vyāsa, etc.) should have resorted to other grammars at least for the rules of Vedic words. It is also not proper to assume such a stretched meaning for the expression '*dṛṣṭvā bahu vyākaraṇam*'.

5. [Objection:] Now in the *Sūtrās* and *Vārttikas* we find such statements as, 'Deviation of these rules is found in many cases (in the Vedic language)'[19], 'In the Vedic language the rules vary (in many ways'[20]. 'All rules are to be understood as optional with regard to the Vedic language'[21], so there is no necessity of the search for another grammar.

[Answer:] This is not correct: because if this be the case, why should Pāṇini and Kātyāyana instead of being satisfied with these statements exert themselves to expatiate the remaining portion related to the language? Therefore even for the usages of Vyāsa, etc., other grammars of special rules can be found.

6. It cannot be said that those usages can be obtained from the *Prātiśākhyas*: for they are also *other* grammars and so it is against your own words.

[Objection:] The *Prātiśākhyas* are special grammars, what we do not favour is the authority of other general grammers.

[Answer:] There is no reason why one should like the special grammars but dislike the general grammars when both are equal in being other than the grammar of Pāṇini. The point that because of the restrictive nature of the rules of Pāṇini there is dislike for other grammars similar to that of Pāṇini will be refuted elsewhere [in this treatise].[22] [The verse] that begins with 'there are three ungrammatical words in the *Māgha*' [and ends in] 'Vyāsah is become one with them' (i.e., the ungrammatical words)[23] is interpreted by eminent [scholars] taking the word *apaśabda* as standing for *apāṇinīyaśabda* by [the method of] ....

18 i.e., Taking *bahu* as an adverb.

19 Pā. III. 1. 85.

20 Ibid. V. 2. 122, VI. 1. 34, VII. 1. 8, VII. 1. 103, VII. 3. 97 and VII. 4. 78.

21. MB on Pā. I. 4. 9. योगविभागः कर्तव्यः । वा छान्दसि सर्वे विधयो भवन्ति ।

22. See: Paragraphs 13 and 14.

23. The source is to be traced.

14. *Bhāvanāsamādhi*, practise of meditation for cultivating the reasoning faculty, *Ibid.* 489a29-491b7.

15. *Bodhyaṅgāni*, seven branches of knowledge - *Ibid.* 491b8-494b29.

16. Miscellaneous matters - *Ibid.* 494c1-498b8.

17. *Indriyāṇi*, twentytwo sense organs, *Ibid.* 498b13-499c24.

18. *Āyatanāni*, twelve organs and objects of sense - *Ibid.* 499c25-500c25.

19. *Skandhas*, five Aggregates - *Ibid.* 500c26-501b23.

20. *Nānādhātu*, various (sixty two) principles explained - *Ibid.* 501b24-505a8.

21. *Pratītyasamutpāda*, twelve terms of the formula of causation explained, *Ibid.* 505a9-513c11.

Systematisation of Abhidharma in the ADPS

The doctrinal topics of the *Abhidharma* texts are said to be developed from the *Nikāyas* and the *Āgamas*. The Buddha's teachings were elaborated by his disciples with the method of grouping of the doctrinal topics *(mātikā)*.[17] This is specially noticed in the *Chachakkasutta*[18]. The topics in the Chinese version of the *sutta* corresponds with the topics of the *ADPS*[19]. The *Chachakkasutta* seems to be original text of the *ADPS* so far as the grouping of the doctrinal topics are concerned. The name of the text *'Dharmaskandha'* itself means the aggregates or groups of *dharma* (doctrine).

The arrangement of the *mātikās* in groups was the early system of *Abhidharma*[20]. The groups of doctrinal topics or *mātikās* have been classified as (1) the doctrines of the Buddha which are to be practised,

i.e. the thirty-seven *Bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*[21] and (2) the teachings of causation *(Paṭiccasamuppāda)* etc., the philosophical understanding of which leads to enlightenment. The *ADPS* follows the lines of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas in its arrangement of the thirty-seven *dhammas*[22]. Moreover, the *ADPS* demonstrates a system of arranging all the *dhammas* of the two groups, a characteristically *Ābhidharmic* system which is only anticipated and not explicit in the *Nikāyas* and the *Āgamas*.

The first fifteen chapters of the *ADPS* elaborate the ethical doctrines leading to enlightenment and the rest explain the theoretical doctrines related to insight. In the first three chapters many doctrines are included which are to be studied by the laymen and the novices of the Buddha's teaching. Next three chapters (4-6) discuss the methods of studying Buddhism. The last nine chapters (7-15) explain the thirty-seven *dharmas* and other practices. Thus the grouping of the topics in the *ADPS* is clearly an attempt to arrange the doctrines of the Buddha following a definite system.

The *ADPS* explains the four meditations in its eleventh chapter and the four immeasurables *(apramāṇa)* in its twelfth chapter. The lowest meditation starts from the four meditations and the highest meditation is arranged in the four immeasurables. Thus both the *dhammas* are related to each other. Compared to this arrangement, the last six chapters of the *ADPS* are not that systematic, which deal with the topics like *dhātu*, *āyatana*, etc. The first fifteen chapters of the *ADPS* were probably composed earlier than the last six chapters. However, the last six chapters contributed to the later development of *Abhidharma* philosophy[23].

A comparison of the topics in the *Abhidharma* text of different schools shows that the topics in them are related to one another in spite of the difference in their arrangements. Watanabe collates the 18 topics of the *Vibhaṅga*[24] (the *Abhidharma* text of the *Sarvāstivāda*), the 21 topics of the *Abhidharma dharmaskandhapādaśāstra* and the *Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*[25] (the *Abhidharma* text of the *Dharmaguptaka*) each and rightly concludes that the three texts indicate the different stages of the development of *Abhidharma*.

Conclusion

The *ADPS* in its matter and form is the most systematic treatment of *Abhidharma* developed by the Sarvāstivāda school. It arranges and explains all the important topics discussed in the six other texts of the *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharmapiṭaka* composed not earlier to it. Admittedly the *ADPS* may be regarded as the original text of the *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharmapiṭaka* till the complete original version of the *ADPS* is not discovered.

References

1. The *Sthaviravāda-Abhidharma* treatises are - *Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Yamaka, Kathāvatthu, Dhātukathā, Vibhaṅga, Puggalapaññatti* and *Paṭṭhāna.*

2. The Chinese versions of the *Sarvāstivāda -Abhidharma* texts are - the *Abhidharmasaṅgītiparyāyapādaśāstra* (Taisho 1544), the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* (Taisho 1543), the *Abhidharmadharmaskandhapādaśāstra* (Taisho 1537), the *Abhidharmaprajñaptipādaśāstra*

(Taisho 1538), the Abhidharmajñānakāyapādaśāstra (Taisho 1539), the *Abhidharmadhātukāyapādaśāstra* (Taisho 1540), the *Abhidharmaprakaraṇapādaśāstra* (Taisho 1542).

3. For Sanskrit fragment of the *Dharmaskandha* see C. Waldschmidt and Sander Holzman, *Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, Wiesbaden (Steiner) 1965, No. 15.

4. J. Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins" in the *Journal of Pali Text Society*, 1905, p. 115.

5. *A-'pi-ta-mo-fa-yün-lun,* Taisho 1537, 453b22-514a10.

6. Fuminaro Watanabe, *Philosophy and its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma* (Delhi, 1983), pp. 54-62.

7. In his *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Kārikā III, Yaśomitra comments - *dharmaskandhasya āryaśāriputraḥ*. See *Abhidharmakośam*, (ed) Dvarikadas Sastri, (Varanasi, 1981), p. 15. Also see Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism* (Chos hbyung), Translated by E. Obermiller, (Heidelberg 1931), p. 149.

8. Mo-ho Mu-kan-len (Mahāmaudgalyāyana) in *ADPS* (Chinese), p. 513c16-17; Ta Mu-kan-lien in *ADPS* (Chinese), p. 453b23.

9. See Takakusu, *op.cit.* pp. 99-103.

10. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, (Delhi,1980), p. 220.

11. Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism*, (Delhi, 1987), p.106.

12. cf. O.V. Hinuber, *Die Erforschung der Gilgit - Handschriften* (The Research of the Gilgit Manuscripts),

Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, 1979), No. 12, pp. 331-332.

13. See *Buddhist Studies in India,* (ed) by R. Pandeya, (Delhi, 1975), pp. 139-182.

14.. Aww "Remarks on the Sanskrit Fragment of the Abhidharma-Dharmaskandhapādaśāstra" in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,* 13, 1965, pp. 33-41.

15. Siglinde Dietz, "Investigation for the similarity of the School of thoughts of the Gilgit-fragments preserved in Ujjain " (in German), in *Zür Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna Literatur,* (Gottingen, 1985), pp. 163-169.

16. *Ibid.* pp. 164-165.

17. A.K. Warder, *op.cit.* pp. 89, 219-222.

18. *Majjhimanikāya* III, 280-87,.

19. For details, see Watanabe, *op.cit.* pp. 54-55.

20. *Ibid.* pp. 58-60.

21. The thirtyseven *dhammas* are 5 *indriyas, 5 balas, 4 sammappadhānas, 4 iddhipādas, 4 satipaṭṭhānas, 8 maggāṅgas, 7 bojjhaṅgas.*

22. Watanabe, *op. cit.* p. 62

23. *Ibid.* pp. 60-61.

24. (Ed.) C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *PTS* 1904.

25. Available only in Chinese, See *Taisho* 1548.

RAM MURTI SHARMA

ŚAṄKARA AND I-SENSE

The Vedānta is 'the philosophy of self consciousness and intuition' and the "Natural Light" viewed by some western critics[1] can be said as parallel to the Vedantic tenet. Thus it is surprising that scholars like A.L. Basham mention Vedānta merely "The Philosophy of intellectual Hinduism"[2]. More clearly it can be said the philosophy of empirical as well as the metaphysical experience.

The level of various empirical experiences and the subjective experience of metaphysical state of *ahaṃ brahmāsmi* can be said as the state of I-sense. Accordingly it perceives the subjective experience like 'I am a scholor' and 'I am not a scholar' and that I am Brahman. The former is phenomenal, while the latter is metaphysical. To study the state and appropriateness of the I-sense, it is quite proper to approach Śaṅkara who presents a full thought keeping in view the empirical as well as metaphysical experience. Curious is to note that how Śaṅkara who does not admit any relation between real and unreal[3], can justify the state of empirical experience like 'I see', in which a clear relation between *sat* (I=Ātman) and *asat* (see=Anātman) is apparent. Thus

the following problems deserve our attention, for the study of I-sense : (i) What is the state of I-sense (*aham anubhava*) and how it distinguishes from "I" (Aham). I-hood (*ahaṃtā*) and the ego (*ahaṃkāra*). (ii) Where does the state of I-sense exist, in Ātman of Anātman or the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). (iii) What is the force behind the state of experience of I-sense and how does it function. (iv) Is it possible for Śaṅkara to accept Brahman as the object of experience which is entirely subtle and non-object and thus can be revealed only.

I

Firstly, the state of I-sense (*ahamanubhava*) is based on the Ātman limited by *ajñāna* and it is in relation to various types of perception like 'I see' or 'I do not see'. Thus when the *ajñāna* exists without any perception, it is 'I'. The egoistic feeling is based on previous impressions, the *saṃskāras*, but there is no sensing like 'I see' or 'I do not see' and in this state of 'I' it is merely 'I'. The feeling of 'I' is called I-hood (*ahaṃtā*). The *ahaṃkāra* includes activity and therefore it is different from 'I', I-hood and also I-sense, because in these states, activity is non-existent. The reason is that action involves another object which is possible only with *ahaṃkāra* and not I-sense; which is the state of sensing or experiencing and not activity. It may be mentioned here that the Vedānta does not admit any activity in Ātman. Further, the *ahaṃkāra* is a mode of *antaḥkaraṇa*. The state of 'I-sense' is the combination of 'I' and perception.

II

Secondly, as far as the question of the substrate of 'I-sense' is concerned, it is *antaḥkaraṇa* in which the 'I-sense' exists. It is because the 'I-sense' is dependent on the state of mind, the *vṛtti* which exists and *antaḥkaraṇa*.

But as the *Upadeśasāhasrī*[4] says, it must be remembered that it is Ātman who is the illuminator and it is also by means of the same that the internal organ is able to perceive. Thus the power to reflect the objects and to become conscious of them does not exist originally in the internal organ, but is acquired by it through its relation with Ātman. Why the *jīva*, which has the characteristic of intelligence, is not able to reflect the objects is a natural query. It is to be noted here that being limited by its adjunct of Avidyā, it is not independently competent to reflect the objects, but only through the internal organ. As the author of the *Siddhāntaleśa* says, the *jīva* by its nature is not directly related to the objects but to the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

III

Thirdly, it is the power of *ajñāna* which is the primary basis of the state of 'I-sense'. But, where the *ajñāna* rests is further to be known, because while the pure *cit* is self-illumined and real knowledge, it cannot be the substrate of the organs because they are opposed to each other. But the Advaitin solves the problem in his own way and says that there is no opposition between pure *cit* and *ajñāna* and the opposition can be observed only while the *cit* becomes opposite to the *ajñāna* and destroys it only when it is reflected through the *vṛtti*. Originally the *ajñāna* rests in the pure *cit* and there is no contradiction or opposition as said above. In this regard, Vacaspati's opinion is different. He says that *ajñāna* does not rest on the pure *cit*, but on the *jīva*. The author of *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṃgraha* reconciles the above view of Vacaspati and finds that *ajñāna* may be regarded as resting in the individual soul, in the sense that the obstruction of the pure *cit* is with reference to *jīva* (*cinmātrāśritam ajñānam ucyte; jīvaprakāśapatitatvāt jīvāśritam, Vivaraṇaprameya-saṃgraha*, p.48). As a

matter of fact, the feeling 'I do not know' seems to indicate that the *ajñāna* is with reference to the knowing self in association with its feeling as ego or 'I'. But this is not correct, because such an appearance is caused on account of the close association of *ajñāna* with *antaḥkaraṇa*, which is essentially the same, as Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṃgraha* (p.48) propounds.

The action of *ajñāna* is seen on the light of reality, Brahman and it is because of the same that the objects remain unknown to us till the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. The action of *ajñāna* is not only with regard to the limitless conciousness, but also with regard to the infinite bliss. The obstruction of the pure and infinite bliss is justified by the fact that though the worldly pleasures are experienced even when there is the influence of *ajñāna*, the supreme bliss remains, inexperienced so long as the *ajñāna* is there.

Ajñāna has many states which constitute various individual experiences with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states are called *tulājñāna*. Thus the state of consciousness or *vṛtti* removes a manifestation of the *ajñāna* as *tulājñāna* and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The *jīva* has the ego of experiencing the particular experience but it is through the experience of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. It must be kept in view that the *jīva* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are not two separate entities, but just the two states of consciousness. The *jīva* is that which is in association with *ajñāna*, while the pure *cit* shines forth in association with *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is the *antaḥkaraṇa* which experiences the objects and it is the *jīva* who has the egoistic feeling of the experience. It may further be added that the *antaḥkaraṇa* being self luminous refelcts itself in the *cit*. Therefore in Advaita, in the

state of 'I-sense' the two elements of the self-consciousness and the *antaḥkaraṇa* are in a fused position. Again, the state of I-sense is the state of union of the real and unreal.

Śaṅkara, the great exponent of the Advaita, has explained the above state of I-sense through his exposition of the theory of *adhyāsa*. As the *antaḥkaraṇa* has the blending of the previous and present lives, the superimposition of the real on the unreal and unreal on the real takes place. Here again is the problem of the substratum of the *adhyāsa* of Anātman on Ātman. As some scholars interrogate, is it *antaḥkaraṇa* or *jīva*? *Antaḥkaraṇa* cannot be the substratum of Anātman, because, it is itself Anātman. Therefore, Śaṅkara explains that Pratyagātmā, the interior self, is the substratum on which the attributes of sense organs and the internal organ and other Anātman objects are superimposed:

Evam aviruddhaḥ pratyagātmany api anātmādhyāsaḥ... Enam ahampratyayinam aśeṣa iva pracārasākṣiṇi pratyagātmany adhyāsya taṃ ca pratyagātmānaṃ sarvasākṣiṇaṃ tadviparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣu adhyasyati (B.S.S.B. Intro.).

Therefore it becomes clear that the substratum of the Anātman objects is Ātman and not the *antaḥkaraṇa*. It also proves that the subject of the *adhyāsa* of I-sense, is *jīva* and not the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*aham idam, mamedam iti naisargiko 'yaṃ lokavyavahāraḥ*). Thus the relation of real and unreal is also based on *adhyāsa* which is false.

IV

How the nameless and formless Brahman or Ātman can become the object of I-sense is a most crucial problem of the Advaitin. Śaṅkara who is conscious of it mentions

accordingly in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* that Ātman is not entirely a non-object, but the object of I-sense. He says:-

(i) *Na tāvad ayam ekāntena viṣayaḥ asmat-pratyayaviṣayatvāt*[5].

(ii) *Prasiddha eva tarhy ātmā aham pratyayaviṣayatayā*[6].

Here, if we examine Śaṅkara's above statements, it can be argued that being I-sense a *vikāra*, how Ātman, which is pure *cit* and bliss, can be the object of I-sense. Therefore the above statements of the Ācārya in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and the *Upadeśasāhasrī* seem to be confusing and perhaps Śaṅkara also realized this fact and therefore gave another reason for proving the existence of Pratyagātman in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and said:

Aparokṣatvāc cātmāstitvasiddheḥ[7].

So also in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara mentions Brahman as *pratyakṣa*:

Dṛṣṭer ātmasvarūpatvāt pratyakṣaṃ brahmā tat smṛtam.[8]

Therefore the Ācārya in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* refutes Ātman as an object of I-sense and thus the I-sense is only an attribute of Anātman and not at all of Ātman, He says:
Aham ity api yad grāhyam vyapetāṅgasamaṃ hi tat[9].
Keeping in view the above arguments, I am afraid, Śaṅkara's aforesaid statement regarding Ātman's objectivity of I-sense can be justified, if by '*ayam*' in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and '*ātman*' in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is understood as *jīvātman*. Actually the non-object Ātman appears as Jīva due to the adjunct of Avidyā.

To support the above view regarding the meaning of *jīva* for the word *'ayam'* and *'ātman'*, Vācaspati Miśra can be quoted who says that the non-object Ātman is like the object of I-sense and thus not the object of I-sense:

Aviṣayo 'pi asmatpratyayaviṣayaiva[10].

Moreover he also admits that the object of I-sense in Jīvātman and not Ātman:

Kathañcid asmatpratyayaviṣayo 'haṅkārāspadaṃ jīva iti ca[11].

Another post-Śaṅkara Vedāntin, Amalānanda also holds the same opinion and says that the object of I-sense is *jīva*:

Asmatpratyayaviṣayatvam api jīvasya[12].

Thus the aforesaid two statements of Śaṅkara, *"Na tāvad ayam ekantena viṣayaḥ* asmatpratyayaviṣayatvāt" (BSSB) and *prasiddha eva tarhy ātmā ahampratyayaviṣayatayā* (U.S.) can properly be understood in the above light.

It is further to be taken into account that the state of I-sense is based on the concept of *vṛtti*, the mode or the modification of mind. As a matter of fact, it is the characteristic of our object of consciousness that it cannot reveal itself apart from being manifested as an object of *cit* through a mental state, the *vṛtti*. Therefore, although the Vedānta takes all objects as merely impositional, yet their experience is possible through specific sense contact and a particular mental state, the *vṛtti*. As the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* propounds, the *vṛtti* is the modification of mind, the *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is the pure consciousness which makes the basis and essence for the appearance of all the objects and also the consciousness which manifests through the various mental states. Thus the pure consciousness is the basis for the whole phenomena

and it also interprets the objects by its reflection though the *vṛtti*. Thus it is to be understood that though the internal organ is said to shed its lustre on the objects and to reflect them, it is actually the Ātman that reflects in it. Here the Vedantic view is similar to Sāṃkhya which accepts that Buddhi and Manas are in themselves unintelligent and they derive the power of intelligence from their proximity to Puruṣa. In Vedānta, the Ātman has taken the place of Puruṣa. In fact, Ātman is the illuminator and by means of it, the *antaḥkaraṇa* becomes the perceiver of all the objects. Thus it is through the mental state that the state of 'I-sense' is experienced. As earlier stated, Ātman is the ultimate consciousness and all pervading. But the determinate knowledge presupposes the modification of the pure and ultimate consciousness into *pramātṛcaitanya* (a subject who knows), *pramāṇacaitanya* (the process of knowledge), *vṛtti* (the modification of internal organ) and the *viṣayacaitanya* (the consciousness determined by the object cognized) The *antaḥkaraṇa* undergoes changes when it comes into contact with the objects. Thus the modification which reveals an object is called *vṛtti*. As a matter of fact, nothing is beyond the reach of *cit-tattva*, the light of reality, but it is on account of the view of *avidyā* that an object is not perceived by it and it is the *vṛtti* which is able to remove the obscuring veil and it is through the process of *vṛtti* that the objects are perceived as such. But it is needless to say that the self-illuminated *cit* is the base of the phenomena as well as the interpreter by a reflection through the mental states. Thus Vidyāraṇya, in his *Pañcadaśī* rightly says:

buddhitatsthacidābhāsau dvāv etau vyāpnuto ghaṭam /

tatrājñānaṃ dhiyā naśyed ābhāsena ghaṭaḥ sphuret //

"Both the intellect and the consciousness underlying it come into contact with the jar. The intellect destroys

the ignorance and the underlying consciousness manifests the jar".

-*Pañcadaśī*, VII. 91.

So, now it becomes clear that it is due to *adhyāsa* and process of *vṛtti* that a person experiences the state of 'I-sense'.

It is further to be pointed out that the state of 'I-sense' is experienced in the waking and the dream states and also the state of spiritual mode - "*ahaṃ brahmāsmi*". But its experience in *suṣupti* or *mukti* is to be further observed. The state of I-sense in the waking and dream states is quite clear, because of the existence of *vṛtti* in these states. In the waking state, the objects exist materially, while in the dream state, their existence is mental. Now it is to be seen if the experience of I-sense exists in *suṣupti* or not. The post-*suṣupti* expression - *sukham aham asvāpsaṃ na kiñcid avediṣam* (I had a sound sleep, but I did not know anything) - seems to prove the experience of 'I-sensing' in the state of *suṣupti*, because the post-sound-sleep experience of happiness cannot be explained without admitting the state of 'I-sense' in *suṣupti*. If the existence of 'I' is not admitted in *suṣupti*, then who is the experiencer of the happiness? This makes the experience of 'I-sense' in *suṣupti* evident. But if it is so admitted, then the problem of the existence of 'I' in *suṣupti* arises. It is very well understood that the *antaḥkaraṇa* experiences pleasure and pain during the waking or the dream state and it is after the experience that the *antaḥkaraṇa* expresses its 'I-sensing' in various ways, accordingly. But, while in *suṣupti* the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dissolved into *ajñāna* which rests in Ātman, in the absence of *antaḥkaraṇa* how can the 'I-sensing' be proved in *suṣupti* without the modification of mind? As earlier stated, the process of *vṛtti* is necessary for the experience

of I-sense. In the same way, while in *suṣupti* the *antaḥkaraṇa* is dissolved into *ajñāna*, leaving no scope for *vṛtti*, the 'I-sensing' is not possible at all. Hence the post-*suṣupti* experiences, like 'I had a sound sleep' are disproven. This antethesis creates a problem for the Vedantin who maintains the expression of 'I-sense'. The Vedantin quietens the above query by explaining that the expression 'I had sound sleep' is based on the *ajñāna-vṛtti* of the state of *suṣupti*, and it is due to the *saṃskāras* that one expresses "I had a sound sleep". So far as the post-*suṣupti* negative experience I did not know anything (*na kiñcid avediṣam*) is concerned, it is based on the *ajñāna-vṛtti* of the sound sleep (*suṣupti*). Therefore, in *suṣupti*, the experience of 'I-sense' is not possible, because of the dissolution of the *antaḥkaraṇa* into Ātman. Thus the experience of 'I-sense' is possible in the state of waking and dream states, but not in *suṣupti*.

With regard to the presence of *vṛtti* in *suṣupti*, the following statement of Sadānanda deserves consideration:

Tadānīm etāv īśvaraprajñau caitanyapradīptābhiratisūkṣmābhir ajñānavṛttibhir ānandam anubhavataḥ (Vedāntasāra, 8).

This statement of Sadānanda seems to be contradicted by another of his own. While differentiating between *nirvikalpaka* and *suṣupti*, he says: *Tataś cāsya suṣupteś cābhedaśaṅkā na bhavati; ubhayatra ....samāne 'pi tat sadbhāvāsadbhāvamātreṇānayor bhedopapatteḥ.*

-*Vedāntasāra*, 62

Here, the text *sadbhāvāsadbhāvamātreṇa* appears to be in contradiction with the prior statement which reads: *ajñānavṛttibhir ānandam anubhavataḥ*. A fine commentator of the Vedantic thought, Jacob also noted

this contradiction very carefully when he said: "The statement here in the text and commentary, regarding the non-existence of the *vṛtti* in sound sleep, seems to be in opposition to that in section eight, where it is said that 'Īśvara and *prajñā* experience pleasure during sound sleep'. In my opinion, the above contradiction does not seem to be proper on the ground that the text, *atisūkṣmābhir ajñānavṛttibhiḥ*, indicates impression (*saṃskāra*) as we understand by the expression *atisūkṣmābhiḥ* and thus there is no contradiction between the above two statements. The question further arises that if there is no *vṛtti* in sound sleep, how does the experience 'I had sound sleep' comes after sound sleep? Because the absence of *vṛtti* in sound sleep also proves the absence of *antaḥkaraṇa*, the experiencer of pleasure and pain, which merges into Ātman. Here it may be mentioned that the pleasure felt in *suṣupti* as contained in the expression 'I had a sound sleep' is based on impressions (*saṃskāras*) and pleasure is the outcome of the non-existence of pain at that stage.

How the state of I-sense is experienced in the state of the spiritual *vṛtti 'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'* needs to be explained. The problem is how the nameless and formless Brahman can become the object of 'I' as it is expressed in the *mahāvākya* - *'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'*. Further, in the state of *'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'* the state of 'I' as Brahman is questionable, because in the state of *brahmanhood*, there is no scope for dual sensing like, *'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'*. As regards the problem as to how the absolute Brahman can become the object of 'I', it is answered by the Vedantin by saying that the object of the *vṛtti 'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'* is not pure Brahman or the Absolute, but Brahman with the adjunct of *ajñāna*.

In the state of *'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'*, the *vṛtti* illumined by the reflection of pure consciousness makes

the supreme Brahman identical with the individual self, its object, and destroys the ignorance pertaining to Brahman, thus leading to the state of *Brahmajñāna*. What becomes of the *vṛtti* - *'aham brahmāsmi'*, the base of I-sense after the *Brahmajñāna*, remains an obvious query. To this, the Vedantin's answer is that as a cloth is burnt when the threads containing it are burnt, so also, all the effects of ignorance are destroyed when their cause, the ignorance, is destroyed. So, after that state of mind, the *vṛtti 'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'* is ended and it remains Brahman only in the end, like the image of a face in a looking glass is resolved into the face itself when the looking glass is removed. Again, it may be said that just as the light of a lamp cannot illumine the lustre of the seen, but is overpowered by it even no consciousness reflected in that state of mind is unable to illumine in the supreme Brahman, which is self effulgent and identical with the individual self and is overpowered by it. Thus the aforesaid state of *'ahaṃ brahmāsmi'* may be equated with the state of experience of I-sense in the Advaitic system.

Reference

1. See, Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe*, article, 'Deism, the Enlightenment and the early history of Indology', p. 54.
2. A.L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, p.328.
3. *Sator hi dvayoḥ sambandhaḥ sambhavati - nahi sadasatoḥ.*
4. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, xviii, 33-54, Taitt.Up.ii, 1.
5. *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya, Upodghāta.*
6. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, II.2, 53.
7. *Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya, Upodghāta.*
8. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I, 17, 40.

9. *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I, 6, 4.
10. *Bhāmatī* on B.S.S.B., *Upodghāta*.
11. *Bhāmatī* on B.S.S.B., *Upodghāta*.
12. *Vedāntakalpataru*, B.S.S.B., *Upodghāta*.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS:

B.S.S.B.	*Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya*
Taitt. up.	*Taittirīyaupaniṣad*
U.S.	*Upadeśasāhasrī*

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ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYA'S APPROACH TO ARTHAVĀDA

The study of Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhāṣya* on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras* is made by the scholars purely from the point of view of Advaita Philosophy. But the real study of his *Bhāṣya* cannot be said to be complete without the knowledge of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The present author has made such an attempt elsewhere[1]; but in the present paper, however, a close study of the use of the Mīmāṃsā concept of *arthavāda* in his *Bhāṣya* is undertaken perhaps for the first time, to bring to light his original views in respect of this highly technical term, particularly against the solid background of the science of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā so ably prepared by the grand-masters of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā like Śabara and Kumārila. Incidentally, an attempt is also made here to highlight the importance of the view point of the great Ācārya, indicating how his solid contribution to the subject proper has escaped even the eagle eye of Kevalānanda Sarasvatī, the learned editor of the *Mīmāṃsā-kośa*.

I. The grand masters like Śabara and Kumārila do not use the Mīmāṃsā technical term *arthavāda* as

an independent authority. The *arthavāda* passages become more effective and efficacious particularly when they are connected with the *vidhi vākyas*; independently these passages do not convey any coherent sense as such. Against this background of the great Mīmāṃsakas, Śaṅkarācārya appears to have made use of the technical term '*arthavāda*' as an independent authority. This position of the learned Ācārya becomes clear even to a casual reader of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* II.1.5. and II.1.25. In his *Bhāṣya* on B.S. II.1.5, the great Ācārya quotes the passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* and *Kauṣītaki Up*. II.14 to prove that the sense-organs and five great elements appear to be sentient, in this world, only because their entire working is governed by the superintending deities (*abhimāni-devatās*). He further adds[2] here that even from the *mantra* portion, *arthavāda* passages, history and purāṇas, we come to know that the superintending deities are connected with the functions of the sense-organs and five great elements. It is further interesting to remember that the great Ācārya looks upon the passages from the *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* II.4.2.4 and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* VI.1.13 as serving his purpose. Further in his *Bhāṣya* on B.S. II.1.25, he again uses[3] the authority of the *mantra* portion, *arthavāda* passages and others to prove that Bhahman does not depend upon external factors for producing this world as is the case with a pot-maker. He again adds that gods, sages and dead ancestors possess extraordinary power or they are endowed with tremendous mental power on account of which they appear to produce anything in the world without, at the same time, depending upon external factors as such. In passing, one is tempted to remark that this novel use of the *arthavāda* has not escaped the notice of S.K. Balvalkar.[4]

II. Generally the fruit for any injunctive sentence becomes known from a *vidhi-vākya*. But when, however,

such a fruit is not possibly available to the readers, one has to depend upon the glorificatory passages in this respect. This is the generally accepted stand-point of the Mīmāṃsakas. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on B.S. III.3.38 quotes passages from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* to prove that one who has realised the '*satyavidyā*' gets the two fruits[5] - he conquers these worlds - and he destroys sins and also abandons the same. It should be remembered here that no direct fruit becomes available to us from the place where there is an injunction of *satyavidyā*. This becomes known from the passages of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. Now the Ācārya points out[6] that if many fruits become available to us in the glorificatory sentences, then all of them are to be connected with only one injunctive sentence. In the present case of *satyavidyā*, however, no fruit becomes available to us from the *vidhi-vākyas*. Had the two fruits become available to us from the two different injunctive sentences, then it would have become possible for us to imagine the existence of two different *satyavidyās*. But this is not the position in the present case. Hence we have to accept that the *satyavidyā* is only one and two different fruits are available to us in the glorificatory sentences and they are to be connected with only one *vidhi-vākya*. One may, in this very context, remember that there is another Mīmāṃsā rule '*aṅge phalaśrutiḥ arthavādaḥ*' - clearly indicating that when any fruit is laid down for any subsidiary act, it becomes a case of glorification. And naturally, such passages are not to be interpreted literally. Here one may accept this stand point of the great Ācārya only after remembering another Mīmāṃsā rule '*rātrisatra-nyāya*' referred to in Jaimini's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā IV.3.17 and explained by the present author elsewhere. This rule must have been at the back of the mind of the great Ācārya when he resorted to this particular position.

III. For a proper position of *arthavāda* in the Vedānta discussion, one will have to study his *Bhāṣya* on B.S. I.3.26 to 33. Particularly on B.S. I.3.33, the great Ācārya has clarified his position in respect of *arthavāda* quite clear to the readers. In this context, he significantly points out that the glorificatory passage is to be treated as authoritative when the sense conveyed by it is proved by our rich experience. Secondly, he adds that when the rich experience goes against the glorificatory sentence, then the glorificatory sentence serves its purpose by pointing out a particular property of a thing or material. Thirdly, the glorificatory passage becomes authoritative when the sense conveyed by it is not proved by any experience or it is also not contradicted by our experience. In such a case, the glorificatory sentence is to be treated as authoritative in respect of its own sense. The *arthavāda-vākya* also helps us to infer that a particular incident has taken place. It thus refers to an accomplished act. In his *Bhāṣya* on B.S.I.3.33, he quotes a *mantra*[8] and also a passage from the *Ṣaḍviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa* I.1[9] to show that Indra took the birth of a goat and took away Medhātithi, the offspring of Kaṇva. He simply remarks here that as the gods are endowed with special power, they can assume any form to get their purpose served. He also takes another example (*indro ha vai devānām abhipravavrāja virocano 'surāṇām*) to show that the present passage is to be looked upon as a case of *anuvāda* and not of *guṇavāda*. *Anuvāda* is also a variety of *arthavāda*, particularly when it refers to an accomplished act. Incidentally, one may draw the attention to his *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. III.3.32 and the fact that after giving up the mortal frame, even a Brahmavid gets another formal frame[10]. This is further evident from the cases of Vasiṣṭha, Bhṛgu and others. In passing, one may note that *guṇavāda* is also a variety of *arthavāda*, when the import of the glorificatory sentence comes

in direct conflict with the daily experience of human beings. It may be noted here that Śaṅkarācarya looks upon the *arthavāda* passages not contradicted by any experience as cases of *anuvāda*[11] and not of *guṇavāda* and this is in perfect harmony with the approach of the Mīmāṃsakas.

IV. The question often arises as to what kind of passages are to be treated as injunctive passages and what are to be treated as examples of glorificatory passages. In this context, the attention of the readers may be drawn to the discussion on B.S. III.4.2. Here the great Ācārya has quoted the sentence (*yasya parṇamayī juhur bhavati na sa pāpaṃ ślokaṃ śṛṇoti, yad aṅkte cakṣur eva bhrātṛvyasya vṛṅkte*). The view point of the prima facie in this respect is that such passages are to be treated as injunctive sentences. But Śaṅkarācārya points out categorically that such passages are to be treated as purely glorificatory and not injunctive, because they aim at glorifying the act rather than laying down the act. In this very context, it should be remembered that in the above quoted passages, the verbs are used in the present tense and not in the potential tense[12] as is generally the case with the *vidhi-vākyas*. One is very happy to observe here that this decision of the great Ācārya has its basis of Jaimini's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā IV.3.1. A curious reader of the Mīmāṃsā literature will not fail to bring to light here the interesting observation[13] made by Ganganatha Jha in his *Mīmāṃsā-Maṇḍana* on Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. From the above discussion, one would legitimately infer that the passages in which the verbs are used only in the potential tenses, they alone are to be accepted as *vidhi-vākyas;* while the sentences with the verbs in the present tenses only aim at glorification.

V. The question often arises as to whether the *śruti* passages pointing out fruits for *ātmavidyā* are to be

treated as injunctive or glorificatory. In this context, the attention may be drawn to the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkarācārya on B.S. III.4.15. Here the view point of the prima facie is that such passages[14] are glorificatory. Here the great Ācārya seems to be in complete disagreement with the view point of the prima facie. He significantly points out that a qualified man gets the fruits of his acts after a pretty long time. But so far as the fruit of the *ātmavidyā* is concerned, one gets it immediately. This kind of fruit is also actually experienced by the concerned *ātmavid* persons. Hence it is not proper[15] to consider such *śruti* passages pointing out fruits for *ātmavidyā* as purely glorificatory[15]. A passage will have to be treated as glorificatory only when its fruit is not actually experienced by the concerned person or about the enjoyment of it there is some scope for doubt. But when, however, a fruit of a particular *vidyā* is actually experienced by the concerned persons, a passage displaying the fruit for a particular *vidyā* does not become glorificatory. It is also a generally accepted view of the Mīmāṃsakas that when for a particular act, a fruit is not available to a person from a *vidhi-vākya,* it can be imagined on the strength of the glorificatory passages. Moreover, one may draw the attention of the careful students of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā to the *viśvajinnyāya, rātrisatranyāya, phalavat sannidhau aphalam tadaṅgam,* etc. indicating the position of the Mīmāṃsakas in this respect. Here one is happy to mention that the great Ācārya has made a very judicious use of the Mīmāṃsā stand-point.

VI. Śaṅkarācārya has also clarified his position in respect of the glorificatory passages becoming operative. For the elucidation of this point, the attention may be drawn to his *Bhāṣya* on B.S. III.3.26. Here Śaṅkarācārya refers to the passages from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VIII.13.1, Muṇḍakopaniṣad III.1.3 and *Kauṣītaki-śruti* I.4,[16] to

show that when an *ātmavid* person abandons his sins and merits, they are taken up by the enemies and good friends. Here the question arises as regards the nature of the acts of giving up a particular thing and taking up a particular thing. Besides, what is the purport at the back of such *śruti* passages? Here it is shown that the main intention of the *śruti* passages is to glorify the *vidyā*, that is connected with the soul. Here it is indicated by the great Acarya that the act of taking up is subsidiary to the act of giving up particular thing. Here the *vidhi-vākya* can be formed as 'One should exert to get the knowledge of *ātma-vidyā*'. The two sentences 'He abandons his sins and merits' and 'His good deeds are taken up by the good and bad deeds are taken up by the bad' are to be treated as glorificatory passages. Here it is further pointed out that one glorificatory *vākya* depending upon another glorificatory *vākya* also becomes operative[17]. This idea is very well explained by Vasudevashastri Abhayankar in his foot-notes nos.14-15, p.73 of the IIIrd volume. Attention of the readers is drawn to this lucid explanation. Here the learned Shastri has also given us a practical example to bring the point home to the readers. Śaṅkarācārya has,thus, expressed a very indepedent view that one glorificatory sentence depending upon another gloryficatory sentence can become operative. It is significant to note here that this special view of the great Ācarya has escaped the eagle eye of the learned. Kevalānanda Sarasvatī in his monumental work entitled *'Mīmāṃsā-kośa.'* Hence a comparative student of Pūrva-Mīmāṃasā and Vedānta cannot afford to neglect this significant contribution of the great Ācārya for the scope of the *arthavāda* sentence. In passing, one may add here that the exact import of this observation of the great Ācārya is also well-brought out by Vācaspatimiśra in his *Bhāmatī*[18] on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*. Incidentally, however, it should

be noted that the idea of one glorificatory sentence depending upon another glorificatory sentence also can become operative is well-explained by Śaṅkarācārya by quoting a passage[19] from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* II. 10.5 and also explaning the same.

VII. One also finds a proper place in the *Bhāṣya* of the great Ācārya on the B .S. III.3.45 for *arthavāda* passage becoming a case of *guṇavāda*. Before entering into the discussion proper, it is also necessary to point out that an *arthavāda* becomes principal when it not only conveys its own sense but also praises the act that is laid down by the *śāstra*. But the *arthavāda* passage becomes secondary when it does not properly convey its sense but only praises the act. Besides, if the fruits mentioned in the glorificatory sentence are not likely to be accrued to the *yajamāna* proper, then the said glorificatory sentance assumes the position of *guṇavāda*. This seems to be the idea at the back of the use of the expression *guṇavāda* in the *Bhāṣya* of the great Ācārya as well explained by Vasudevashastri Abhyankar in his footnotes on B.S. III.3.42. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. III. 3.45 has expressed one view-point through the view point of the prima facie that if for an *arthavāda-vākya*, no original source is available then it could be treated as a case of *guṇavāda*[20]. It may be noted here in passing that the Ācārya has decided in his dissussion on the B.S. III.3.49 that when any sentence having no potential forms occurs in the context of a sentence having the potential forms, then the former assumes the nature of the *arthavāda-vākya*.

VIII. Śaṅkarācārya has also given us a clue to recognise what kind of passages are to be treated as injunctive and what passages are to be treated as glorificatory. One can elucidate this point by drawing the attention

to his discussion on the B.S. III.4.31. Here the question arises whether the *śruti* passages prohibiting the eating of the uneatable, assume the nature of the *vidhi-vākya* or the *arthavāda-vākya*. The prima facie view is that such passages are injunctive sentences. While Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. III. 4.31 holds that these passages of the nature of glorification and moreover, the words *yaḥ evaṃ veda* in the *śruti* passage further indicate that these are the glorificatory sentences. In addition to this, he also adds that in these *śruti* passages, we do not come across potential forms indicative of the *vidhi-vākyas*. He concludes the entire discussion by stating that such passages are to be interpreted in such a way that they should be in complete agreement with the spirit of the *Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā*. This again goes to show his high regard for the *śruti* passage. The converse of this discussion[23] is available to us in his discussion on the B. S. III.4.20.

IX. The importance of the *Bhāṣya* of the great Ācārya can also be appreciated from another point of view. In deciding whether the word in a particular sentence is expressive of injunction or glorification, Śaṅkarācarya has given us a good clue which clearly reveals to us that a word occurring in the *arthavāda-vākya* cannot assume the position of a *vidhi-vākya*. Here one could draw the attention of the readers to his *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. III.3. 40-41. Here the question aries as regards the exact nature of the expression '*prāṇāgnihotra*'. Actually this expression refers to the five *āhutis* that are supposed to be taken by a man before taking his lunch or meal. Now the expression *pañca-āhutis* is connected with *Agnihotra*. Does it there by reveal that the expression *prāṇāgnihotra* assumes the characteristics of the *Agnihotra*? i.e. whatever the duties connected with the performance of the *Agnihotra*, the same are to be connected with the parformance of *prāṇāgnihotra* ? In his

Bhāṣya on the B.S. III.3.41, the Ācārya points out that the word *Agnihotra* has occurred in the glorificatory sentence and not in the *vidhi-vākya*[24]. Hence , whatever are the duties connected with *Agnihotra*, the same are not to be connected with the *prāṇāgnihotra*. He finally concludes the discussion by stating that if there is the dropping of the lunch or dinner, then there is also the dropping of the *prāṇāgnihotra*[25]. The long and short of the discussion is that while deciding the nature of any word, one has to take into account whether the word has occurred in the centext of the *vidhi-vākya* or the *arthavāda-vākya*. This alone has served as a sound warning for deciding the nature and scope of a word in the parlance of Mīmāṃsā interpretation.

X. Attention may also be drawn to a discussion in the *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. III.4.20 for introducing a point that no syntactical connection is to be established between a *vidhi-vākya* and an *arthavāda-vākya* and such a sentence is actually to be treated as a case of *guṇavāda*. This is a view which generally runs counter to the view point of the well-known Mīmāṃsakas like Śabara and Kumārila. Here a question arises as regards the exact import or purport of the passage from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* II.23.1.[27] Whether this passage lays down the duties of the three stages of life or whether it only aims at the glorification of the *brahmaniṣṭha*. The view point of the prima facie is that just make the repetition of these other stages of life and they do not aim at laying down any injunction as such. The great Ācārya expresses his *siddhānta* view on B.S. III.4.20, that the passage from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* II.23.1 aims at laying down the performance of the three stages of life alone with the stage of a house-hold. The laying down of the three stages of life is actually something which is *Apūrva*. If , however,one holds that the the two purports can be drawn from one and the same *Chāndogyopaniṣad*,

then it may be said that it gives rise to the fault of *vākyabheda* which is to be accepted most unwillingly in the present context. Besides, in the *Jābāla-śruti,* the performance of all the three stages of life is laid down. It will not be proper to say that the performance of these stages of life is meant only for the blind and the lame. Hence he rightly feels that one should not try to bring about any syntactical connection between the two passages of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* and *Jābāla-śruti* and treat the passage from the *Chādogyopaniṣad* as indicating the purport in the form of praise of *brahmaniṣṭha* and hence a good example of *arthavāda* of the type of *guṇavāda*[28]. One will have to admit that the Ācarya has indeed displayed his skill in interpreting the Upaniṣadic passages from the Mīmāṃsā angle - the rare skill not shown by any other Ācarya as such.

XI. Any dispassionate reader of the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkarācārya on the B.S. will be bound to be impressed by the commentaries -*Bhāmatī, Kalpataru* and *Parimala* -indicating and throwing further light on his *Bhāṣya* from the Mīmāṃsā point of view by introducing some new maxims and Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtras,* at the back of the mind of the great Ācārya. These commentaries certainly render more help for appreciating Śaṅkarācārya's views and his deep knowledge and penetrating insight into the subject of Vedānta and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

In conclusion, one would appreciate the novelty of Śaṅkarācārya's approach to the Mīmāṃsā technical term *arthavāda* by noting his ability to treat *arthavāda* as an independent authority, to know the fruit for a *vidhi-vākya* from an *arthavāda-vākya.* A passage becomes glorificatory when its fruit is not actually experienced by a man. *Arthavāda* passages become *guṇavāda* when no original source is available for the same. The context

of the word in a sentence determines its nature as a *vidhi* or *an arthavāda*, when no syntactical connection is to be established between a *vidhi-vākya* and an *arthavāda-vākya*.

References

1. 'Śaṅkarācārya and Pūrvamīmāṃsā', *Mysore Orientalist*, vol. IV, pt.2, 1971, pp. 79-89.

2. अनुगताश्च सर्वत्राभिमानिन्यश्चेतना देवता मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहास–पुराणादिभ्योऽवगम्यते। SB on B.S.I.2.5, p.443. Page numbers are with reference to the Nirnayasagara edition of the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya* with the commentaries, *Bhāmatī, Kalpataru* and *Parimala*, 1938.

3. यथा लोके देवाः पितर.......... नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि च रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यात् ...,Ibid. I. 2. 25, p.475.

4. Notes on II. 1.5, p.19.

5. भेदेन हि फलसंयोगो भवति–जयतीमाल्ँल्लोकान्(BU.V.4, 1) इति पुरस्तात् हन्ति पाप्मानं जहाति च (Ibid. V. 5.3.4) इत्युपरिष्टात्। SB on B.S. 3.3. 38, pp. 825-826).

6. अपि चार्थवादादेव फले कल्पयितव्ये सति विद्यैकत्वे चावयवेषु श्रूयमाणानि बहून्यपि फलान्यवयविन्यामेव विद्यायामु–पसंहर्तव्यानि भवन्ति। Ibid. p.826. Also see *Vedāntakalpataru* p.826. And also *Bhāmatī* makes a distinction of *nitya* and *kāmya karmas*.

7. *JORI Manuscripts Library*, Kerala Vol. XVIII, 4, pp.5-6.

8. सुब्रह्मण्यार्थवादे 'मेधातिथेर्मेषा' इति।SB on B.S.I.3.33, p.341.

9. मेधातिथिं ह काण्वायनमिन्द्रो मेषो भूत्वा जहार।Ibid.p.341.

10. वसिष्ठश्च ब्रह्मणो मानसः पुत्रः सन्निमिशापादप- गतपूर्वदेहः पुनर्ब्रह्मा देशान्मित्रावरुणाभ्यां संबभूवेति। Ibid. p.817.

11. प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधे सति यः अर्थवादः स गुणवादः। अनुवादः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तर अवधारिते।

12. स्वर्गकामः अग्निष्टोमं जहुयात्।

13. एतेषु वाक्येषु फलं साध्यत्वेन न प्रतीयते शृणोती- त्यादिवर्तमानत्वनिर्देशात्। तस्मात् यदत्र फलश्रवणं तत् तत् कर्मणि प्रवर्तकः क्रत्वर्थोऽर्थवाद एवेति।*Mīmāṃsāmaṇḍana*, p.175. Also see SB on B.S. III. 4.49, p.843.

14. BU.IV. 4.22 and quoted in SB on B.S. III. 4. 15, p. 958 & 875.

15. अतोऽपि न विद्यायाः कर्मशेषत्वं नापि तद्विषयायाः फलश्रुतेरयथार्थत्वं शक्यमाश्रयितुम्।SB on B.S. 3. 4. 15, p. 875.

16. तत्सुकृतदुष्कृते विधूनने तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः सुकृतमु- पयन्त्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम्।KU. I. 4. quoted in SB on B.S. III. 3. 26, p. 804.

17. सुप्रसिद्धा चार्थवादान्तरापेक्षार्थवादान्तरप्रवृत्तिः।Ibid.p. 805.

18. न चार्थवादान्तरापेक्षार्थवादान्तराणां न दृष्टा।*Bhāmatī* on ibid. p. 805.

19. एकविंशो वा इतोऽसावादित्यः।ChU. II. 10.5 quoted in ibid. p. 805.

20. अन्यार्थदर्शनं चासत्यामन्यस्यां प्राप्तौ गुणवादेनाप्युपपद्यमानं न प्रकरणं बाधितुमुत्सहते।SB on B.S. III. 3. 45, p.841.

21. यत्र हि विस्पष्टो विधायको लिङ्गादिरुपलभ्यते युक्तं तत्र संकीर्तनमात्रस्यार्थवादत्वम्। इह तु विस्पष्टविध्यन्तरानुपलब्धेः संकीर्तनादेवैषां विज्ञानविधानं कल्पनीयम्।SB on B.S. III. 3. 49, p. 843.

22. सोऽपि 'न ह वा एवं विदि' (Ch U. 5.2.1) इत्यस्यार्थवादत्वादुपपन्नतरो भवति। तस्मादेवंजातीयका अर्थवादा न विधय इति।SB on B.S. III. 4.31, p. 902.

23. सतीमपि त्वेकवाक्यताप्रतीतिं परित्यज्य विधिरेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यः अपूर्वत्वात् विध्यन्तरस्यादर्शनात्। SB on B.S. III. 4. 20, p. 880.

24. इह पुनरर्थवादगतोऽग्निहोत्रशब्दो न तद्वद्भावं विधापयितुमर्हति।SB on B.S. III. 3.41, p. 832.

25. न ह्यस्ति वचनस्यातिभारः। न त्वनेनास्य नित्यता शक्यते दर्शयितुम्।Ibid. p.833.

26. See f.n. 23 above.

27. त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धाः। Quoted in B.S. III. 4.19.

28. विस्पष्टाच्चाश्रमान्तरप्रत्ययाद्गुणवादकल्पनयैकवाक्यत्वप्रयोजनानुपपत्तेः।

29. See *Vedāntakalpataru* on SB. I. 3. 33, p. 347.

K.V. SARMA

JYOTIRMĪMĀṂSĀ OF NĪLAKAṆṬHA SOMAYĀJĪ (A.D. 1443-1545) AND THE TRADITION OF REVISION IN HINDU ASTRONOMY

Jyotirmīmāṃsā ('Investigations on astronomical rationale') by Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājī (A.D. 1443-1545),[1] is a unique work in Hindu astronomy, wherein the author deals with the discipline not as one of mere computation, but also of experimentation and observation. Nīlakaṇṭha was an astute astronomer of Kerala in South India and was the author of a dozen works, all on astronomy, both original works and commentaries,[2] his *magnum opus* being an elaborate *Bhāṣya* on the *Āryabhaṭīya*.[3]

In the *Jyotirmīmāṃsā* Nīlakaṇṭha insists that results arrived at by computation should accord with those of observation. He adds that when texts were actually composed, computations made using the parameters given in those texts accorded with observation. When, however, on account of the passage of time, the two results differed, necessary corrections have to be applied suitably to the parameters so that computations made using the revised parameters accorded with observation. Thus he writes:

"Atha grahaṇam. Nanv evam api svakāla eva Gītikokta-bhagaṇādyāḥ (Āryabhaṭīyam, Gaṇitapāda, 3ff.) (sūkṣmaḥ, yadā) gītasya grahaṇasya pratyakṣasaṃvādaḥ syāt, yata idānīṃ granthakaraṇakāle tṛtīye divyābde mahān khalu bheda upalabhyate. Gaṇitānītakālataḥ paścād eva hīdānīṃ sarvāṇy api grahaṇāni dṛśyante. (Jyotirmīmāṃsā, p.1).

'Now, eclipse. The revolutions of planets as enunciated in the *Gītikā* (section of the *Āryabhaṭīya*, 3ff.) should have been true for contemporary times when eclipses as computed were identical with what was observed. At the present time, being the third divine year when this work has been composed, there is found considerable differences. Nowadays, eclipses are all seen to occur only after their times arrived at by computation.'

Nīlakaṇṭha illustrates his statement by two eclipses which he had observed, the latter of which might be noticed here: *'sambhuñjītāhistapanam' (16,86,847) ity asminn ahargaṇe sparśopalabdha padacchāyā ekādaśasaṅkhyā. mokṣadyugatam punaḥ pañcadaśa ghaṭikāḥ aṣṭāṃśatrayasahitaḥ. tac ca Hariharādiṣu madhyatamaskam. tasmin dine 'pi Gītikokta-bhagaṇādisiddha-candrādibhir gaṇyamāne grahaṇaṃ naivātra syāt* (op. cit. p.2).

'On Kali date 16,86,847, the gnomonic shadow at the time of commencement (of an eclipse) was eleven. The residual time for sunset was 15 *ghaṭikās* and 24 *vighaṭikās*. In places like Harihara (in Karnataka), it was mid-eclipse then. On that day (in his place) there should have been no eclipse at all if computed with the revolution numbers enunciated in the *Gītikā*.'

The author now points out that Āryabhaṭa had made a provision for such contingencies. He says:

"Evamādidūṣaṇam parair udbhāvyamānam parihartum parīkṣāprakāram āha, yadartham padatrayeṇa sakalā yuktayaḥ pradarśitāḥ—

kṣitir aviyogāt dinakṛt ravīnduyogāt prasādhitas cenduḥ /
śaśitārāgrahayogāt tathaiva tārāgrahās sarve / /

(Āryabhaṭīyam, Golapāda, 49)

iti. atroktābhir yuktibhir eva buddhimadbhiḥ samyak parīkṣaṇaṃ śakyaṃ kartum (op. cit. p.2).

'It is to ward off possible objections of this nature that could be raised by others, that (Āryabhaṭa) enunciated the method of experimentation with the words: 'The Sun (can be obtained) from the conjunction of the Earth and the Sun, the Moon from the conjunction of the Sun and the Moon, and all the other planets from the conjuctions of the (respective) planets and the Moon. 'By means of the methods enunciated here, it is possible for the intelligent to conduct the necessary experiments.'

But there could arise the doubt whether divine revolution said to have been recorded would go wrong at all. Nīlakaṇṭha envisages this objection thus:

"Nanu tapobhiḥ prasanno Brahmā Āryabhaṭāya bhagaṇa-paridhyādīnāṃ grahagaṇanasādhanabhūtaṃ saṅkhyāviśeṣam upadideśa. tad upadiṣṭam punar Āryabhaṭaḥ sarvam yathopadiṣṭam eva daśabhir gītibhir nibabandha iti kecin manyante. tasya kutaḥ parīkṣaṇam, Brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatvāt, rāgadveṣābhāvac ca, avitathaniścayāt, iti cet", Jyotirmīmāṃsā, p.2.

'Some think that God Brahmā, being pleased by the penances (of Āryabhaṭa), taught him the specific planetary revolution numbers to be used in the computation of eclipses. And, Āryabhaṭa depicted in ten *gīti* verses all that he was instructed. Why then should there be any verification in that matter, for Brahmā is all-knowing,

not vitiated by likes and dislikes and therefore positively truthful.'

Nīlakaṇṭha's reply is characteristic of a logical scientist. He says, 'O dull-head! That is not so. Then blessings of a supernatural being would only be in the form of cleansing the intellect and inspiring it. To be sure, God Brahmā or the Sun will not come down in person and instruct (a person)':

"Manda! maivam. devatāprasādo mativaimalyahetur eva. na ca punaḥ Brahmā Ādityo vā svayam evāgatya upadiśet."

Nīlakaṇṭha continues: *"Evam eva vakṣyati cānantarasūtre—*

sad-asaj-jñānasamudrāt samuddhṛtaṃ devatāprasādena /

saj-jñānottamaratnam mayā nimagnaṃ svamatināvā / /

(Āryabhaṭīyam, Golapāda, 49)

'Moreover, he (Āryabhaṭa) himself says in the next verse: 'By the grace of Brahmā, the precious jewel of excellent knowledge (of astronomy) has been brought out by me by means of the boat of my intellect from the sea of true and false knowledge, by diving deep into it.'

"na punaḥ Brahmopadiṣṭam sad-asaj-jñānasamudranimagnam. na ca tatra saṅkīrṇatā. sadasajjñānayoḥ asajjñān anādāya svamatināvā sajjñānasyaiva uttamaratnasya uddharaṇam upapadyate. tasmād Brahmaṇopadiṣṭam ity etad Āryabhaṭīyavākye naiva viruddham " (*op.cit.* p.2).

'To be sure, the instructions of Brahmā cannot be such as to be immersed in the sea of true and false knowledge. Neither can there be any jumbling. It is logical to say that the precious jewel of true knowledge is obtained

through the boat of one's intellect by discarding false knowledge from a jumbling of true and false. Hence there is no contradiction to facts in the words of Āryabhaṭa, viz., 'instructed by Brahmā'.

In order to reinforce the argument for experimentation, Nīlakaṇṭha takes the aid of the forensic discipline of Mīmāṃsā. He says: *"Jyotiśśāstre 'pi yugaparivṛttiparimāṇadvāreṇa candrādityādigativibhāgena tithinakṣatrajñānam avicchinnasampradāyagaṇitānumānamūlam' iti Vārttikakāro 'pi grahagatijñānam anumānenāha. (Tantravārttika* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.2). tatrā 'vicchinnasampradāyam apy evam vyācaṣṭe—'gaṇitonnītasya candrādeḥ deśaviśeṣānvayasya pratyakṣeṇa saṃvādaḥ, tato niścitānvayasya parasya gaṇitaliṅgopadeśaḥ, tatas tasyāptopadeśāvagatānvayasya anumānam, saṃvādaḥ, parasmai copadeśaḥ, iti sampradāyāvicchedāt prāmāṇyam' iti (Ajitāvyākhyā,* by Paritoṣamiśra).

'The Vārttikakāra (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) has observed that the knowledge of the lunar days and constellations based on planetary revolutions and derived by unbroken computational tradition is based on inference. The expression 'unbroken tradition' is explained thus: The computed Moon is first correlated with the observed Moon at a particular place. Then instruction of the reasons for the computational difference to another, (a pupil), who clearly understands the matter. Then inference (by the pupil) who has been so instructed by the reliable person (viz., his teacher). Then verification and later instructions (in a similar manner, by the pupil) to another (viz., his pupil). The authoritativeness is due to this type of unbroken continuity.'

Therefore, Nīlakaṇṭha asserts: 'Experiments should be (continued to be) performed by all (astronomers) in the teacher-disciple tradition. *"Tasmāt śiṣyapraśiṣyaparamparayā sarvair api parīkṣaṇaṃ kāryam."*

Elsewhere Nīlakaṇṭha asserts that even a new system of astronomy might be enunciated if there be need for it. Thus, in a later section of the *Jyotirmīmāṃsā* he pointed his finger towards certain doubting Thomases, who despair saying: 'There are current astronomical *siddhāntas*, like the *Paitāmaha* and others which do not tally mutually. There will be differences in time (in *nāḍikās* and *vināḍikās*) for the same moment of time if computed by these different *siddhāntas*. When there is difference in time indicated, Vedic, domestic and worldly rituals which are dependent on their performance at correct times become infructuous. And, when there is defect in rituals, worldly life breaks up. Alas. 'We have fallen into a calamitous situation' (op.cit. p.6):

"Nanu paitāmahādibhedena parasparaviruddhāś ca siddhāntā bhavanti. siddhāntabhede sati kālabhedaḥ. kālabhede sati kālāṅgāni śrauta-smārta-laukikāni karmāṇi vikalāni syuḥ. karmavaikalye sati lokayātrocchedaḥ. Hā dhik! saṅkaṭe mahati patitās smaḥ" (op.cit. p.6).

The reaction of Nīlakaṇṭha to this apparently insurmountable objection is clear and decisive. He says:

"Atrocyate 'Ṛjumate.' sa na śocitavyaḥ. Gurucaraṇaparicaraṇaparaiḥ kiṃ iva na jñāyate. Pañcasiddhāntās tāvat kvacitkāle pramāṇam eva ity avagantavyam. Api ca yaḥ siddhānto darśanāvisaṃvādī so 'nveṣaṇīyaḥ. darśanasaṃvādaś ca tadānīntanaiḥ parīkṣakair grahaṇādau vijñātavyaḥ. ye punar anyathā prāktanasiddhāntasya bhede sati, yantraiḥ parīkṣya grahāṇāṃ bhagaṇādisaṅkhyāṃ jñātvā abhinavasiddhāntaḥ praṇeya ity arthāt. Tat ta ihaloke 'hasanīyaḥ', paraloke 'daṇḍanīyaś ca' iti" (op. cit., p.6).

'Here, I say: 'Oh simpleton.' The situation is not to be despaired of. It is to be noted that for a certain period (only) the Five Siddhāntas will remain authori-

अस्थिरकार्यकराः शिक्षादिसत्कार्यविदूरगाः कठोरहुंकाररवप्रदर्शनादिना सर्वेषां झटिति मनःक्षोभमाकलयन्तः ते सर्वे गजाः वानरांशा सत्कार्येष्वनर्हाः दूरतस्सन्त्याज्या इत्युपदेशः। एतावता ग्रन्थेन प्रतिपादितेषु अष्टाविंशतिविधांशभासुरेषु गजेषु तत्र तत्र जनितेषु सुबुद्धिमान् महीपालः सचिवाद्योरण्याधादिसाह्येन स्वयमपि चिरं ज्ञात्वा सल्लक्षणान् गजान् बन्धनादिना स्वदेशमानीय गजशालासु पालयेत्। एवं मध्यमांशगजान् स्वमन्दुरा-जनितांश्च परिपाल्या:(लयेत्)। यदि न रोचेत तदा तानपि वने सन्त्यजेत्। अधमांश-गजास्सर्वेऽपि दूरतः परिहर्तव्या एवेति ॥ स्पष्टमन्यत् ॥

इति [नारद]गजशिक्षायां व्यक्तिटिप्पण्यां गजजात्यंशनिरूपणात्मकः

द्वितीयः पटलः

तृतीयः पटलः

III, १-४ अथास्मिन् तृतीये पटले कुञ्जादिवनभूमितलेषु संप्राप्तजन्मनः शुभलक्षणभासुरान् तानुत्तमगजान् भूमिपालादयः कथं वा बन्धयेयुः केन वा प्रकारेण स्वदेशमानयेयुः इत्याकांक्षायां तत् सर्वमपि निरूपयति भगवान् नारदो मुनिरिति पटल-ग्रथनसंदर्भार्थो ज्ञेयः। तत्रादौ सल्लक्षणभासुराणां गजानां प्रयोजनादिकं निरूपयति उत्तमेष्वित्यादिना। गजा एव नरपालादीनामुत्तमकार्येषु सहायकारिणः सद्भटसन्निभाश्च। एवमापत्कालादिष्वपि उत्तममित्राणि गजा एव। यदि रक्षणादिना मानितास्ते सर्वे मतंगजास्तदा भूपालादीनां विजयलक्ष्मीमपारं यशः विपुलमैश्वर्यं च जनयन्तीति तन्महिमा। स्वबाल्ये वयसि यौवने वार्धके च काले सर्वैरपि प्रकारैर्गजा एव मनुष्याणां उत्तमसाह्यकरा निश्चिता इति। किंच कुलीनाः शान्तस्वभावाः दर्शनादेव पुंसां पुण्यवर्धकाश्च भवन्ति गजा इति विशेषतः तन्माहात्म्यादिकं ज्ञेयमिति ॥

III, ५-२३ असाध्यान्यपीति। सम्यक् शिक्षणादिना संप्राप्तकरकौशला-दिभिर्वीरभटैः सल्लक्षणभाग्भिः उत्तमैस्तुरगादिभिर्वा इह किल भूलोके यानि कार्याणि सुतरामसाध्यानीति निश्चितानि भवन्ति तादृशकार्याण्यनायासेन गजा एव साधयन्ति संपूर्णफलप्रदानि तानि कुर्वन्तीति परोपकाराय दीक्षितानां देवांशभाजां एतेषां गजानां चरित्रकीर्तनं प्रातरादिसमयेषु दर्शनं प्रीतिपूर्वकमाहारप्रदानादिकं च जनयन्ति बहुविध-श्रेयांसि भूपालानामिति तन्महिमा महर्षिभिरुपदिष्टः आदरणीयः। अपि च सुशोभनबुद्धि-शालिनामिभानां बहुविधा मनोहरलीलाः शश्वन्निरीक्षिता अपि न तृप्तये भवन्ति रसिकानाम्

V.N. JHA

NAVYA NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

0.0 Introduction

What is known to-day as Navya Nyāya Philosophy is a stage of development of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Philosophy. In this paper I would like to highlight some of the salient features of this system of Indian Philosophy. Although it is a system of Philosophy having well-defined goal, still it did not have anything more than what the Prācīna Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika systems had. Therefore, it will be proper to view at Navya Nyāya more as a system of logic than a system of Philosophy. While Prācīna Nyāya paid more attention to *prameya,* the entities of the world, Navya Nyāya gave more stress on *pramāṇa*, the source of a valid cognition.

1.0. The goal of Navya Nyāya

Navya Nyāya system of Philosophical logic came into existence out of a necessity to evolve a language of precise communication. The period of Prācīna Nyāya was experiencing a problem of a medium of

communication. Since the medium of language was more-or-less, ordinary Sanskrit, a speaker could not convey in an unambiguous term what he wanted to convey and many a time he was misunderstood. Therefore, there was an immediate need for a precise language of communication. This was the prime goal of Navya Nyāya. Another important goal of Navya Nyāya was to satisfactorily explain consistent human behaviour and inconsistent human behaviour. Since a behaviour is prompted by knowledge and since consistent and inconsistent behaviours are prompted by true cognition and false cognition respectively, the definitions of true cognition and false cognition became a prime necessity. While doing so, naturally, the Navya Naiyāyikas could not avoid the question of the reality of this universe. Thus, if a consistent behaviour is to be explained, it is necessary to explain what a true cognition is and what the object of a true cognition is with which one behaves consistently. Thus, ultimately the Navya Naiyāyikas were led to present a full-fledged theory of epistemology.

1.1 Theory of Epistemology

The basic assumptions in the theory of Navya Nyāya epistemology are that a cognition is a product and as such it is produced by some instrument. A true cognition is produced by say, a true instrument called *pramāṇa* and a false cognition is produced by pseudo-instrument called *pramāṇābhāsa*. Another assumption in this system is that a cognition is produced through a process and in a sequence.

In this system there can be only four varieties of cognitions and the entire world can form the object of these cognitions. What forms the object of these four varieties of true cognitions has real existence and that which does not form such an object has no existence what-so-ever.

These four varieties of true cognitions are perceptual, inferential, verbal and analogical cognitions and the instruments or *pramāṇas* which produce them are also four, namely, *pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda* and *upamāna*. These four *pramāṇas* are to be looked upon as four different processes of producing knowledge and the difference in the process accounts for the difference in the resultant cognitions. The Navya Nyāya system elaborates these four processes of knowledge. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the great systematiser of the Navya Nyāya system of Logic, thus, divided his *magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi* into four parts called *pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, anumāna-khaṇḍa, upamāna-khaṇḍa* and *śabda-khaṇḍa.*

1.2 The process of perceptual cognition

The system conceives six sense-organs and the universe is divided into two groups for each perceiver-(1) internal objects such as cognition, soul, desire, pleasure, pain, etc. and (2) external objects such as trees, flowers, fruits, etc. everything other than the internal objects.

Out of the six, five are external sense-organs to perceive external objects and the sixth one, i.e. mind is to perceive internal objects.

The sense-organ, when comes into contact with respective object the resultant cognition is a perceptual cognition, and it is produced in the soul.

Ātman → *manas* → *indriya* → *artha* → *nirvikalpaka* → *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*

For example, perception of fire.

1.3 The process of Inferential cognition

Here suppose, the same fire is known by observing a smoke then the following process is said to be involved:

1. The observer observes the smoke *(hetu-darśana),*
2. He remembers the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire since he already had seen the co-existence of smoke and fire. *(vyāpti-smaraṇa),*
3. He confirms that the smoke which he is observing on a locus is also such a smoke *(parāmarśa),*
4. And finally he comes to know the fire *(anumiti).*

hetudarśana → vyāptismaraṇa → parāmarśa → anumiti

This process is called *svārthānumāna,* i.e. the inferential process to know the *sādhya* by oneself. If one requires to make the *sādhya* known to others he will have to take recourse to five sentences technically called *pañcāvayavavākya* 'a five-member syllogism'. These five members are -

1. *pratijñā* proposition
2. *hetu* ground
3. *udāharaṇa* example to show the invariable concomitance
4. *upanaya* confirmatory cognition
5. *nigamana* corroborative conclusion.

This process is called *parārthānumāna.*

1.4 The process of analogical congition

This is one of the means by which the relation between a word and its meaning is grasped. The following process is described:

When one does not know the meaning of a word, he may ask one who knows it. The person who knows the meaning may find it difficult to express it directly and may take the half of it indicating through analogy

and use some sentence to draw the similarity between the object already known and the object to be known as the referent of the word, the meaning of which is not known to the enquirer.

The enquirer then identifies the objects and remembers the sentence describing the similarity and finally comes to know the relation between that word and its meaning.

The stock-example is about the meaning of the word *gavaya*. One asks the meaning of it to forester and he says in reply *yathā gauḥ tathā gavayaḥ*. The enquirer identifies some animal which is similar to cow and remembers that similarity-statement, and finally comes to know that such and such species is the meaning of the word *gavaya*. This is how he comes to know the relationship between the word *gavaya* and the species *gavaya*.

sādṛśya-jñāna → *atideśavākya-smaraṇa* → *saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha-jñāna (upamiti)*

1.5 The process of verbal understanding

The following process is envisaged in the system:

1. *padajñāna* 'hearing a morpheme or reading a morpheme'
2. *padārthasmaraṇa* 'remembering the meaning'
3. *tātparya-jñāna* 'knowing the intention of the speaker'
4. *padārthadvaya-sambandha-jñāna*, i.e. *śābdabodha* 'verbal understanding'

This is the process through which a reader or listener of a sentence understands the meaning of a

sentence. A sentence is a cluster of morphemes having *akāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi.*

A listener is required to have the knowledge of the relation between the morpheme and its meaning. Otherwise, he cannot understand the sentence. The other requirement is the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. The knowledge of the intention of the speaker helps in grasping the intended meaning of the speaker. Suppose, a, b, c and d are the morphemes of a sentence then the following will explain the process of verbal understanding.:

Step I	a	+	b	+	c	+	d
Step II	a	+	b	+	c	+	d
	∧		∧		∧		∧
	a'a"		b'b"		c'c"		d'd"
Step III	a	+	b	+	c	+	d
	a'		b'		c'		d'
Step IV	a	+	b	+	c	+	d
	a'	-	b'	-	c'	-	d'

Here a is *pada*, a', a" are *padārthas* and the relation between a' and b' is *vākyārtha.*

There are various theories like *Anvitābhidhānavāda, Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Saṃsargamaryādavāda* to account for the *vākyārtha*. This is how the Navya Nyāya system describes the process of various types of knowledge. Living beings acquire such knowledges and behave with the things presented by these knowledges.

2.0 Theory of knowledge

Navya Nyāya developed a theory of knowledge of its own. According to the theory, a knowledge is a

quality of the soul. The soul is a substance and when a knowledge is produced in a soul, the soul is called sentient *(jñānādhikaraṇam ātmā).*

A knowledge must have an object *(viṣaya), jñānam saviṣayakam bhavati.*

Jñāna

A knowledge can be determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). Our behaviour is always prompted by a determinate cognition. An indeterminate cognition is merely a logical position in order to explain the determinate perception. A determinate knowledge alone can be expressed by language, but not an indeterminate knowledge.

A determinate knowledge which can be verbalised is not an illusion as thought by the idealist systems.

Since the determinate cognition can be verbalised, the Navya Naiyāyikas say that such a knowledge has structure and the structure is of the qualifier-qualificand type *(viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa-bhāvāpannaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakam).* Thus, there are three object types in a determinate cognition — a qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa),* a qualificand *(viśeṣya)* and the relation *(saṃsarga)*, between *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa.*



savikalpakajñāna

A *savikalpaka-jñāna* is thus also known as *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* or qualified cognition. It implies that the determinate cognition has a content which is a qualified content reflecting the structure of a qualifier-qualificand-type.

2.1 Content-ness (*viṣayatā*)

When a thing becomes the object of a cognition, it is called *viṣaya*. The very fact that it is called *viṣaya* implies that there has arisen a property called *viṣayatā* (contentness) in the content. We have seen in the earlier section that there can be three types of objects in a determinate congition which is capable of being verbalised. They are *viśeṣya, viśeṣaṇa* and *saṃsarga*. All the three together form the content (*viṣaya*) of the determinate cognition, and hence in all the three there exists the acquired properly called *viṣayatā*. Thus, there is *viṣayatā* in *viśeṣya*, in *viśeṣaṇa* and the *saṃsarga*. The *viṣayatā* which exists in *viśeṣya* is called *viśeṣyatā*; that in *viśeṣaṇa* is called *prakāratā* and that in *saṃsarga* is called *saṃsargatā*.

In order to specify the locus of such property, Navya Nyāya employs the technique of delimiting or *avacchedaka*.

3.0 The Navya Nyāya technique of delimiting:

As indicated above, the main necessity of Navya Nyāya was to evolve a precise language of communication, which does not allow any ambiguity. To achieve this goal, the Neologicians evolved a technique of delimiting called *avacchedaka* or delimitor. Either a space *(deśa)* or time *(kāla)* can be a delimitor. Similarly, a *dharma* and a relation were accepted as delimitors. This technique helped to a great extent in disambiguating an ambiguous statement.

3.1 Dharma as a delimitor

Suppose, we are referring to an absence of all parts, the precise statement would be *gaṭatvāvacchinna-pratiyogitānirūpakaḥ abhāvaḥ* which means that 'here is an absence the counterpositiveness of which is delimited by 'potness' which is in all pots.' When such

is an expression, the situation referred to by this expression will not allow even a single pot to be there.

3.2 Sambandha as a delimitor

Similarly, if we say *saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitā-nirūpakaḥ abhāvaḥ* it implies that this *abhāva* is of a pot on the ground or on any locus where the pot can exist by contact *(saṃyoga)* and on any other locus where a pot exists by inherence *(samavāya).*

Likewise space and time can also be employed as delimitors.

By employing such techniques Navya Nyāya could create a language of precise discourse which was not only adopted by the philosophers of other systems of Indian Philosophy but even by the grammarians and the Ālaṅkārikas. The *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha bear testimony of this fact.

4.0 Conclusion

From all that we discussed above we can say that Navya Nyāya Philosophy is an analytic philosophy. This system developed both logic and language to suit any discourse which requires analytic approach. This is why it enjoyed the place in Humanities and Arts what Mathematics enjoys in the case of Physical Sciences. Navya Nyāya epistemology is a distinct contribution to Indian Philosophy.

D. SATYANARAYANA

RELIGIOUS SUICIDE OR RIGHT OF A MAN TO HIS OWN LIFE

A report under the caption 'Pilgrim cuts himself to death' appeared in the *Hindu* dated 05.12.1969 on page 11 column 8. The matter runs as follows: " Tirupati Dec. 5: Venu Ramulu of Peddagollapuram in Visakhapatnam district is reported to have cut his throat with a razor in the tonsuring shed at Tirumala last evening by way of offering his life to Lord Venkateswara. He was removed to the Devasthanams hospital where he died.

It is stated that Ramulu with his wife and two children were on pilgrimage to Turumala". -F.O.C.

Suicide is derived from Sanskrit. Suicide = *sui* + *cide* wherein *sui* = *sva* meaning oneself and *cide* = to cut, derived from the root *chid* 'to cut', taken together the term *suicide* would mean to kill oneself. It is generally contrasted with the term homicide. A religious suicide is an act which is considered to be meritorius in itself, as against suicide as an escape from the worldly troubles.

Modern use of the term in this sense can be traced back to the 18th century used for the first time by Desfontaines as *suicidium* meaning the act of self-destruction.

In Indian life and society suicide is abundantly found in literature as well as in practice from the Ṛgvedic time to the latest suicide referred to the above on 05.12.1969. The copious references in *Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads,* Epics, Purāṇas, Buddhist and Jain literature, Arthaśāstra, *Smṛti* texts and law digests, epigraphical material, foreign travel accounts, official records and literature in general, will undoubtedly prove the place of suicide in the Indian scheme of life. No less than 10 prominent authorities on Dharmaśāstra beginning from 11th century A.D. down to 17th century and on *Tīrthas* or the pilgrim centres have deliberated in detail on this problem[1] and made out certain classes of suicides as permissible. Religious suicides at different places of religious sanctity have been attached with virtues. Prayag and Kashi are two such places which all authors have highly and unanimously commended for self-immolation.[2] Beal in his *Si-Yu-Ki* (7th century A.D.) speaks of self imposed deaths from the *bata-vṛkṣa*[3].

METHODS OF SUICIDE:

Some of the methods enumerated in the Smṛti texts for suicide are 1) starving, 2) covering with cowdung-cakes and setting fire and consuming oneself therein, 3) burying oneself in snow, 4) immersing oneself in water, 5) cutting one's throat, 6) throwing oneself under the car of the deity especially of Jagannātha, 7) throwing oneself down from a mountain top, etc.

PERMISSIBLE CAUSES OF SUICIDE :

The causes of suicide approved on the mundane level are 1) an old man unable to observe the rules

of bodily purification owing to extreme weakness 2) ill, beyond all hopes of medical aid; 3) on the supermundane level suicide is also recommended for a man who has gained knowledge of Brahman and has been convinced of illusory nature of this world includeng his body as also the real nature of the Ātman as well its indestructibility. Such a man is in no way under the control of earthly rules. He can cast off his body without any fear from social customs or śāstric injunctions.

TYPES OF SUICIDES :

Besides the religious suicides there are other types of suicides which are equally permitted. They are the Satī practice and the Jauhar practice. Political suicides in India have drawn a considerable interest. Besides Jotin Das, Potti Sriramulu and Darshan Singh Pheruman's suicides, were calculated political moves. Desires suppressed and being denied direct expression also result in suicidal acts. Various kinds of hardship such as unemployment, hunger, poverty, loss of honour, position, freedom, love, disgrace, sex difficulties accompanying tangled personal relationship and failure at an examination are some of the probable reasons which drive a man to find an escape from this life. Abnormal grief accruing from the loss of the loved one, mutual jealosy, mental difficulties, infidelity, dessertion, family discord, pride, remorse and shame, feeling of inferiority, hatred, aggressiveness, revenge, guilt and mental disorders and other seemingly insurmountable difficulties forge emotional immaturity which sometimes act as a compelling necessity to choose suicide as a sure means to get relieved of the distress.

LEGAL POSITION OF SUICIDE IN INDIA TODAY:

Indian Penal Code Act 305 reads: If any person under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any

delirious person, any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication commits suicide, whoever abets the commissioner of such suicide shall be punished with death or transportation for life or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or shall be liable for fines.

Indian Penal Code 306 reads: If any person committed suicide, whoever abets commission of such suicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall be liable to fines.

In both these sections it is the abetment that is an offence. The Indian Penal Code also declares whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any thing towards the commission of such offence shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. In this it is the attempt or when the actions conclusively prove the course of attempt then it is an offence recognisable, culpable and the guilty to be punished, but after the suicide is accomplished.

In a satī-case (Empire Vs. Ram Dal 1913, 36 Allahabad) 26 persons were held guilty. The case was that a window wanted to become satī by offering herself on to the pyre. These 26 persons tried their best to dissuade her from becoming a satī. These men also informed the nearest police station about her intentions. But finding it impossible to dissuade her " complied with her wishes and helped her in effecting her object".

RELIGIOUS SUICIDES AT TIRUMALA :

Suicides at Tirumala as a means of cessation from the sufferings that beset one's life as in a general pattern prevailing throughout India from time immemorial

at a pilgrim centre. The *tīrtha* or the pilgrim centre by its very austere and pious atmosphere wipes out all the sins. A bleached-soul should not be allowed to glot in this world. Therefore the co-ordination of the body and the spirit has to be severed. The soul once released follows the path of Gods.

In the *Veṅkaṭācala Māhātmya* on page 20 verse 13[4], page 28 verse 51 [5], page 476 verse 187 Vol.III[6] are clear enough to convince a devotee to exhibit that one severing the co-ordination between the body and the soul obtains final release is alluring enough to undertake such a religious act of self-immolation; verse 66 at page 433 is commanding enough (*tasmāt deham tyaja atra eva*); on page 386 Vol.II (verse 17-25) there is a direct reference to suicide by falling from a cliff. Once a man moves to this *Kṣetra* his soul is purified and salvation is near in reach. If he relapses back to the worldly surroundings the distractions of the mundane objects and the senses draw him back to glut of this world. Better therefore,to put an end to one's own life and face death now and right here where *mokṣa* or emancipation is awaiting for the righteous and the sinners alike. Garga says 'one should not live vainly'. If a man has accomplished his task in life and has no desire left for the pleasures of any of his senses, to die at a *tīrtha* is better than *tapas* or the penance.

TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS SUICIDE IN INDIA:

In Vedic literature we have the story of Śunaḥ-sepa wherein he is substituted for another man to be sacrificed. In the *Puruṣasūkta* it is stated " with sacrifice the God worshipped the sacrifice". In *Ṛgveda* x.10.6-8 suicide at Prayag is mentioned. In *Ṛgveda* x.121.2. Hiraṇyagarbha is described as the giver of the self. In *Ṛgveda* x.81.5-6 Viśvakarma is said to have sacrificed himself.

In the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* VI.2.16 the lord of creatures offered himself as a sacrifice for the Devas. In XIII.6.1 the same idea is repeated. In the Brāhmaṇa literature a conception is projecting out of the total mass of literature that man's self-sacrifice is the only proper sacrifice. Giving away every thing, i.e. *sarvamedha*, includes one's total possession comprising of the self as well.

The *Vālmikirāmāyaṇa* (*Araṇya* V. 40) narrates Sarabhaṅga's entry into fire. The *Mahābhārata* recommends suicide at Prathūdaka (*Śalyaparva*) and at Prayag (*Vanaparva*). The *Anuśāsanaparva* praises relinquishng one's body at the Himalayas. The *Mahābharata* III.83.78 rejects the injunction of the *Veda* as also strong force of tradition and asks the aspirants to commit suicide at Prayag[7]. The last *parva* is named as *Svargārohaṇaparva* wherein walking towards north till death is shown. The name of the chapter is *Mahāprasthānika*. Purāṇas permit suicide for those who suffer from incurable diseases, too old to perform their religious duties by drowning, starvation, fall from a mountain top or even can arrange self-cremation.[8]

The *Liṅgapurāṇa* also recommends suicide at Kurukṣetra. The *Matsyapurāṇa* eulogises suicide at the peak of Amarakaṇṭaka.[9] The *Kūrmapurāṇa* 1.37.39, the *Padmapurāṇa* 1.44.4. and *Nāradapurāṇa, Uttara* 43.97 say whosoever casts his body in the Gaṅgā whether wilfully or unintentionally goes to heaven after death.

In the Jaina texts suicides are profusely given and they are also spoken of highly. These suicides are recommended for those who have obtained higher degree of perfection. The *Uvāsagadadasāo* frequently mentions of fasts which virtually means giving up begging and living down at a chosen place for about a month. The self-imposed death by fasting is called *sallakhana* and

Plate II

testify to the suicides[18]. The Kalandri Inscription records suicide by fasting.

ACCOUNTS BY FOREIGN TRAVELLERS:

Megasthenese (M'crindle, p. 106) has given an account of death of Kalanos the Indian gymnosophist at the age of 73 who burnt himself over a pyre in the camp of Alexender, the Great. Alberuni has also referred to the practice of religious suicide[19].

LITERATURE:

The Sanskrit drama *Mṛcchakaṭika* tells that the King Śūdraka entered into fire[20]. Kālidasa's *Raghuvaṃśa* also describes King Aja's (VIII, 94) religious suicide at the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the Sarayū[21]. In *Śaṅkara-digvijaya* it is stated that Kumārila, the great scholar committed suicide by entering into a mild fire of husk. *Ain-i-akabari* has also stated that cutting of one's throat is a meritorious deed[22].

SMṚTI LITERATURE AND SUICIDE:

The Smṛti literature has drawn a decided line between religious suicide and non-religious suicide. Smṛtis are generally against the practice of suicide but they commend suicide at pilgrim centres and allow the old, the decrepit and the incurably ill to commit it. Two types of terms are used to denote suicide and they mean a) casting of one's body and b) self-destruction. The persons who undertake suicides are also classed into two categories: one who has satisfied himself on a wordly level and one who is unable to face the worldly circumstances successfully. Those who have enjoyed all that they wanted in the mundane level can only aspire for spiritual emancipation and as such permissible to undertake the journey to the higher life but one without fulfilling the obligations here and not living a full life

commits suicide for final liberation is a coward and deserves only censure.

Suicide is specially recommended for a sanyāsin. A sanyāsin's *mahāprasthāna* or the great journey culminates in terminating one's life in the process of *mahāprasthāna*[23]. Manu has classifies *dehapāta* into two classes:

1. a tree falling because of bank shorn by the force of flooding waters,

2. a bird leaving the tree which is falling.

A man overpowered by the worldly compulsion is like a tree overpowered by currents and a bird leaving the falling tree is like the wise who has known the illusory nature of the world and of the body[24]. The ascetics take a gradual ascendency in austerity and perish gradually by resorting to subsist only on fuits, then on roots, grass, water, air, and finally on ether alone waiting for death.

Aparārka commenting on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* says by embracing death the individual incurs no sin. This self embraced death is more advisable than the *tapas*. He who cannot shoulder the responsibilities as conferred upon an individual by *śāstras* has no legitimacy to live[25].

Why is death in a holy place so very rewarding that suicide had to be included into religion as a legitimate means of attaining heavenly bliss. It is the grace of the presiding deity which produces overwhelmingly such results. The Lord will rescue his devotee is the guarantee of the rescuing help of the Lord was the hope of those who commit religious suicides at such pilgrim centres as their belief spurts them to do.

Mechanism of attaining Mokṣa by committing suicide at a pilgrim centre has not been given in all cases but in case of Kasi it has been fully explained. No emancipation is possible except by true knowledge. The presiding deity of Kasi, i.e. Śiva guarantees the true knowledge to all irrespective of their past record of merit. This is called the *tārakamantra*. Thus, the bleached-soul deludes the worldly snares and never comes back to the cycle of life and death, and falls a prey to the mundane distractions.

Prayaga and Kasi are two very important pilgrim centres of India. Kasi Karavata is famous for suicide at Varanasi. Suicides at Prayaga has been of great importance. Vācaspatimiśra in *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* (p 47-52), Mitra Miśra in *Tīrthaprakāśa* (p 342-57) and Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in *Tristhalisetu* (p 46-56) discuss the problem. Qualitative permissability is also a point for discussion by Mitra Miśra since every one cannot commit suicide. None can run away from the worldly responsibility. Voluntary death or self-killing to gain mundane profits is censurable. An indebted cannot commit suicide unless he clears off his loan.

RIGHT OF A MAN TO HIS OWN LIFE:

The Indian Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights. Article 25 includes - 1) Freedom of consciousness, and 2) Freedom to profess, practice and propogate religion and gives religious freedom as a fundamental right to each individual.

Faith is held too sacred to be a matter of state regulation and temporal control. Religion cannot be a subject of direct legislation. Persons of all religious groups and denominations have been given fullest freedom to maintain their respective faiths. Every body is secured of his right to religious freedom subject to 1) public

order 2) morality and health 3) social welfare and reforms 4) economic, financial and political interests and 5) respect of fundamental rights in general, secondarily.

Thus not only Indian citizen is free to entertain any religious belief as may be approved by his judgement and consciousness but also to exhibit his belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper to propogate or to dessiminate his ideas for edification of others. In Ratilal Premchand Gandhi Vs State of Bombay (AIR 1954 S.C. 388) their Lordships have stated, "unless absolutely necessary for compelling reasons of public order, health, morality, the state should honour religious right of the individual."

The matter of religion includes practices, things, tenets, usages which are denominationally regarded as essential and integral part of a religion. Not only they include matters of doctrinal belief or a philosophy of religion but also experiences associated with profession, practice and propogation of religion (Venkataramana Devaru Vs State of Mysore AIR 1958 S.C. 255).

The members of a religious community are free to prescribe the rights and ceremonies which they find religiously efficacious as being in agreement with their religious beliefs and practice them unhindered. Persons professing Ānandamārga faith have filed cases to vindicate their religious right and exercise them according to their belief.

Now the question is whether a religious suicide in exercise of one's religious freedom oversteps its legitimate limits and presently endangers the recognised interests of the society and the state and it encroaches into an area not given to religion?

Religious suicide is one of the voluntary acts motivated under certain circumstances and beliefs. Religion is difficult to define, says Radhakrishnan. It can be identified with feeling, emotion, sentiment, instinct, cult, ritual, perception, consciousness and belief of faith. It is an attempt to discover the self, ideal of human existence or a quest for emancipation, salvation or Mokṣa from immediate compulsion of earthly existence and *karma*. It is not wholly intellectual, moral or aesthetic but a combination of all these and a spiritual intuition.

An individual committing suicide does not come in conflict with state duties. Suicide by a man by his own hand would cause little or no pain to any one else.

POST MORTUARY BENEFITS:

Emancipation is said to be full of pleasure indescribable in mundane terms. In other schemes of life where post death aim is heaven or *svarga* an enchanting description in worldly context is given. One does not become old. A bevy of celestial damsels wait upon him for sensual pleasures - inexhaustable riches - kingdom - elephants, horses - slaves and even wine and *amṛta* are available in plenty.

If suicide is a crime war is still a greater crime and much more harmful to the human race than self-murder. Individual is whipped up into the inevitable compulsion of committing voluntary suicide under military bands and other methods of psychological coercion in the name of new religion namely patriotism. The act of suicide by the individuals whether under a spell of religious fanaticism or patriotic zeal does not constitute a separate category as compulsion in one case is national and in other is religious.

References

1. In the Smṛti literature the following texts deal with suicide:
Lakṣmīdhara's Kṛtyakalpataru - Tīrthavivecanakāṇḍa - 1125 A.D. 293-94 and *Rājadharma* pp. 186-7.
Hemādri - *Caturvargacintāmaṇi* - *Tīrthakhaṇḍa*, p. 1270.
Vācaspati - *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* -1460.
Raghunandana -*Tīrthatattva* -1530.
Ramakṛṣṇa - *Tīrtharatnākara* -1540.
Toḍaramal - *Toḍarānanda* - *Tīrthasaukhya* - 1575.
Nandapaṇḍita - *Tīrthakalpalatru* - 1610.
Mitramiśra -*Vīramitrodaya* - *Tīrthaprakāśa* - 1620.
Sidhāntavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācharya - *Tīrthakaumudī* - 1600.
Vācaspati - *Tīrthakalpalatā*.

2. अग्निप्रवेशं ये कुर्युः अविमुक्ते विधानतः।
प्रविशन्ति सुखं ते मां न पुनर्भाविनो जनाः।।
Tīrthakhaṇḍa, p.21.

व्याधितो यदि वा दीनः क्रुद्धो वापि भवोन्नरः।
गंगायमुनामासाद्य यस्तु प्राणान् परित्यजेत्।।
दीप्तकाञ्चनवर्णाभैर्विमानैस्सूर्यवर्चसैः।
गन्धर्वाप्सरसां मध्ये स्वर्गे मोदति मानवः।।
प्रयागं स्मरणमात्रेण यस्तु प्राणान्परित्यजेत्।
ब्रह्मलोकमवाप्नोति वदन्ति ऋषिपुंगवाः।।
Tirthakhanda Chap. III. p. 136-39

वटमूलं समासाद्य यस्तु प्राणान्परित्यजेत्।
सर्वलोकानतिक्रम्य रुद्रलोकं स गच्छति।
Tirthakhanda p.142.

3. A. Beal, *Si-Yu-Ki* (7th century A.D.) speaks of self-imposed deaths from the Bata Vrksa, I. p 232.
4. पूर्वदेहसमायुक्ताः पुनर्जीवन्ति जन्तवः।
5. रंगदासो निराहारः क्रमात्त्यक्तकलेबरः।

6. पापान्ते मुक्तिरस्त्येव वेङ्कटाद्रौ न संशयः।
7. न वेदवचनात्तात न लोकवचनादपि।
मतिरुत्क्रमणीया ते प्रयागमरणं प्रति॥
Mahābhārata III.83. 78.
8. वृद्धः शौचस्मृतेर्लुप्तः प्रत्याख्यातभिषक्क्रियः।
आत्मानं घातयेद्यस्तु भृग्वग्न्यनशनादिभिः।
Atrismṛti 218.
9. एवं सर्वसमाचारो यत्तु प्राणान्परित्यजेत्।
तस्य पुण्यफलं राजन् शृणुष्वावहितो मम।
शतं वर्षसहस्राणां स्वर्गे मोदेत पाण्डव।।
Matsya 186.26-7.
अनिवर्तिका गतिस्तस्य पवनस्याम्बरे यथा।
पतनं कुरुते यस्तु अमरेशे नराधिप।।
Matsya 186.35.
परित्यजति यः प्राणान्पवतेऽमरकण्टके।
वर्षकोटिशतं साग्रं रुद्रलोके महीयते।।
Matsya 186.53-4.
10. *Jataka* Nos. 161, 165, 173, 175, 180, etc.
11. *Epigraphica Indica* XII. 207
12. *Epigraphica Karnatica* II Sk. 136.
13. शौर्यसव्यधरो यः प्रयागगतो घने।
अम्भसीव करीषाग्नौ मग्नः स पुरापपूजितः
Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, Vol. III, No. 42 lines 7-8, p.203.
14. *Epigraphica Indica* p. 137 Verse 55
15. (666) *Epigraphica Indica,* I. 200-1.
16. By Sallakhana.
17. Khaira Plates, *Epigraphica Indica,* XII, page 211.
18. A. Eram posthumous Stone inscription of Goparāja -*Nepal inscriptions* of 705 A.D.
B. Balataru inscription of Śaka 799 of Rājendra

Coladeva. *Epigraphica Indica,* VI. 213; XX. 168, X.39, XVI. 10, etc.
C. Satī memorial Stone, JBORS XXII, pt. IV.

19. The Sravana Belagola Records: *Epigraphica Indica* I, p.140.
20. शूद्रकोऽग्निं प्रविष्टः।Com. thereon: अग्निप्रवेशोऽपि सर्वस्वांरनामके यज्ञविशेषे।
21. *Raghuvaṃśa* VIII. 94: प्रायोपवेशनमतिर्नृपतिर्बभूव।
Mallinātha quotes some purāṇa:
प्रायोपवेशनेऽनशनावस्थाने मतिर्यस्य स बभूव।
अत्र पुराणवचनम् –
समासक्तो भवेद्यस्तु पातकैर्महदादिभिः।
दुश्चिकित्सैर्महारोगैः पीडितो वा भवेत्तु यः।
स्वयं देहविनाशस्य काले प्राप्ते महामतिः।।
आबाह्मणं वा स्वर्गादिमहाफलजिगीषया।
प्रविशेज्ज्वलनं दीप्तं कुर्यादनशनं तथा।।
एतेषामधिकारोऽस्ति नान्येषां सर्वजन्तुषु।
नराणामथ नारीणां सर्ववर्णेषु सर्वदा।।
22. *Ain-i-Akabari,* Blochmann, vol. II Chevers p. 664.
23. महाप्रस्थानयात्रा च कर्तव्या तुहिनो परि।
आश्रित्य सत्यं धैर्यं च सद्यः स्वर्गप्रदा हि सा।।
Tīrthakhaṇḍa, p. 258.
24. नदीकूलं यथा वृक्षो वृक्षं वा शकुनिर्यथा।
तथा त्यजन्निमं देहं कृच्छ्राद्ग्राहाद्विमुच्यते॥Manu VI.78.
25. तथा च ब्रह्मगर्भः। यो जीवितुं न शक्नोति महाव्याध्युपपीडितः महाप्रस्थानगमनं ज्वलनाम्बुप्रवेशनम्। भृगुपतनं चैव। वृथा नेच्छेत्तु जीवितुम्।Aparārka, p. 536.
He also maintains that suicide adds bliss and in supoport quotes verses from *Ādipurāṇa* p. 877.

C. RAJENDRAN

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION

An attempt is made in this paper to explore the principles of evaluation implicit in the Dhvani doctrine of Ānandavardhana. Evaluation of literature, the concern of judicial criticism is the most tricky aspect of literary criticism. Evaluation is always based on 'axiology', the theory of value, but there is no such axiology by means of which we can grade a variety of literary experiences into any meaningful hierarchy (Ruthven: 1979:181). Neverthless, evaluation is unavoidable and probably implicit in any pronouncement regarding literature. Literary critics are often confronted with the problem of finding out the real value of the work in question and they apply, consciously or unconsciously, an axiology of their own in reaching a meaningful conclusion. Our own notion of great literature largely rests upon this type of perpetual evaluation. Allen Tate is therefore quite justified in making the comment that judicial criticism is 'perpetually necessary' and 'perpetually impossible' (1951:44). It is interesting to note that Ānandavardhana also, in his *Dhvanyāloka*, makes use of an axiology of his own and evaluates literary works, though the main purpose

of the work is the exposition of the Dhvani doctrine.

Ānandavardhana cites and comments upon a vast bulk of contemporary and past literature during the course of the exposition of the Dhvani doctrine. The works cited by him include epics *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*, *kāvyas* like *Kumārasambhava* and *Meghasandeśa* and *gadyakāvyas* like *Harṣacarita* and *Kādambarī* and dramas like *Veṇīsaṃhāra* and *Ratnāvalī*. He cites stray verses of authors like Amaruka also. Apart from these, he refers to the vast Prakrit literature as epitomised in works like *Gāthāsaptaśatī* of Hāla also. We can form an idea of the principles of evaluation of the author from his treatment of this literature before him.

Western literary criticism refers to two types of axiology in literary evaluation, viz. the 'aestheticist' and the 'affectivist'. As per the former, literary works are evaluated on the basis of aesthetic values. Political, moral and psychological impact of the work is the concern of the latter (Ruthven: 1979: 181-82). Ānandavardhana's approach to literature can be seen as largely aestheticist since he very often evaluates works of art on the basis of aesthetic considerations. However, it is not correct to say that he was averse to affectivist axiology altogether. In fact, it can be seen that Ānandavardhana tried to evolve a comprehensive axioligy which could combine aesthetic and moral principles alike. In this respect, he has a parallel in Kant who believed that the beautiful is 'the symbol of the morally good' (1790:250).

Ānandavaradhana seems to have considered the art of suggestion as the very touchstone of a poetic genius. He equates suggested meaning in poetry with the beauty of the women and points out that its presence is a feature of the verses of great poets (I:4). According

to him it is the suggested meaning manifested in poetry which is the hallmark of a great poet (I.6). Ānandavardhana further points out that the status of a *Mahākavi* can be attained only by mastering the art of suggestion and not by the mere capacity of uttering forth the plain meaning (I.8). The exalted status a *Mahākavi* enjoys in Ānandavardhana's concept can be inferred from his pronouncement that only 'two or three, or at the most five or six poets like Kālidāsa are counted as such great poets' (I.6).

It is, therefore, not surprising that Ānandavardhana shows a marked preference for *dhvanikāvya*, which, as per his doctrine, is poetry par excellence, and superior to other types of poetry like *citra* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. He does not consider *citrakāvya*, poetry devoid of any emotive suggestion, as poetry proper. He denounces poetry devoid of *rasa* as a solecism on the part of the poet by virtue of which the latter sinks into oblivion (III.19). The evaluatory significance of these remarks cannot be lost sight of in the light of the author's remark that he has postulated *citra* variety of *kāvya* simply because of the practice of recalcitrant poets to compose verses without bothering about their emotive significane (III.24). It has no aesthetic significane worth the name. Though Ānandavardhana does not cite any such poem by name, it is clear that he does not attach any significance to verbal acrobatics indulged in by even great poets with total disregard to the overall emotional significance.

According to Ānandavardhana, even in *dhvanikāvya* proper, distractions like *yamaka* and *anuprāsa* strike jarring notes (II.14.15). In other words, a poet's orientation towords *citrakāvya* definitely diminishes the aesthetic value of poetry, like the laboured *śāstrakāvyas*, the *dvisandhānakāvyas*, etc., and portions like the

yamakasargas even in works like *Raghuvaṃśa* belong to the category of *citrakāvya* and as such are not reckoned as instances of great poetry by Ānandavardhana.

Ānandavardhana's attitude to *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyakāvya* is not this much clear. While he painstakingly and consistently distinguishes between *dhvani* and the *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, he also maintains that the latter resolves ultimately into the former in view of its suggestion of *rasa* (III.40). In one instance, he asserts that 'one should not be unduly obsessed by *dhvani* everywhere' (III.39) only to retract it in the next instance that 'there is no variety of poetry which goes beyond the province of dhvani' (III.42). In a good many instances, as in the verse *'nyakkāro hy ayam eva'*, etc., cited for the suggestiveness of declensional and conjugational suffixes, there is a suggested meaning which is subordinated to the expressed meaning and another one, the *rasa*, which occupies the predominant position. It is not at all *clear* how Ānandavardhana would evaluate such instances in comparison with instances of 'pure' *rasadhvani*.

This ambivalence of Ānandavardhana has been the cause of some grave theoretical problems for authors like Mammaṭa who use terms *uttama, madhyama* and *adhama* to designate the three types of poetry mentioned above. This categorisation implies value judgement, but the possibility of the same poem becoming *madhyama* and *uttama* types of poetry confounds the discerning critic. To which category can we assign verses like *'nyakkāro hy ayam eva'* etc., and why? Further, as per the Dhvani theory, not-so-elegant verses like *'bhrama dhārmika'* etc., would be instances of *uttamakāvya*, while beautiful verses like *'Prayacchatoccaiḥ kusumāni mānini'* etc., and *'patyuśśiraś candrakalām'*, etc., will have to be relegated to the status of *madhyamakāvya* , at least in view of their subordination of the suggested meaning in the from of *vastumātra*.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that critics like Mahimabhaṭṭa do not accept Ānandavardhana's dictum that suggested meaning does not become subordinated to the expressed meaning in *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. According to Mahima, there is no perceptible difference whatsoever between *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* with regard to the status of the suggested meaning (1982:161). It may be recalled that Jagannātha Paṇḍita, in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*, tries to overcome the difficulty caused by the relegation of *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyakāvya* to *madhyamakāvya*, by postulating a fourfold classification of poetry with *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* enjoying the status of *uttamottama* and *uttama* varieties (188:11-21).

It seems that Ānandavardhana gave utmost importance to poetic genius in the reckoning of the greatness of a word of art. It is poetic genius which enables poets to master the art of suggestion.The *pratibhā* of the poet is capable of even submerging defects in their poetry caused by the lack of erudition. On the other hand,the defects resulting from the lack of insight cannot be brushed aside so lightly since it prominently manifests itself (III.5).

Generally speaking, we can see that Ānandavardhana's axiology is aestheticist, though he applies moral criticism also in the evaluation of literature. Ānandavardhana tried to evolve a comprehensive axiology by postulating *aucitya* as the cardinal principle of *rasadhvani*. *Aucitya* is the principle of propriety which combines both aesthetic and moral values. This is contrary to the view held by Oscar Wiodo who prefaced 'the Picture of Dorian Gray' with the statement of Huysman that 'there is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all' (Ruthven: 079:182). To illustrate, upholding the principle of *aucitya*, Ānandavardhana criticises Kālidasa for having depicted the carnal love of Śiva and Pārvatī in the eighth canto of *Kumārasambhava*. The depiction may be beautiful on aesthetic considerations, but morally

it is repugnant just as the depiction of the carnal love of one's own parents (III.5.). However, he hastens to add that such a defect is concealed by the genius of such a great poet like Kālidāsa. From this, it is evident that Ānandavardhana supplements his aestheticist axiology with moralistic and other principles by accepting the necessity of *aucitya*.

A perusal of *Dhvanyāloka* shows that Ānandavardhana had a profound perspective on Sanskrit literature and that he could distinguish between great and trivial literatures. He gives an exalted position to great authors like Vyāsa, Vālmiki and Kālidāsa. He was the first author to apply the maxim 'small is beautiful' in literature by recognising the stray verses of Amaruka as compositions having distinct individuality. It was, again Ānandavardhana who recognised the literary value of the vast folk poetry in Prakrit, treating it side by side with Sanskrit poetry. In fact, it is no exaggeration that through his Dhvani theory, Ānandavardhana could formulate a more or less sound axiology to evaluate the vast literature before him.

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APARNA CHATTOPADHYAY

SOME FACTS NOTICED IN ROCK EDICT I - A STUDY

According to Rock Edict I, in the kitchen of Devānāmpriya Priyadarśin many hundred thousands of animals were slaughtered daily for the sake of curry (for the purposes of curries)[1]. Here we should examine first if the exact number of living beings daily killed was hundred thousand or it is just a way of emphasizing upon the exceptionally large number of living beings daily slaughtered. In north Indian languages such a term is used when the idea of an exceptionally large number of things is to be conveyed. As observed by Mookerji[2], we possibly cannot and should not take here the number of living beings slaughtered, as given in the above edict, literally. In this matter Mookerji says that it is "probably an exaggeration from which the edicts are not free sometimes, like the literary work much maligned on that ground"[3].

But possibly it is not an exaggeration of facts but a way of expression to emphasize upon the excessive number of the living creatures slaughtered[4]. It has been aptly observed by an author in this matter that the number should be taken figuratively. Bhandarkar has

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cited the instance of king Rantideva of the *Mahābhārata*. In the kitchen of king Rantideva two thousand cattle and two thousand kine were slaughtered daily and by doling out meat to his people the king attained incomparable fame[5]. Bhandarkar forwards his opinion that like Rantideva, Aśoka must have been in the habit of distributing meat among his subjects and that his object in doing so must have been precisely the same, namely, that of making himself popular[6]. Bhandarkar's opinion does not seem to be convincing. Because Aśoka, during the years between his accession and the Kaliṅga war, had followed a ruthless repressive policy and after Kaliṅga war, though he changed into a benevolent ruler he never followed any appeasing policy. The very idea that Aśoka, when he was following the stern policy of an autocratic ruler, or when he turned into a pious and kind monarch, ever tried to please his subjects by distributing meat among them, seems absurd. And a ruler of the far-flung Maurya empire could not distribute fresh meat among all his subjects. He could distribute meat among the citizens of Pāṭaliputra. But that would not have helped him at all to win special affection or sympathy from the entire population of the whole empire.

In the *Mahāvaṃśa* we find that Aśoka continued for three years, the practice of his father of daily feeding sixty thousand Brāhmaṇas who were worthy of honour (who followed the path of a true Brāhmaṇa). Then he started to feed persons of other sects too, having tested in his audiance hall the standard of their knowledge[7]. Since in ancient India, the Brāhmaṇas and holy personages of other sects also, could be non-vegetarians, it is possible that slaughter of living creatures, as noticed in Rock Edict I, was meant for feeding deserving Brāhmaṇas and eminent persons of other sects and also guests, visitors, members of

the imperial family and persons who were attached to the court and palace.

Another point which may be historically correct is the following. Hiuen Tsiang tells us that in India soldiers dwelt in garrisons around the palace (of the king)[8]. We know that Candragupta Maurya performed the extraordinary task of dethroning the Nandas and he drove away the Greeks with the help of his army which was the very back-bone of his newly built empire and what was more important for him was the loyalty of the army. So it is possible that the slaughter of living creatures was meant for feeding the soldiers living in garrisons around the Maurya palace. Though from the account of Megasthenes, we do not get any corroborative data for it, there is a strong possibility, that the practice of killing daily a remarkably large number of living beings was to feed the soldiers too, who could thus feel contented and remain pleased with the monarch who might need their services at any moment and at any hour. So the imperial kitchen possibly was meant for the Brāhmaṇas and distinguished persons of other sects, the soldiers, army officials, state guests, visitors, members of the imperial household and others in the service of the court and palace. This kind of possibility has been suggested by Rajbali Pandey. He says that slaughter of lakhs of animals daily just for the members of the royal family is not possible. The killing of those living beings in all probability was done for feeding all the state officials and the army[9].

Bhandarkar has pointed out the practice of the rulers of the native states of British period, of doling out food to hundreds of people. It is to be noted that this practice of distributing free meals to large number of people daily, is still to be found in India among rulers of states big and small, rich landlords, merchants, etc.

Opening free rest houses (*dharmaśālās*) and charitable dispensaries, digging tanks for the public, distributing daily free meals - these are considered to be acts of piety leading to the acquisition of religious merit. If in modern times princes and well-to-do people could feed hundreds of people daily, it was not difficult for Maurya emperors like Bindusāra and Aśoka to feed larger number of people, though the number of sixty thousand Brāhmaṇas might have been an exaggeration and daily slaughter of many hundred thousands of living creatures is also an exaggeration.

The terms "dvo mora eko mago"

These terms in R.E.I.[10] require some analysis. The terms may mean two peacocks and one deer or two birds and one animal. On the basis of Buddhaghoṣa's commentary on *Bhayabherava-sutta* of the Majjhimanikāya, it has been observed that here in this edict simply two birds and one animal are meant.[11] The context of the *Bhayabheravasutta* may suggest the meaning of *mora* as just a bird and the meaning of *maga* as just an animal. Because here in *Bhayabheravasutta* we find a nocturnal scene in a forest. On a full-moon night or on a new-moon night or on the night of *aṣṭamī-tithi* (eighth day of the bright-half or dark-half of a month) when a Brāhmaṇa or a Śramaṇa, who still is not free from desires and attachments, goes to a lonely forest and dwells in a lonely hermitage and goes to worship Caityas, he will be scared when an animal (or a deer) comes near him or a bird (or a peacock) causes a branch of a tree fall down, or because of the murmuring noise of tree-leaves due to the blowing of the wind through them[12].

Here in the *Bhayabheravasutta*, the terms *mora* and *maga* can be taken in the general sense of a bird and an animal. The line "if a *mora* or a *maga* comes," suggests, 'if by chance a peacock or some bird comes

or some four footed animal (*maga*) comes to that spot.' This is what was possibly meant by Buddhaghosa, who did not mean that in Pali '*mora*' means not only peacock but any other bird too. The context of the text is always important in interpreting the implied meaning.

Secondly, it is to be noted that in Pali the term *mora* means peacock[13] and in Sanskrit also this term generally means peacock[14] though it may mean cock also according to "Lexicographers specially such as Amarasimha, Halayudha, Hemacandra, etc."[15]

In the case of Maurya imperial kitchen, however, the term *mora* most probably meant peacock and not cock. The soup of peacock's flesh is recommended for kings by Susruta, as it counteracts the effects of poison[16]. That Candragupta Maurya lived in constant fear of being poisoned or losing his life in some other way in the hands of his enemies, is noticed in history[17]. In Kautilya's *Arthasastra* we find elaborate rules for protecting the king from being poisoned and we find large number of articles of daily use apart from food articles, through which the king could be poisoned[18]. The same articles are noticed in *Caraka-samhita*[19] too and its list, in brief, is given by Susruta[20].

So the meat and soup of peacock's flesh as recommended by Susruta to neutralise the effects of poison were taken daily by the Maurya kings. It will not be wrong to infer that the term *mora* in Rock Edict I, means peacock and no other bird. The flesh of peacock was also a delicacy for the people of ancient India. It was eaten by people also as one of the common varieties of meat[21].

As regards the term *maga* in Rock Edict I, it may not mean exclusively deer but also some other animal like sheep, goat, etc.[22] But the greater possibility

is that it means deer, because the flesh of deer was a food for the aristocracy[23].

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RAMESH S. BETAI

RADHA KRISHNAN IN "HEART OF HINDUSTAN"

The title of this collection of seven papers is significant. The philosopher is an apostle of peace and humanism from India and he talks to us as also to the western world about where exactly the heart of India lies and how it breathes, what the inner humanism of the country is and how India, with its multiple races and their varied *dharmas* have a common bond that keeps all together into what the author knows as Hindustan. It is Hindustan, not because in this country Hindus are in a majority but because the word "Hindu" as Radhakrishnan here understands, has a very wide and significant meaning in which faiths of all other races living on this common soil are covered up and enveloped. The basic teachings and concepts of all *dharmas* in India are just the same and this is the heart of Hindustan, of the people who live in this land. This can be illustrated by these words of the author. He says, "With the openness of mind characteristic of the philosophic temper, the Hindus believe in the relativity of the creeds to the general character of the people who profess them. Religion is not a mere theory of the supernatural which we can put on or off as we please. It is an expression of the

spiritual experience of the race, a record of its social evolution, an integral element of the society in which it is found. That different people should profess different faiths is not unnatural" (p.3)and, according to Sura V-69 of the *Holy Qu'ran*, "Verily, those who believe (the moslems) and those who are Jews, Christians or Sabaeans, whoever hath faith in God and the last day, and worketh that which is right and good - for them shall be the reward with their Lord; there will come no fear on them; neither shall they be grieved" (p.59) and Radhakrishnan states, "Both Islam and Hinduism at their best teach that true religion is to serve God in truth and purity and obey His laws reverently in all affairs of life" (p.72) and "It is a matter of great satisfaction that under the impulse of higher criticism, the increasing knowledge of nature, idealist philosophy, comparative religion, the psychology of the religious consciousness and a deeper acquaintance with mystic experience, Christian thinkers are engaged in a reconstruction of belief that brings Christianity near the Hindu religion and promises to bridge the gulf that separates the Christian from other religions"(p.74).

Radhakrishnan thus lays emphasis on the essential unity of all religions and it is from this that the humanistic outlook of the authors springs. This unity is essentially in the inner spirit, in the very core of the teaching of all religions and not in the externals on which followers of religions often tend to lay greater emphasis, and, as a result, (i) to emphasise the supremacy of one's own religion, and often to spread a campaign of hatred which is never preached by any religion. Radhakrishnan wants all men to know that "Freedom is the nature of man; bondage is due to the barriers that shut us from ourselves. Our slavery is complete when we begin to hug it. If we break our selfishness, which walls us all from the world and identify

ourselves with the larger ends, we can gradually develop the love that casteth our fear, disarms all hatred and breaks all springs of bitterness" (p. 76).

It is conceded that mutual distrust, hatred, a spirit of one's own religion being the best, taking to arms for the so-called defence of one's religion, etc. overcome the mind of man when he is guided only by the externals, the superficialities and often the timely preachings that have only an external social or other purpose and interest these are not the true spirit of any religion, not even of ethics of any religion. Ethical endeavour consists in an attempt to live on earth, every moment of our life, in the sweet spirit of adoration, in the glad consciousness of an external relationship with God. The ideal man lives always in the light of heaven, and his life embodies the great virtues of truth, purity, love and renunciation"(p.13), states Dr. Radhakrishnan. He further states, "The *Dharma* has two sides, which are interdependent, the individual and social. The conscience of the individual requires a guide and he has to be taught the way to realise his purpose and live according to spirit and not sense" (p.15). And this becomes possible only when man probes deep into the inner, the genuine, the real spirit of one's own religion and decides to follow it, to practice it. Muslims are expected to realise that "In the *Qu'ran* there are ever so many things of strictly local and temporal interest, which are not at all relevant to religion *quq* religion" (p.56). It is only when man probes deep into the spirit of his own religion that a genuine muslim, say like Sir Ahmed Hussain, will realise that Islam" is not inconsistent with *true* Christianity or any other *true* religion," for, all religions have for their essence the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Only the sectarian dogmatic creeds fight one another" (p.60). Only then will Sir Charles Townshend contend in his defence of Kut-el-Amara that "The Hindu population

of India has made the cause of religious freedom of all the races of India its own" (p.62). And it is in this spirit that Radhakrishnan has hopes for the future to state that "Though the interaction of Islam and Hinduism, which are today looking towards each other, India's vision of harmonising the different religious systems that have met on her soil will be promoted (p. 62)".

Radhakrishnan thus analyses the externals and the internal essential spirit of all *dharmas* and states that if all this be the reality, man shall not cultivate a spirit of "religious tolerance" - *sarvadharma sahiṣṇutā* - as Christianity may concede, but a spirit of "acceptance in equal love and regard all religions" - *sarvadharma-samabhāva* as Gandhiji would like to stress. The thinking of Radhakrishnan is just on these lines even though, in the present context, he does not use these words of Mahatma Gandhi. And he has no doubt in his mind that once man comes to the state of probing deep into the inner essential spirit of his own religion, he will find that all religions in the world breathe the same spirit. And if this is true of all religions, a spirit of Universal brotherhood and love for all humanity at large is bound to evolve. It will only then be, to state in the words of Radhakrishnan that "Sri Ahmed Hussain believes that all religions profess belief in one and the same reality", "One and only one God who is Infinite and Absolute, who hath neither beginning nor end, who is not conditioned or limited by anything whatever. Yezdan, Ishvara, Jehovah, God, Allah are the names in different languages of the same Infinite and Absolute God" (p.63).

In the days in which the present papers were published, the process of racial and communal conflicts had already commenced, and, as a result, social and political restiveness was on; it was assuming serious proportions. This resulted in the "Quit India Movement"

mostly supported only by Hindus; and later on partition of India into India and Pakistan. The cheap propaganda on one side was "Islam in danger" and so on. This led to the inconceivable carnage on the borders in which two million and more men and women were ruthlessly slaughtered, thousands of women were raped and what not! Mutual hatred led to several wars and the recent very serious problems of Kashmir and Punjab still lurk in a virulent form on our borders. Communal riots have become common. Religion is the basis of these conflicts. If we were to ask Dr. Radhakrishnan "What now Dr. Radhakrishnan," he will state like Gandhi, with all force at his command that what he stated in the *Heart of Hindustan* is all the more true to-day. Humanity, love, mutual faith, etc., guided by the innermost secret doctrines of all religions, must be made the be-all and end-all of life. Man is today at cross-roads. One road is likely to lead to uplift and goodness and blessedness in life; the other can lead to total extinction in which perhaps no religious faith will survive. Man has to make his choice, to take his decision.

Radhakrishnan has deep faith in the inner potentialities of religions. All roads ultimately lead to God and God is the same in all religions. The very first verse of the *Qu'ran* says:

"Say, He alone is God: God the Eternal. He begetteth not and is not begotten; there is none like unto Him." Sura VI. 104 states: "Sight perceives Him not, but He perceives men's sight; for He is the knower of all secrets, the Aware." This sounds very much like the Upanishads, may be even like the doctrines of Śaṅkara to some extent. Rightly did Caliph Ali say:

"God was not like any object that the human mind can conceive, no attribute can be ascribed to Him

which bore the least resemblance to any quality of which human beings have perception from their knowledge of material objects. The perfection of piety consists in *knowing* God; the perfection of knowledge is the affirmation of His verity; the perfection of verity is to acknowledge His Unity in all sincerity; and the perfection of sincerity is to deny all attributes to the Deity. God has no relation to place, time or measure" (quoted on p. 64).

It would thus mean that if a misconception of the spirit of *dharma* and too much of emphasis on it can invite all faiths to their extinction, even if a unity of all races is to be attained only *dharma* can help, only religion in its true perspective is the hope. Radhakrishnan expects man to realize this inner spirit of *dharma* which is almost the same in religions and faiths. Man must be made to realise that peace and prosperity of humanity lie in the basic similarity, shall we say, oneness of all religions. Overemphasis on the externals of *dharma* can lead to destruction, while the realization and experience of the oneness of *dharmas* and the essential oneness of all races can lead to progress, uprise, sublimation. Says Dr. Radhakrishnan:

"The very name *Ar. Rahman,* with which every chapter opens, expresses the conviction that divine love enfolds all creation. It works in man so as to remove the veil from the heart of the creature and draws him near to God (p.65)".

Again Dr. Radhakrishnan states: "Man is made in the image of God and so, is not naturally depraved......" The Hebrew story - "Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste brought death into the world and all our woe" - endorses the Hindu view that sorrow and suffering, consequent on sin and stupidity, are produced by man, though God allowed them when he gave us

freedom. God, as we saw, does not deal with us as a potter with day, but gave us full freedom to realise our destiny"(p.87).

Radhakrishnan has unstinted faith in the essential and ultimate goodness and inner potentialities of man. He does not accept the concept of natural depravity of man. He would therefore not lose faith in man and his humanity and would accept that ultimately man will come on the right path; the process might be slow, very slow. He adds: "Salvation is more a gradual development of the diving in us than a gift due to the grace of God. Modern psychological analysis of the act of redemption makes it clear to us that God acts in the development of the individual soul more from within than from without" (p.88).

This very wide vision of *dharma* as also man and his humanity leads Radhakrishnan to faith in the future of mankind. To him, this future is bright and lustrous. What is required is to trace the right path and then decide firmly to tread on it. *Dharma* in the *universal* sense of the term and faith in and a firm resolve to follow God can and will lead man to divinity. Actually this divinity lies within man and it must come out. What we require is inward renewal. Radhakrishnan states:

"When we undergo this inward renewal of mind, heart and will, when we give up our self-regarding life, we find a self which beats in *unison* with the impersonal and the *universal* good. This is "to be saved. The secret of salvation is not a change of creed but an inward renewal (p.88)" and this renewal will come. That is the reason why Radhakrishnan adds:

"The ascended Christ says: "I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God and he shall go no more out."

The expression that 'he shall go no more out' has a family likeness to the Hindu view that the saved soul does not return to the struggle of *saṃsāra*" (p.91).

Religion, conception of God and their deep influence on man's life as man, as a human being, as a consciousness that struggles to sublimate itself will thus have an impact on human ethics, morality and civilization and culture in all of which man shall be able to find common elements and he will then, on his own, experience that:

ayaṃ nijaḥ paro veti gaṇanā laghucetasām /
udāracaritānāṃ tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam //

"Only the insignificant minds do entertain considerations such as- "This is mine and that one not," while for the large hearted liberal souls the entire world is just one family".

And true it is and well emphasised that - *dharmo viśvasya jagataḥ pratiṣṭhā* the entire world is firm rooted in *dharma*."

In *Religion and Society* Radhakrishnan agrees with St. Paul when he states:

".........though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day . . . . while we look not at the things which are seen, for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal" (p.46).

And in the present work which reveals successfully the heart of the religions in this country, he has taken for granted that :

"All religions spring from the saved soil of the human mind and are quickened by the same spirit. The different

systems are tentative adjustments, more or less satisfatory to spiritual reality" (*East and West in Religion*, p. 19).

He also states:

"Religions have failed because we did not take them seriously. Their chief aim is the remarking of man. Self-will, egotism, insisting on playing one's own hand, making one's own bargain, furthering one's own interests at the expense of others, are the sources of all frustration" (*Religion and Society*, p.70).

This clarifies that the title of the present work rightly reveals before us the "Heart of Hindustan" in the sense of revealing the inner essential spirit of all religions and all conceptions of God being one and thus bringing about oneness in the life of all Indians.

This thinking and conception of the great scholar, every inch an Indian, is quite in tune with his conception of *dharma*, human life, its real happiness as also its meaningfulness that found a larger and more detailed analysis in his *"Religion and Society," "East and West in Religion", "Idealist view of life"*, etc. All these works breathe the life and yield the nectar of the best that Indian philosophy has to offer. In his *Heart of Hindustan* the heart is the very basic essence of Hinduism that he finds in other religions that are practised in India, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. in particular. That is the reason why he expects man genuinely to live in religion and then to allow religion to take care of itself and wider humanity at large. He says:

"Any serious pursuit of ideas, any search after conviction, any adventure after virtue, arises from resources whose name is religion. The research of the mind for

beauty, goodness and truth is the search for God," (*Religion and Society*, p.47),

and

" To do justly, to love beauty, and to walk humbly with the spirit of truth is the highest religion. This experience is not confined to any race or climate," (*Religion and Society*, p.47),

and

"Thought, when it thinks itself out to the end, becomes religion by being loved and tested by the supreme test of life. The discipline of philosophy is at the same time the fulfilment of a religious vocation" (p.48).

GANESH U. THITE

SUBJECT - PREDICATE - ORDER IN THE PROSE OF KĀLIDĀSA

(with special reference to his Abhijñānaśākuntala)

It is wellknown that the Sanskrit authors many times preferred verse to prose. Even scientific literature is at times written in verse-form. The peculiar nature of the Sanskrit language allows many authors to prefer verse to prose. On the other hand the following line also is equally wellknown: *gadyaṃ kavīnāṃ nikaṣaṃ vadanti* which says that prose is the real test of a poet. This line indicates that since many authors write in poetry there is nothing difficult in writing verses. To compose a good literary piece in prose is however a very difficult thing. The reason behind this way of thinking is that the high standards of prose which were before the authors of the later Classical Sanskrit works were so difficult to achieve that even to go near to those standards was considered to be a great achievement. And therefore prose was considered to be the test of an author. It must however be emphasized that the prose intended here is of Gauḍī-style. Thus this type of prose consists of long compounds, long sentences, alliterations, puns and similar word-plays. This type of prose is often found in the works of Subandhu, Bāṇa, etc. And it is this type of prose which was considered

to be the test of an author. This is quite in keeping with the pedantic values which prevailed in the decadent period in the history of Sanskrit literature. Not only the aurhors of Campū-literature but the authors of dramas in Sanskrit tried to follow this path.

The history of Sanskrit prose has however some other aspects also. The prose of the Brāhmaṇa-texts, that of the *Pañcatantra and Hitopadeśa*, that of the dramas of Bhāsa, Kālidāsa and Śūdraka, etc. shows quite a different type of features. This prose is characterised by small sentences, small compounds, witty dialogues and numerous colloquialisms. In short we can say that this prose represents living, dynamic and effective Sanskrit speech.

Kālidāsa is better known through his verses. In the three dramas ascribed to him there are many verses. It seems however that little attention has been paid to Kālidāsa's prose from the point of view of language study. In this paper it is intended to draw attention to one aspect of the prose of Kālidāsa namely the order of words, particularly that of subeject and predicate (*uddeśya* and *vidheya*).

Generally speaking, there are no hard and fast rules regarding the order of words in a Sanskrit sentence. The words can generally convey their meanings wherever they may be. This is particularly so in verses. But still we should note that the commentators like Mallinātha comment on verses following the natural order of the words which is called *daṇḍānvaya*. This clearly means that even in Sanskrit the natural order of words is subject, object and verb. The adjectives precede the words they qualify. The subject is always placed before the predicate. In Kālidāsa's prose we do find this natural order followed in some sentences. Thus see the sentences *tvam api svaniyogam aśūnyaṃ kuru* (p.451)[1]; *śāsanabhūmimārgam ādeśaya* (p.510);

svakarmānuṣṭhīyatām (p.519): *athavā bhavitavyatā khalu balavatī*(p.523), etc.

A very striking feature of the prose style of Kālidāsa is that very often predicate comes first and then the subject.

The subject and predicate order seems to have changed for the sake of emphasising the predicate. Thus for example in many sentences containing the verb in imperative, the verb preceds the subject or object. See for example the following sentences: *avatartu āyuṣmān* (p.433); *śṛṇotu āryaḥ* (p.440); *ājñāpayatu bhartā* (499); *upasarpatu āryaḥ* (p.449);*jayatu svāmī*(p.449);*pralapatu evaṃ vaidheyaḥ* (p.450);*apanayantu bhavatyo mṛgayāveṣam* (p.451); *āsane niṣīdatu bhavān* (p.451); *gacchāgrataḥ* (p.451);*ādiśyantāṃ śārṅgaravamiśrāḥ śakuntalānayanāya* (p.483);*ājñāpyatāṃ bhavān* (p. 490);*ārohatu dev aḥ*(p.499); *prasīdantu bhāvamiśrāḥ* (p.511);*prasīdatv āryaḥ*(p.517); *yathākāmam adhyāstāṃ vinodasthānāni mahārājaḥ* (p.520); *paritrāyatāṃ devaḥ saṃśayagrastaṃ vayasyam* (p.537); *avataratu āyuṣmān* (p.545).

In some sentences there is a passive imperative form. In such sentences the verb precedes the object which is in the nominative case . See thus: *tat pratipātraṃ ādhīyatāṃ yatnaḥ* (p.427); *tena hi vimucyantām abhīṣavaḥ* (p.430); *tena hi pragṛhyantāṃ vājinaḥ* (p.531);*pratigṛhyatām atithisatkāraḥ* (p.432); *mucyatām eṣa jālopajīvī* (p.513), *nanu vāryatām eṣa dhṛṣṭaḥ* (p.530); *dṛśyantām atrabhavatāṃ ṛṣīṇāṃ tapovanabhūmayaḥ* (p.545).

There are some other sentences which contain active imperative forms. There is no subject but the object follows the verb. Thus see: *kathayāmi te bhūtārtham* (p. 428); *paśyainaṃ vyāpādyamānam* (p.431); *codayāśvān* (p.432); *śithilaya tāvad etat* (p.434); *paritrāyethāṃ mām anena durvinītena duṣṭamadhukareṇa abhibhūyamānam*

(431); *anujānīhi naḥ utajagamanāya* (p.488); *tena hi nivartaya pūrvagatān vanagrāhiṇaḥ* (p.450); *paridhatsva sāmpratam vicitram kṣaumayugalam* (p.486); *pariṣvajasva mām sakhījanam ca* (p.491); *dehi me vivaram* (p.509); *avalambasva mām* (p.516); *latāsaṃśritā drakṣyāmi tāvat tasyāḥ pratikṛtim* (p.522); *trāyasva mām* (p.523).

In some other sentences containing imperative forms of verbs there is no object. The verb is used before the subject. Thus *āsane niṣīdatu bhavān* (p.451); *anuśāstu bhavān* (p.509); *prasīdatu āryaḥ* (p.517); *jayatu mahārājaḥ* (p.519).

In some other sentences also active finite verbs precede the subject. See thus: *yad ājñāpayaty āyuṣmān* (p.430); *atītya harito 'pi harīn vartante vājinaḥ* (p.431); *priyam api tathyam āha śakuntalām priyaṃvadā* (p. 435); *asti ko 'pi kauśika iti gotranāmadheyo mahaprabhāvo rājarṣiḥ* (p.440). (this is a very famous type of sentences, in narrating stories as in *Pañcatantra*, etc.); *śroṣyāmyāsam viśrambhakathitāni* (p.461); *avitatham aha priyaṃvadā* (p.463); *avadhīraṇabhīru punar vepate me hṛdayam* (465); *pratinivartāmahe vayam* (p.508); *prasphurato mama agrahastau asya granthicchedakasya vadhasumanasaḥ pinaddhum* (513), *skhalatīva me dṛṣṭir nimnontapradeśeṣu* (p.527); *asty atra me bhāvacihnam* (p.528); *asti kālanemiprasūtir durjayo nāma dānavagaṇaḥ* (p.539); *sādhāyamy aham* (p.546); *vardhate tava saṃrambhaḥ* (p.547); *santi punar nāmadheyasādṛśyāni* (p.551); *yadājñāpayati bhagavān* (p.559).

The subject-predicate order is at times reversed for the sake of emphasis in sentences containing the word *khalu*. Instead of sayingA is B it is said,"B indeed is (what is) A". This stylistic pattern is observed in the following sentences: *pratyādeśaḥ sa khalu rūpavatīnām* (p.453); *paravatī khalu tatrabhavatī* (p. 453); *balavān khalu me abhilāṣaḥ* (p.462); *arthavān khalu me rājaśabdaḥ* (p.500); *upapannaḥ khalu aṅgulīyakasyāgamaḥ* (p.513):

utsavapriyāḥ khalu manuṣyāḥ (p.518); *anabhijñāḥ khalu īdṛśasya rūpasya mohadṛṣṭir ayam janaḥ* (p.528); *kaṣṭam khalv anapatyatā* (p.534); *śūnyaṃ khalv idam* (p.537); *utsarpiṇi khalu mahatāṃ prārthanā* (p.546); *pratipālyāvasaraḥ khalu prastāvaḥ* (p.546); *āryaputraḥ khalv eṣaḥ* (p.553).

It is worthy to be noted that in these sentences the verb is not used. It is understood. There is also a counter example where the subject is also used first and then the predicate: *athavā bhavitavyatā khalu balavatī* (p.523). It may be remarked that in this sentence the emphasis is on *bhavitavyatā* rather than on *balavatī*.

In some other sentences also the construction is of the following type: "B (is what is) A". Thus predicate precedes the subject. The word *khalu* does not occur in such sentences. The verb is also not used but it is understood. Thus: *sadṛśam etat puruvaṃśasya* (p.432); *aho madhuram āsāṃ darśanam* (p.432); *asādhudarśī tatrabhavān kāśyapaḥ* (p.434); *ucitaṃ naḥ paryupāsanam atithīnām* (p.438); *sanāthā idānīṃ dharmacāriṇaḥ* (p.440); *aniyantraṇānuyogas tapasvijano nāma* (p.441); *nadīvegas tatra kāraṇam* (p.448); *saviśeṣam me vacaḥ* (p.449); *nisargād apragalbhās tapasvikanyakāḥ* (p.453); *vighnavatyaḥ prārthitārthasiddhayaḥ* (p.474); *aviśramo 'yam lokatantrādhikāraḥ* (p.497); *svādhīnakuśalāḥ siddhimantaḥ* (p.501); *sāvalepo 'sya vacanopakṣepaḥ* (p.502), *tapovanasaṃvardhito 'nabhijñaḥ khalv ayam janaḥ kaitavasya* (p.506); *avasaropasarpaṇīyaḥ rājānaḥ* (p.503); *mahāprabhāvo rājarṣiḥ* (p.518), *nanu pravāte 'pi niṣkampā girayaḥ* (p.523); *anatikramaṇīyā divaspater ājñā* (p.540); *tena hy anatikramaṇīyāni śreyāṃsi* (p.544); *anāryaḥ paradāravyavahāraḥ* (p.550); *diṣṭyā akāraṇapratyādeśī nāryaputraḥ* (p.558).

There are some other sentences in which the predicates are of the nature of adjectives and they are used before

the subjects.The verb *asti* is understood there. Thus: *labdhāvakāsā me prārthanā* (p.443); *anirvarṇanīyaṃ parakalatram* (p.501); *tapovanasaṃvardhitaḥ anabhijno 'yaṃ janaḥ kaitavasya* (p.506); *avasaropasaraṇīyaḥ rājānaḥ* (p.513); *evaṃ utsuko 'pi priyadarśano devaḥ* (p.520); *agṛhītārthe avām* (p.516).

There are some sentences which contain past participles and they precede the subject. They form a part of the predicate. In these sentences finite verbs are generally not used. They are understood. See thus the following sentences: *ālikhhita iva sarvato raṅgaḥ* (p.429); *vismṛtaṃ khalu mayā* (p.429); *samidāharaṇāya prasthitā vāyam* (p.432); *bhavatīnāṃ sūnṛtayaiva girā kṛtam ātithyam* (p.438); *mandotsāhaḥ kṛto 'smi mṛgayāpavādinā māḍhavyena* (p.449); *tena hi gṛhītapātheyaḥ kṛto 'si tayā* (p.454); *kṛtaṃ bhavatā nirmakṣikam* (p.454); *anasūyām apyupagato madīyas tarkaḥ*(p.462); *upasthiteva ajanī* (p.473); *kasmiṃścit pūjārheparāddhā śūnyahṛdayā śakuntalā* (p.478); *gṛhītaḥ sandeśaḥ* (p.490) (here the subeject is not used); *pratihatam amaṅgalam* (p.500); *prathitaṃ duṣyantasya caritam* (p.507); *anuṣṭhito guror nideśaḥ* (p.508, no subject); *sevito nāma bhartā āvuttena* (p.514); *pratyavekṣitaḥ tapovanabhūmayaḥ* (p.520); *sarvathā pramārjitaṃ tvayā pratyadesaduhkham sakuntalayah* (p.532); *pratihatam amaṅgalam* (p.524); *anugṛhīto 'ham anayā maghavataḥ sambhāvanāya* (p.539); *saṃyantrito mayā rathaḥ* (p.544).

In some sentences the subordinate clauses contaning the forms of *yat* come after the principal clauses. Thus *asādhudarśī khalu tatrabhavān kāśyapo ya imam āśramadharme niyuṅkte* (p.434); *anavāptaphalo 'si yena tvayā draṣṭavyānāṃ paraṃ na dṛṣṭam* (p.451).

In the following constructions the subordinate clause is an object to the verb in the principal clause. The object should come before the verb. But here these

clauses come after the verb: *na jāne katham cikitsitavyo bhaviṣyatīti* (p.520); *śrūyatāṃ yadartham asmi hariṇā bhavatsakāśaṃ preṣitaḥ* (p.539).

In the following sentence also the subordinate clause is an object to the verb in the principal clause. The word *yat* however is not used. Here also the subordinate clause comes after the principal clause: *jānāmi viśrabdhakāryā ṛṣayaḥ* (p.500); *yat* is to be understood after *jānāmi*.

In another construction the subordinate noun clause is in apposition to the principal clause. The subordinate clause comes after the principal clause : *idam tat pratyutpannamati strainam iti yaducyate* (p.505).

In the following construction it is the subordinate noun clause subject to the verb *asti* which is understood in the principal clause: *na kila śrutaṃ yuvābhyāṃ yad vāsantikais tarubhir api devasya śāsanaṃ pramāṇīkṛtaṃ tadāśrayibhiś ca* (p.517).

There are a few miscellaneous sentences in which also the predicate is used before the subject . In *etu bhavān etu* (p.451), the first *etu* precedes the subject. Then it is repeated but in this second sentence the subject is not repeated. It is understood. Still here we can say that the verb preceds the subject. In the following sentence the subject *anārambhaḥ* is used after the word *pratīkārasya*. The verb is not used: *vikāraṃ khalu paramārthato jñātvā anārambhaḥ pratīkārasya,* (462). Similar is the case in the following sentence: *vanaukaso 'pi santo laukikajñā vayam* (p.491). In *śakya eṣa vācāmātreṇa viramayitum* (p.548); the word *eṣaḥ* is used before the word *śakyaḥ* after which the verb *asti* is understood.

It can be concluded on the basis of the sentences quoted above that the order of subject and predicate in many sentences of Kālidāsa's prose is just reverse[2].

It might have been done purposefully for the sake of giving emphasis on the predicate or it is possible that the order is just stylistic. In a verse which begins with the words *nyakkāro hy ayam eva* and is quoted in the first chapter of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, poeticians find the defect named *avimṛṣṭavidheyāṃśa*. For, in this verse the predicate is used first and then the subject. If their principle is applied to all the sentences quoted above, all the sentences will have to be considered to be defective. But they are not. Nor there is any defect in the verse just mentioned above. Only in sentences like *mūkaṃ karoti vācālam* the subject-predicate order has some meaning. In other cases it can be changed and then that order should not be regarded as defective. In dramatic conversation there is great importance to the rise and fall of the voice and some words are to be uttered emphatically. So it is quite understandable that the order of words may be reversed purposefully by the author. The same logic can be applicable to the verse *nyakkāro hy aym eva* also.

Notes: 1) The page-references in this paper refer to Rewaprasad Dvivedi (ed.): *Kālidāsa Granthāvali,* Varanasi, 1976.

2) This paper is limited to the *Abhijñānaśākuntala* only.

TEXTS & STUDIES

ఆంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరము

పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతము

ĀNDHRABHĀṢĀRATNĀKARAMU

(A Metrical Telugu Lexicon)

of

Paiḍipāṭi Lakṣmaṇakavi

Edited with Introduction

by

Dr. K.J. Krishnamoorthy, M.A., Ph.D.,

ఉపోద్ఘాతము

కవి :

ఆంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరమను ఈ లఘు నిఘంటువు (minor lexicon)ను రచించిన కవి పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి. ఈతడు ఉమామహేశ్వర వరప్రసాదాసాదిత కవిత్వవైభవుడు; ఏకామ్రనామాత్యుని తనూభవుడు. ఈ యంశము లిందలి యాశ్వాసాంతగద్య వలన తెలియుచున్నవి :

> "ఇది శ్రీ మదుమామహేశ్వర వరప్రసాదాసాదిత కవిత్వవైభవ, పైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రనామాత్య తనూభవ లక్ష్మణ కవి ప్రణీతంబైన యాంధ్ర భాషారత్నాకరంబను నైఘంటుకశాస్త్రంబునందుఁ బ్రథమాశ్వాసము."

'ఆంధ్రనామసంగ్రహ'మనెడి పద్యరూప నిఘంటువును రచియించిన ప్రసిద్ధుడగు పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి యొకడున్నాడు :

"తే.గీ. అంకిత మొనర్తుఁ దెనుఁగుపేళ్లరసి కూర్చి
గరిమతో నాంధ్రనామ సంగ్రహమనంగ
నమరు కృతిఁ బైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రమంత్రి
సుతుఁడఁ గవి లక్ష్మణాఖ్యుఁడ సుజనహితుఁడ"

– ఆంధ్రనామసంగ్రహము, దేవ వర్గు, ప. 3.

Vaikhā. SS. 1.1 says that one may set up the fires on the new or full moon day under Viśākhā. One desirous of progeny should establish fires under Viśākhā (Bhār. SS. 5.1.17, Āpas. SS. 5.3.14, Satyā. SS. 3.2, Mān. ŚS. 1.5.17).

The Anūrādhā asterism is also considered auspicious for establishing the sacred fires (Satyā. SS. 3.2). Vaikhā. SS. 1.1 suggests the new or full moon day under Anūrādhā as the most suitable. This asterism is considered to be most suitable for one desirous of prosperity (Bhār. SS. 5.1.17, Āpas. SS. 5.3.14, Satyā. SS. 3.2, Mān. SS. 1.5.17).

The Śravaṇa asterism too is considered suitable for the establishment of the sacred fires for a person desiring welfare (Āpas. ŚS. 5.3.14, Satyā. ŚS. 3.2). According to Vaikhā. ŚS. 1.1 one may establish the fires on the new or full moon day under the Śravaṇa asterism. According to Satyā. SS. 3.2 also this asterism is suitable.

The Prosthapadā too is an auspicious asterism for establishing the fires (Āśva. ŚS. 2.1.10). One desirous of firm support may establish under Prosthapadā (Mān. ŚS. 1.5.1.7). Also Bhār. SS. 5.1.17 says that this asterism is suitable for the establishment of fires for one desiring high position. According to Satyā. ŚS. 3.2 one desirous of Brahman splendour may establish under Prosthapada. Āpas. ŚS. 5.3.14 specifies the Uttarā Prosthapadā as suitable for establishing the fires for one desiring firm foundation.

DATE

In the Vedic texts there is also the discussion on the new-moon and the full-moon day from the point of view of establishment of the fires (M.S. 1.6.9, K.S. 8.1, Kp. K.S, 6.6, Āpas. ŚS. 5.3.17, Mān. ŚS. 1.5.1.8, Śān. ŚS. 2.1.7). K.S. 8.1 and Kp. K.S. 6.6 say that both these days are auspicious for obtaining merits. According to M.S. 1.6.9 the full moon and new moon days are identical with the breast of Prajāpati. If one establishes fires under either of these two days, one milks Prajāpati as it were. These two days represent the *Sadas* and *Havirdhāna* of the gods. Therefore one who establishes on these days, establishes fires on either of the auspicious days for both these days are connected with sacrifice.

Vaikhā. ŚS. 1.1 while saying that the new or full moon day is auspicious asterism also specifies the auspicious asterism.

నిశ్చితమైనది. కనుక, కొన్ని వ్రాతప్రతుల యాశ్వాసాంతగద్యలలో కనబడుచున్న 'అమరనామాత్యు'డను తండ్రి పేరు నాధారముగాగొని, ప్రకృత నిఘంటు రచయితయగు లక్ష్మణకవియు, ఆంధ్రనామసంగ్రహకారుడైన లక్ష్మణకవియు వేర్వేఱు వ్యక్తులని భ్రమింపరాదు.

కాలము :

తెలుగులో నిఘంటు నిర్మాణము క్రీ.శ.17వ శతాబ్దమునుండి ప్రారంభమైనది. క్రీ.శ. 1619–'37 సంవత్సరముల నడుమ "చౌడప్పసీసములు" అను లఘునిఘంటువును రచించిన కవిచౌడప్ప తొలి తెలుగు నిఘంటుకారుడుగా నెన్నబడుచున్నాడు.[5] క్రీ.శ.17వ శతాబ్ది మధ్యకాలమున వేంకటేశాంధ్రము, ఆంధ్రద్విరూపకోశము – అను నిఘంటువులను రచించిన గణపవరపు వేంకటకవి తెలుగునిఘంటు రచయితలలో ద్వితీయుడు. వేంకటకవికి ఇంచుక తరువాతి కాలమున 17వ శతాబ్ది చివరి భాగమున నుండినవాడు పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి. ఇట్లు కాలక్రమమునననుసరించి తెనుగు నైఘంటికులలో మూడవవ్యక్తి యైనను, ఈతడు రచించిన 'ఆంధ్రనామ సంగ్రహము' అంతకు మునుపు వెలువడియున్ననిఘంటువులను మించిన ప్రశస్తి ప్రచారములను పొందగల్గినది! ఇందులకు ముఖ్యహేతువు లక్ష్మణకవి యొక్క గ్రథనకౌశలమే!

రచన:

పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి రచించిన నిఘంటువులు రెంటిలో గ్రంథ పరిమితి, శైలీపరిణతి, కూర్పు నేర్పు – అను అంశములనుబట్టి చూచినయెడల 'ఆంధ్ర భాషారత్నాకర' మాతని తొలి రచనయని సులభముగా గుర్తింపవచ్చును. ఇట్లు ఈ కవియొక్క మొదటి కృతియైనను, ప్రకృతనిఘంటువు తెలుగుదేశమున నొకప్పుడు మిగుల ప్రచారము నొందియుండినదనుటకు తిరుపతి, మదరాసు,కాకినాడ లందలి గ్రంథాలయములలోగల పెక్కువ్రాతప్రతులు అక్షరసాక్ష్యములై యున్నవి.

ఈ నిఘంటువునకు మదరాసున గల యొక వ్రాతప్రతిలో వ్యాఖ్య వ్రాయబడియున్నది. శిష్టవ్యవహార భాషలో రచింపబడియున్న ఈ సంగ్రహవ్యాఖ్య దీని ప్రశస్తికి మఱియొక తార్కాణము.

వ్రాతప్రతులు :

ఈ పరిష్కరణమున ఉపయోగింపబడిన వ్రాతప్రతులు పంద్రెండు. వీటిలో తొలి పదునొకండు తాళపత్రప్రతులు. పంద్రెండవది కాగితపు ప్రతి. ఈ పంద్రెండింటిలో తిరుపతి శ్రీవేంకటేశ్వర విశ్వవిద్యాలయ ప్రాచ్య పరిశోధన సంస్థయందలివి ఏడు (అ, క, చ, ట, త, ప, గ). మదరాసు ప్రభుత్వ ప్రాచ్య లిఖిత గ్రంథాలయమందలివి రెండు ప్రతులు (జ, జ[1]). కాకినాడ ఆంధ్రసాహిత్య పరిషత్ గ్రంథాలయము నందలివి మూడు ప్రతులు (డ, ద, బ). ఈ మొత్తము ప్రతులలో దేనియందును అవతారిక లేదు. ఈ ప్రతులన్నింటియొక్క ముఖ్యాంశములు సంగ్రహముగా ఈ దిగువ నీయబడుచున్నవి.

అ [R.No.863(a)]

ఇది 125 పద్యముల సమగ్రప్రతి. ఇందాశ్వాస విభజనము లేదు. గ్రంథాంతమున షష్ఠాశ్వాసము పూర్తియైనట్లు తెలిపెడి ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్య యున్నది. తక్కిన ప్రతులెల్ల మూడాశ్వాసములతో (ఇంచుమించు 80 పద్యములలో) ముగియుచుండగా, ఈ యొక్క ప్రతియందు మాత్రమే తరువాతి గ్రంథభాగముకూడ లభ్యమగుచున్నది. 57పద్యముల పరిమితిగల ఈ 'తరువాతిగ్రంథభాగము'నకు ప్రత్యంతరము లభింపలేదు.

పాఠాంతరముల కవకాశములేని యీ భాగము (57 పద్యములు) తరువాతి సంచికలో ప్రచురింపబడనున్నది.

క [D.No.1371]

ఇది మూడాశ్వాసముల ప్రతి. ప్రథమాశ్వాసమున 26, ద్వితీయాశ్వాసమున 18, తృతీయాశ్వాసమున 25, వెరసి 69 పద్యములున్నవి.

చ [R.No.984 (b)]

ఇదియు మూడాశ్వాసముల ప్రతి. ప్రథమాశ్వాసమున 26, ద్వితీయాశ్వాసమున 23, తృతీయాశ్వాసమున 25, మొత్తము 74 పద్యములు

గలవు. ఒకటి రెండు చోటుల ఇందలి కొన్ని పదములకు లఘుటీక కాన్పించుచున్నది. ప్రతి చివర లేఖనకాలాదిక మిట్లు తెల్పబడినది :

"కాళయుక్తి సం॥ చైత్ర శు.13 స్థిరవారంసరికి దీక్షితుల వెంకన్న ఆంధ్రవ్యాకరణమ్కు టీక బాలసరస్వతియ్యమున్ను, ఆంధ్ర భాషారత్నాకరమున్ను స్వంతానికి వ్రాసుకునెను."

ఈ ప్రతి లేఖనకాలము క్రీ.శ.1858 మార్చినెల 27వ తేదీ శనివారము.

ట [R.No.399(b)]

ఈ ప్రతిలో ఆశ్వాస విభాగము లేదు. మొత్తము 69 పద్యములున్నవి. ప్రతిచివర తృతీయాశ్వాసము పూర్తియైనట్లు తెలిపెడి ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్య కలదు.

త [R.No.430(c)]

మూడుల్లాసముల ప్రతి. ప్రథమోల్లాసమున 26, ద్వితీయోల్లాసమున 19, తృతీయోల్లాసమున 21, మొత్తము 66 పద్యములు గలవు. ఇందలి విభాగములు 'ఆశ్వాసము'లని కాక, 'ఉల్లాసము'లని వ్యవహరింపబడియుండుట గమనింపదగినది. గ్రంథాంతమున వ్రాయసకాని వక్కణ మిట్లున్నది :

"పింగళనామ సం॥ ఫాల్గుణశుద్ధ 11 బుధవారంసరికి భాగవతుల లక్ష్మీనారాయణ ఆంధ్రరత్నాకరం సంపూర్ణంగా వ్రాసుకొనెను."

ఇది క్రీ.శ. 1858 ఫిబ్రవరి 24వ తేదీ యగుచున్నది.

ప [R.No.976(b)]

ఇందాశ్వాస విభజన లేదు. 42 పద్యములు గలవు. "మత్సరంబన రోసంబు" – అను పద్యముతో ఈ ప్రతి ముగియుచున్నది. (చూ. ద్వితీయాశ్వాసము, ప.18). అటు పిమ్మటగల ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్యలో "సర్వము నేకాశ్వాసము సంపూర్ణం" అని కలదు. ఈ ప్రతి చివర వ్రాయసకాడు లేఖన కాలమును, తన పేరును వివరించెడి యొక కందమును రచించియున్నాడు :

"కం॥ వరరౌద్రి నామ సంవ్వ
త్సర శ్రావణ శుక్లపక్ష దశిమీ గురువా
సరమున దంత్తుర్త్రాన్వయు
డిరువంద్దగ సుబ్బయాఖ్యు డింప్పుగ వ్రాసెన్"

ఈ లేఖనకాలము క్రీ.శ.1860 జూలై 26వ తేదీ గురువారమునకు సమానమైనది.

గ [R.No.785(b)]

మూడాశ్వాసములు గలవు. ప్రథమాశ్వాసమున 26, ద్వితీయాశ్వాసమున 22, తృతీయాశ్వాసమున 19, మొత్తము 67 పద్యములు గలవు. తృతీయాశ్వాసములో "చౌకళించెననఁగఁ జక్కఁగా" అను 20వ పద్యమునకు తరువాతి గ్రంథభాగముగల చివరి తాళపత్రము ప్రతినుండి లోపించినది.

జ [R.No.1895]

ఈ ప్రతిలో ఆశ్వాస విభాగము లేదు. ఇందలి పద్యములు 68. గ్రంథాంతమున ప్రథమాశ్వాసము పూర్తియైనట్లు తెల్పెడి ఆశ్వాసాంత గద్య యున్నది. అటుపిమ్మట గల ఈ క్రింది కందపద్యమువలన లేఖకుని నామధేయము, లేఖన కాలము తెలియుచున్నవి.

కం॥ వరహేమలంబి సంవ
త్సర కార్తిక శుక్ల పక్ష షష్ఠీ రవివా
సరమువర కాంధ్రరత్నా
కరమున్ గరమొప్ప తిమ్మకవి లిఖియించ్చెన్"

ఈ కాలము క్రీ.శ. 1837 నవంబరు 5వ తేదీతో సమానమగుచున్నది.

జ[1] [R.No.2197]

ఈ ప్రతిలో మూలము లేదు. కావున పాఠాంతరములకు ఇందవకాశము లేదు. 'జ'- ప్రతియందలి మూలమునసనుసరించి ఇందు ఒక్కొక్కపద్యమునకు

టీక వ్రాయబడియున్నది. వాడుక భాషలో రచింపబడిన ఈటీక ఆయా పదముల యర్థమును సంగ్రహముగా చక్కగా వివరించుచున్నది. ఇందు మొత్తము 67 పద్యములకు టీక గలదు. ఇందు ద్వితీయాశ్వాసమందలి "మత్సరంబన రోసంబు" (ప.18) - అను పద్యము మొదలుకొని తృతీయాశ్వాసమున "చెన్నుదలఁచు" (ప.2) - ఇత్యాది పద్యమువరకు గల ఏడెనిమిది పద్యముల టీక గల ఒక తాళపత్రము లుప్తమైనది.

'జ' - ప్రతిలేఖకుడైన తిమ్మకవియే ప్రకృతప్రతిని లిఖించినవాడు :

"ఆంధ్రరత్నాకరం ప్రథమాశ్వాసమునకు తెనుగు టీక. ఆన విలంబిసం॥ మార్గశిర బ.4 గురువారము. శ్రీరస్తు. శ్రీగురవే నమః. తిమ్మన్న లిఖితమిది."

ఈ లేఖనకాలము క్రీ.శ.1838 డిసెంబరు 6వతేదీ గురువారమునకు సరియగుచున్నది.

డ [178/6]

ఈ ప్రతిలో ఆశ్వాస విభజనము లేదు. మొత్తము 69 పద్యములు కలవు. గ్రంథాంత గద్యలో "సర్వంబు తృతీయాశ్వాసం" - అనియున్నది. ఈ ప్రతి చివర-

"మన్మథనామ సంవ్వత్సర కార్తిక బ.7 జె॥న్నాడు పాలతేటి నీలకంఠు వ్రాశిన ఆంధ్రరత్నాకరం సంపూర్ణం"

అను వ్రాయసకాని వక్కాణ కలదు. ఈ వక్కాణము ననుసరించి 178/6 సంఖ్యగల పై తాళపత్రప్రతి క్రీ.శ. 1775 నవంబరు 14వ తేదీ జయవారమునాడు పూర్తిచేయబడినట్లు తెలియుచున్నది.

ద [201/6]

ఈ ప్రతి రెండాశ్వాసములుగా విభజింపబడినది. ప్రథమాశ్వాసమున 26 పద్యములు, ద్వితీయాశ్వాసమున 42 పద్యములు గలవు. వ్రాయసకాడు పొరపాటున ఇందలి తృతీయాశ్వాసమును ద్వితీయాశ్వాసములోనిదిగానే భావించి లిఖించి యున్నాడు. ఇందు మొత్తము 68 పద్యములున్నవి.

౨౦ [17/20]

ఇందాశ్వాస విభజన లేదు. మొత్తము 63 పద్యములు కలవు. గ్రంథము చివరనున్న గద్యలో "సర్వము నేకాశ్వాసము" అని యున్నది.

పరిష్కరణ :

మీద పేర్కొనిన పంద్రెండు వ్రాతప్రతులలో లేఖనదోషము అంతగా లేనిది, సమగ్ర తరసుస్థితిలో నున్నదియునగు 'అ' ప్రతి ప్రకృత పరిష్కరణమున ప్రధాన ప్రతిగా స్వీకరింపబడినది. లేఖనదోషములను సముచితరీతిని సవరించిన పిమ్మట, 'అ' ప్రతియందలి పద్యములకు తక్కిన పది ప్రతులనుండి పాఠాంతరము లీయబడినవి.

ప్రతి పద్యమునకు దిగువ, పాఠాంతరముల అనంతరము 'జ1' ప్రతియందలి టీక యథాతథముగా నీయబడినది. 'జ1' ప్రతిలో టీకలేని పద్యములకు అర్థములు సమకూర్పబడినవి. అట్టిచోటుల ఆ అర్థములు పరిష్కర్త కూర్చినవనుటకు సూచకముగా అవి కుండలీకరణముల (brackets)చే గుర్తింపబడియున్నవి.

అవసరమైనపట్టులయందు ఆయా అంశములకు ఉపబలకముగా బ్రౌణ్యము (సి.పి.బ్రౌన్ తెలుగు-ఇంగ్లీషు నిఘంటువు), సూర్యరాయాంధ్రనిఘంటువు - మొదలగు ఆకరములనుండి అర్థవిశేషములు 'Note':- నిర్దేశముతో వివరింప బడియున్నవి. అదేవిధముగా ఆవశ్యకమైన స్థలములయందు సముచితములగు జ్ఞాపికలు (references) సమకూర్పబడియున్నవి.

మఱియు ఈ నిఘంటువులో ఆయా చోటులందు సందర్భానుగుణముగా నెలకొనియుండు వేర్వేఱు విరామ చిహ్నములు, పద్యములయందు గోచరించు లక్షణానుసరణములు మున్నగు 'తీర్పు'లన్నియు పరిష్కర్త పాటించినవిగా తెలియదగినవి.

ప్రకృత నిఘంటువునకు చెందిన తొలి మూడాశ్వాసముల తరువాతి గ్రంథభాగము (57 పద్యములు) ఒక్క 'అ' (ప్రధాన) ప్రతియందు మాత్రమే లభ్యమైనది. పాఠాంతరముల కవకాశములేని ఈ భాగము తరువాతి సంచికయందు అనుబంధముగా 'అకారాదిపద సూచిక'తోపాటు ప్రచురింపబడనున్నది.

కృతివిశిష్టత :

తెలుగున వెలువడిన పద్యరూప నిఘంటువులలో కాలక్రమమున మూడవదైన ప్రకృత నిఘంటువు పరిమితిలో అలతియైనను, పరిశోధనదృక్పథము ననుసరించి మిగుల ప్రాధాన్యమువహించియున్నది. కందము, తేటగీతి, ఆటవెలది – అను త్రివిధచ్ఛందములలో రచింపబడి ఇంచుమించు 135 పద్యముల పరిమితి గల్గిన ఈ లఘుకృతిలో తదితర నిఘంటువులయందు కానరాని కొన్ని అచ్చ తెనుగు పదములు, మఱికొన్ని దేశ్యములు, క్రియాపదములు, కతిపయ అన్యదేశీయములు నెలకొని యున్నవి. ఇది యిందలి యొక ముఖ్య విశేషము.

ఈ నిఘంటువు పైడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవియొక్క ప్రాథమిక రచన యగుటచే కాబోలు, ఇందు కొన్ని చోటుల వ్యావహారిక సంధిరూపములు, శకటరేఫ సాధురేఫముల అభేదప్రయోగములు, అర్థ వివరణములో కొంత డొంకతిరుగుడు ధోరణి కన్పట్టుచున్నను, మొత్తముమీద ఈ కవికిగల నిఘంటునిర్మాణసామర్థ్యము ఈ కృతియందంతట గోచరించుచునే యున్నది.

"కఱివేల్పు పిట్టనందగుఁ దెనుఁగున్" (అనుబంధము, ప.12) అని తెలుగు భాషను 'కఱివేల్పుపిట్ట' (=గరుత్మంతుడు)గా పవిత్ర భావన చేసిన ఈ కవి భాషాభిమానము ప్రశంసనీయమేగాక, ఇతోఽధిక పరిశీలనార్హమై యున్నది.

ప్రకృతప్రచురణ ఆంధ్ర నిఘంటు వాఙ్మయమును ప్రోదిసేయుట ద్వారా, వాఙ్మయారాధకులగు పరిశోధకులకు ఆమోదదాయి కాగలదని మా ఆశయము.

ప్రజోత్పత్తి మహాశివరాత్రి
తిరుపతి–517 502
2–3–1992

కె.జె.కృష్ణమూర్తి

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2. 'ఏకామ్రనాథామాత్యుడు' – అనునది మొట్టమొదటి రూపము. ఉచ్చారణ వశమున ఇందలి 'థా'యను నక్షరము లోపించి, ఏకామ్రనామాత్యుడు' అను రూపము సిద్ధించెను. అటుపిమ్మట అనుచితవిభజనము (wrong splitting)అను ధ్వనినియమానుసారము 'ఏకామ్రన+అమాత్యుడు' అనెడి పదవిభజన మేర్పడినది. అనంతర మిందలి 'ఏకామ్రన'లో స్వరభక్తి (anaptyxis) అనెడు ధ్వనినియమము ప్రకారము నడుమ అచ్చుచేరి 'ఏకామరన'యైనది. ఇది మరల 'అనుచితవిభజనము'నకు గుఱియై 'ఏక+అమరన'గా విడగొట్టబడినది.

   అటుపిమ్మట శీఘ్రోచ్చారణలో 'ఏక' శబ్దము తొలిగిపోగా, చివరకు 'అమరన' మిగిలినాడు! అట్లే 'అమాత్య' శబ్దముతోగూడి "అమరనామాత్యు"డైనాడు. 'ఏకామ్రనాథామాత్య, ఏకామ్రనామాత్య, అమరనామాత్య' – నామధేయముల పరిణామ క్రమము పైరీతిని గుర్తింపదగియున్నది.

3. చూ. 'ఎ ట్రయన్నియల్ కేటలాగ్ ఆఫ్ మాన్యుస్క్రిప్ట్స్' పార్ట్ 3– తెలుగు (1913), పుట 17, గవర్నమెంట్ ఓరియంటల్ మాన్యుస్క్రిప్ట్స్ లైబ్రరి, మద్రాసు.

4. చూ. 'ఆంధ్రనామసంగ్రహము' గ్రంథాంతగద్యము, పుట 95, వావిళ్ల ప్రచురణము, చెన్నపురి (1920).

5. చూ. వావిళ్ల నిఘంటువు (మొదటి సంపుటము) –1949, పీఠిక పుట 3.

6. చూ. 'ఇండియన్ ఎఫిమెరిస్', వాల్యూమ్ VI, 353 పుట.

శ్రీ రస్తు శుభమస్తు అవిఘ్నమస్తు

ఆంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరము

ప్రథమాశ్వాసము

1

క. [1]కడిమనఁగా వడియనఁదగు;
వోడికంబన వేగమనుట కొన; రొసపరినాఁ
బుడమినిఁ జక్కఁగ ననుటకుఁ;
దొడరెననన్ జెలఁగెననుట తోరముగ భువిన్.

1.కడిమియనన్ – ట.

టీక. కడిమి అనగా వడికిన్ని, వోడికంబు అనగా వేగాన్కిన్ను, వొసపరి అనగా చక్కదనాన్కిన్ను, తొడరెను అనగా చెలగుటకున్ను – అనగా ప్రకాశానకున్నుపేరు.

2

ఆ.వె. అడరె, నలరె [1]ననెడునట్టి పల్కులు తెన్గు
బాస నెచట నెచటఁ బ్రబలియున్న
నన్ని యొప్పిదంబులయ్యెనంటకుఁ [2]జెల్లు;
వెలయు వెల్ల తేజి గలుగు రాజ!

1.నుడువులన్ని తెనుంగు – క, ట, వ. 2. బేళ్ళు –ద.

టీ. అడరెను, అలరెను – యీ పదాలు వొప్పుచుండెననుటకు పేర్లు.

3

ఆ.వె. సరవిఁ బొసఁగుచుండెఁ, జక్కఁగానుండెను,
చెలఁగె, వేడ్కనుండె, వెలయుచుండె
[1]ననఁగ నిట్లు పెక్కులై చాలఁ దగు పలుకు
లన్ని యొప్పుచుండెననుట కొప్పు.

1. ననుచు – క, చ, ట, ప, గ.

టీ. పొసగుచుండె నన్నాను, చక్కగానుండె నన్నాను, చెలగె నన్నాను, వేడ్కనుండె నన్నాను, వెలయుచుండె నన్నాను – ఒప్పుచుండె ననుటకు పర్యాయములు.

4

క. గుఱుతును, నెరవును, మురువును,
మెఱుఁగును, మఱి చెప్పఁదగిన మేటి గొనంబుల్
తిరముగను గలిగి వెలయుటె
హరువనఁదగు నెల్లప్రజలు నౌనని పొగడన్.

టీ. గురుతు, నెరవు, మురువు, మెరుగు – అన్నాను హరువు అనుటకు పర్యాయములు. అనంగా యీ నాలుగు గుణాలతోటి కూడుకున్నది హరువు. అనగా సొగసనుట.

Note:-*ఈ పద్యమునకు ట–ప్రతిలో క్రింది వివరణ కలదు.*
"గురుతు, నెరవు, మురువు, మెరుగు – యివి మొదలయిన మిక్కిలి మాటలు గలిగి ప్రకాశించుటపేరే హరువు."

5

క. గుఱియన, గుఱుతనఁ, దలక,
ట్టరిదగు; గాదిలన, నెయ్యమనఁగ, ననుఁగునా,
మఱి గారామన ముద్దాగిఁ
గొఱలును; నెరవన గొనబుల కుదురు తలంపన్.

టీ. గురి అనగా, గురుతు అనగా, తలకట్టు అనగా, అరిది అనగా శ్రేష్ఠానకు పేర్లు. గాదిలి అనగా, నెయ్యము అనగా, అనుగు అనగా, గారాము అనగా ముద్దుకు పేళ్లు. నెరవు అనగా గొనబు కుదురు. అనగా శృంగారానకు స్థానమనుట.

Note:-*1. ఈ పద్యమునకు ట-ప్రతిలో క్రింది వివరణ కలదు.*

"గురి, గురుతు, తలకట్టు, అరిది - యీ నాలుగున్ను
శ్రేష్ఠము పేళ్లు. గాదిలి, నెయ్యము, అనుగు, గారాము - యీ నాలుగున్ను
ముద్దు పేళ్లు. నెరవు - యీ పదం చక్కదనాలకు స్థానం పేరు".

Note:-2. *చ, గ - ప్రతులలో క్రింది పద్య ముదాహరింపబడియున్నది.*

"ఆంధ్రనామ సంగ్రహ ఉదాహరణం -

క. కన్నాకన్నను, తలక
ట్టన్నను, మఱి మేలుబంతియన, మిక్కిలినా
నిన్నియు శ్రేష్ఠముపేళ్లై
యెన్నంబడు రాజసభల నిభదైత్యహరా!"

(ఈపద్యము ఆంధ్రనామసంగ్రహమునందలి స్థావరవర్గులోనిది. సంఖ్య 27.)

6

క. చెప్పిన పల్కుబడులలో
నొప్పదరఁగ వచ్చి నిల్చు నొగియను పలుకుల్
తప్పక మేల్బంతులగున్
చొప్పదరఁగఁ దెనుఁగుబాసఁ జొచ్చి వెదకినన్.

టీ. ఒగి అనే పదము మేలుబంతికి పేరు. అనగా నాయకమణి. అత్యంతమున్ను శ్రేష్ఠమనుట.

7

క. నెఱియనఁగ మించుఁబల్కాగి;
మురువుగ మొనసెనను నుడియు, మునుకొనెననఁగా
నెఱి హెచ్చెననుట; మఱి చి
[1]చ్చఱ యనఁగా నగ్నిపేరు జానగుఁ బుడమిన్.

1.చ్చెఱువనఁగా నగ్గిపేరు చెన్నగుచుండున్ - వ;
చ్చెఱయనఁగా నగ్నిపేరు చెన్నగుఁ బుడమిన్ - జ.

టీ. నెరి అనగా మించుబల్కు. అనగా అధికానకు పేరు. మొనసె అనగా, మునుకొనె అనగా హెచ్చుకు పేర్లు. చిచ్చర (చిచ్చెర) అనగా అగ్నికి పేరు.

8

ఆ.వె. [1]తెంచెఁ, బుడికె, నేఱెఁ, ద్రుంచెననంగను
కోసెననుట కొప్పు గుఱుతుమీఱ;
భువి లకోరి, యలుఁగుఁ, బొరిఁ జిల్కునాఁ గోల
వెలయుఁ దెల్లతేజి గలుగు రాజ!

1.ఎంచె – మిగిలిన ప్రతులన్ని.

టీ. ఎంచె అనగా, పుడికె అనగా, ఏరె అనగా, త్రుంచె అనగా కోసె ననుటకు పర్యాయములు. లకోరి అనగా, అలుగు అనగా, చిలుకు అనగా కోలపేర్లు. అనగా బాణం.

9

ఆ.వె. గరువమనఁగ నొకని గణుతింపకుండుట;
మురిపెమనఁగఁ దన్ను మొనయఁ డొక్కఁ
డనెడు గొనముచేత నందంబుఁ జూపుట
వెల్లవేల్పు! గట్టువిల్లుదాల్పు!

టీ. గరువము అనగా ఒకర్ని గణుతింపకుండుట. అనగా అలక్ష్యభావము. మురిపెము అనగా తన్ను బోలరనుటకు అందంబు జూపుట. అనగా సొబగు చూపుటకు పేరు.

10

ఆ.వె. ఒగి విసుమన విసుక కొప్పు; దీబన దిబ్బ
కొప్పు; జోగునాఁగ నొప్పు నోడ;
రహి యనంగ జిగి; [1]గిలాబాయనంగను
మిద్దెలందుఁ జేయు మెఱుఁగుపనులు.

1.జిరాబా – క, ట, వ, జ, ద.

టీ. ఇసుము అనగా యిసుకపేరు. దీబ అనగా యిసుకదిబ్బపేరు. జోగు అనగా వోడకు పేరు. రహి అనగా జిగిపేరు. జిరాబా (గిలాబా) అనగా మిద్దెలందు చెయ్యబడ్డ మెరుగుపనులకు పేరు.

11

క. తేజనఁగ వన్నెపేరగు;
బోజనఁగా బ్రజలచేతఁ బొగడికగొనుటే;
రోజనఁ, బ్రూటన దినమగు;
నోజన నిక్కముగ నంటియున్న గొనంబో.

టీ. తేజా అనగా వన్నెపేరు. బోజా అనగా ప్రజలచాత పొగడిక గొనడము. రోజా అనగా, ప్రూట అనగా దినానకు పేర్లు. ఓజా (ఓజ) అనగా స్వభావగుణమనుట.

12

ఆ.వె. టాకులనఁగ గూళ్లు; డంబునా నరయంగఁ
బొగడ నలవిగాని పొంపు మిక్కు
టంబుపేరునా [1]నిజంబుగ; చక్కని
వెల్లవేల్పు! గట్టువిల్లుదాల్పు!

1.నిజంబు చక్కని మేటి - త, బ.

టీ. టాకులు అనగా గవాక్షులు. డంబు అనగా పొగడడముకు శక్యంకాని పొంపుయొక్క మిక్కుటానకు పేరు. అనగా సమస్తగుణాలతోటి సర్వోత్కృష్టమై వొప్పినదని తాత్పర్యం.

13

తే.గీ. వాటమన, బాగనంగను వఱలుఁ బేరు;
చెలఁగి తగ నేఁచెనన బాధచేసెననుట
[1]కలరుఁ; దేవనంగను వేగ యనుట కొప్పు;
నెంతయు నటంచుఁ బల్కుపే రెంచ మిగుల.

1.కలరు తేకువయన వేగయనుట కొప్పు - వ;
కలరును తవాయి యాపద యనుట కొప్పు - ద.

టీ. వాటము అనగా, బాగు అనగా శ్రేష్ఠమైనదాని పేర్లు. యేచెను అనగా బాధచేశెననుటకు పేరు. తేవ అనగా వేగమనుటకు పేరు; శీఘ్రం. యెంతయు అనగా మిక్కిలి యనుటకు పేరు.

14

తే.గీ. వేల్పుదొరపీఁటయందున వెలయ నాటి
నట్టి రాతుల కొఁగిఁబేళ్లు నలరుచుండు
నరయఁగఁ దలంపురాల్; నెనరనఁగఁ గనిక
రంబునకుఁ బేరు దగుచుండు డంబు మీఱ.

టీ. వేల్పుదొర = దేవేంద్రుడియొక్క, పీటయందున = సింహాసనమందు, వెలయ = వొప్పుచున్నుండగాను, నాటినట్టి = స్థాపన చేసినటువంటి, రాతులు = రాళ్లు, అనగా తలంపురాలు - అనగా చింతామణులకు పేరు. నెనరు అనగా కనికరానకు పేరు.

15

క. తెలిదూఁడువిరి యనంగాఁ
బొలుపలరఁగఁ దెల్లదమ్మిపువ్వు దలంపన్;
కలలేని మూఁక యన వే
ల్పుల[1]దండు దలంచి చూడఁ బొసఁగఁ [2]దెనుఁగునన్.

1. పిండు – త. 2. దెలుఁగునన్ – క.

టీ. తెలిదూడువిరి అనగా కాడతో కూడుకున్నటువంటి తెల్లదామరపద్మము. కలలేని మూక అనగా వేల్పుల దండు. అనగా దేవసముదయమనుట.

16

తే.గీ. ఎంచ జాఱించెననఁ జెమరించెననుట;
[1]బొత్తమన మొత్తమునకొప్పుఁ బొందుగాఁగ;
దొడ్డనా బలువనుటయుఁ దోరముగను
ప్రబలు నెలతాల్ప! జేజేల పాలివేల్ప!

1. పొత్తమనఁ బొత్తమున కొప్పు – క.

టీ. జారించెను అనగా చెమర్చుటకు పేరు. బొత్తము అనగా మొత్తమునకు పేరు. అనగా సమూహమనుట. అర్థాంతరమందు 'పొత్తము' అనగా పుస్తకమునకు పేరు. దొడ్డ అనగా బలువనుటకు – అనగా అధికానకు పేరు.

Note:- 'బొత్తము' అనునది 'బొత్తి' అనుదాని పర్యాయ పదము. బొత్తి = *a pack or bundle in which things are arranged in order.*

చూ. బ్రౌను తెలుగు–ఇంగ్లీషు నిఘంటువు, పుట 912.

17

ఆ.వె. అరణమిచ్చెననఁగ నరయఁ గట్నంబిచ్చె
ననుట కొప్పు; మెండునాఁగ గళువు;
పరఁగ వీలనంగ బాగనఁ దనరును
వెలయు తెల్లతేజి గలుగు రాజ!

టీ. అరణమిచ్చెను అనగా కట్నమిచ్చెననుటకు పేరు. యిది కర్నాటదేశియ్యము. మెండు అనగా గళువుకు పేరు. అనగా గడువు. వీలు అనగా బాగనుట. యిది దేశియ్యం.

18

క. నెలఁతుకలు దొడు గిజారులు
సుళువుగ మఱి వారు మేల్ముసుంగు లిడెడు వ
ల్వలు, వారు విసరుకొను వలు
వలు పావడ, కుంచెలనఁగ వఱలుం జగతిన్.

టీ. నెలతుకలు = స్త్రీలు, తొడుక్కునే యిజారులు పావడలనిన్ని, వారు మేలుముసుకులు వేసుకునేటవంటివిన్ని, విసరుకునేటవంటివిన్ని వలువలు = చీరలు, కుంచెలుఅనిన్ని చెప్పబడును.

19

క. గొనకొనెనన హెచ్చెననం
జనుఁ; గడపట ననఁగఁ గడయుఁ; జక్కంగడుఁబొ
ల్చెను [1]నాఁ గనఁబడెననుటకు
ననయము [2]పేల్లగుచునుండు నవనిఁ దలంపన్.

1. నా నగవడె ననుటకు – జ.

2.దగుచుండు (బుడమియందుఁ దలంపన్ – క, చ, త, ట, వ, గ, డ, ద, బ.

టీ. గొనకొనెను అనగా హెచ్చెననుటకు పేరు. కడపట అనగా కడకు పేరు. చక్కగా పొల్చెను అనగా కనుపించెననుటకు పేరు.

20

క. కొంకన లోపము; తోఁపన
బొంకంబైనట్టి తోఁట; పొలియించెను నా
జంకక చంపెననందగు;
నింకయునా మఱియు ననుట కెనఁగును పేరై.

టీ. కొంకు అనగా లోపమునకు పేరు. తోపు అనగా తోటకు పేరు. పొలియించెను అనగా చంపెననుటకు పేరు. యింకయు అనగా మరియును అనుటకు పేరు.

21

క. తఱిమెననఁ దోలెననుటకుఁ;
గఱపెనునా నేర్పెననుట; కడుఁబన్నుగనా
నెఱిఁ జక్కఁగ ననుటయు; మఱి
కరమనఁగా మిక్కిలనుటకగుఁ దెలివేల్పా!

టీ. తరిమెను అనగా తోలెననుటకు పేరు. కరపెను అనగా నేర్పెననుటకు పేరు. పన్నుగ అనగా చక్కగా యనుటకు పేరు. కరము అనగా మిక్కిలి యనుటకు పేరు. అనగా అధికమనుట.

22

క. తెగయన జత; వీఁకనఁగాఁ
దగ వేగము; సూటియనఁగఁ దలఁపంగాఁ ది
న్నగ ననుటకు; వల్లనఁగా
వగ నలవడు పేరు భువిని వరుసఁ జెలంగున్.

టీ. తెగ అనగా జతకు పేరు. వీక అనగా వేగానకు పేరు. సూటి అనగా తిన్నగా ననుటకు పేరు. వల్ల అనగా అలవడ్డదాని పేరు.

23

తే.గీ. [1]తెల్లమిగ నొప్పెననఁగను దెలిసి చూడ
నచ్చుగా నొప్పెననుటకు నలరుఁ బేరు;
మఱియు హొయలన సొంపుల [2]నెరవు దలఁప;
వఱలు తెలివేల్పా! ముమ్మొనవాలుదాల్పా!

1. తెల్లముగ – ట, డ, ద.

2. నెరవు – క, ట, వ, జ, బ.

టీ. తెల్లమిగ నొప్పెను అనగా అచ్చుగా వొప్పెననుటకు పేరు. అనగా ప్రకటనగా వొప్పెననుట. హొయలు అనగా సొంపుల నెరవు. అనగా శృంగారానకు స్థానమనుట.

24

తే.గీ. అరయఁ దారనఁ దమరంట కలరుఁ బేరు;
తారెననఁ [1]బాఱెననుటయౌ దలఁచి చూడ;
మొక్కపోయె ననంగను మోసపోయె
ననుట; జేజేల పాలింట నమరు దంట!

1. బాఱెననుటకౌ – క, ద.

టీ. తారు అనగా తమరంటకు పేరు. తారెను అనగా పారిపోయెననుటకు పేరు. మొక్కపోయె అనగా మోసపోయెననుటకు పేరు.

25

తే.గీ. వెలయుఁ జీరెననంగను బిలిచెననుట;
[1]గరిపాడిచెనని యనఁగను గగురుపాడిచె
ననుట కొగిఁ బేరునై యొప్పు గొనబు మిగుల;
ఊరసంబన రోసంబు నెంచి చూడ.

1.గగురుపాడిచె ననంగను గరిపాడిచెను – మిగిలిన ప్రతులన్ని.

టీ. చీరెను అనగా పిల్చెననుటకు పేరు. గరిపాడిచెను అనగా గగురుపాడిచె ననుటకు పేరు. ఊరసంబు అనగా రోసముపేరు.

26

తే.గీ. లేఁతదానిపైపైని లేలేఁతఁదనము
నెనసి తగుటయు నదియె నూఁగనఁగఁ దనరుఁ;
బొంకమనఁగ హేరాళమై పొసఁగు సొబఁగు
వఱలు తెలివేల్పు! ముమ్మొనవాలుదాల్పు!

టీ. లేతదానిపైపైని లేతదనము అనగా మిక్కిలి మృదువు కలుగుట. అదియె నూగు అనుటకు పేరు. ఆరునకు నూగారు అని చెప్పబడును. పొంకము అనగా హేరాళమై పొసగు సొబగు. అనగా పేరుపడ్డ సొగసనుట.

27

తే.గీ. వెలయు సుదతి యనంగను, వెలఁదియనఁగ
నంగనకుఁ బేరులగును; కుఱంగటనఁగ
బ్రోలననుటకుఁ బేరగుఁ జాల భువిని;
బూటకమని యనంగను బొంకుపేరు.*

(సుదతి, వెలఁది - అంగనకు పేరులు. కుఱంగట = ప్రోల. బూటకము = బొంకు.)

* ఈ పద్యము ట, డ, - ప్రతులలో మాత్రమే కన్పట్టుచున్నది.

గద్య*

ఇది శ్రీమదుమామహేశ్వర [1]వరప్రసాదాసాదిత కవిత్వవైభవ, [2]పైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రనామాత్య తనూభవ [3]లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతంబైన [4]యాంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరంబను నైఘంటుక శాస్త్రంబునందుఁ బ్రథమాశ్వాసము.

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* ఈ నిఘంటువు యొక్క వ్రాతప్రతులన్నింటిలోను ఆశ్వాసాంత గద్యలు మిగుల వైవిధ్యము గలవై యున్నవి. ఒక్కొకచో ఒకప్రతియందలి ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్యలు సైతము ఒకదాని కొకటి భిన్నములుగా కన్పట్టుచున్నవి. కొన్నిటి ఆశ్వాసముల కడపట గద్యలు లేవు. కొన్ని ప్రతుల గ్రంథాంతగద్యలో 'సర్వము నేకాశ్వాసము' - అనియు వ్రాయబడియున్నది. ప్రతులు వ్రాసికొనిన వ్రాయసకాండ్ర కైవాడము ఈ వైవిధ్యమునకు కారణము కావచ్చు. ఉన్నంతలో చ, గ, - ప్రతులయందలి ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్య సమగ్రముగా, సమానముగా నుండుటచే, అదియే ఇందు ప్రధానముగా గైకొనబడినది. తదనుసారముగా తక్కిన ప్రతులయందలి మొత్తము గద్య లన్నింటినుండి పాఠాంతరము తీయబడినవి.

1. వరప్రసాద లబ్ధ కవిత్వవైభవ - అ, ట, ప, ద.,
వర లబ్ధ కవిత్వవైభవ - క, డ.,
వరలబ్ధ సరస కవిత్వవైభవ - త.,
వరప్రసాద లబ్ధకవితావిచిత్ర - జ.,

2. అమరనామాత్యపుత్ర - అ, క,ట, జ, డ, ద.,
పైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రమంత్రి తనూభవ - త.,
యేకామ్రనామాత్యపుత్ర - ప, బ.

3. పై ఁడిపాటి లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతంబైన - అ, క, ట, ప, జ, ద.,
పైఁడిపాటి లక్ష్మణామాత్యకవిప్రణీతంబైన - డ.,
కౌండిన్యసగోత్ర పవిత్ర సదారాధితదిశాపటలశాటి పైఁడిపాటి
లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతంబైన - బ.

4. యాంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరంబునందుఁ బ్రథమాశ్వాసము
- క,ట, జ, డ, ద.,
ఆంధ్రరత్నాకరంబను కృతియందుఁ బ్రథమాశ్వాసము-బ.

5. ప్రథమోల్లాసము - త, గ.

ఆంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరము

ద్వితీయాశ్వాసము

1

తే.గీ. చుంచనఁగఁ బిల్లకొప్పుపే రెంచిచూడ;
సరవితోఁ బొంకమనఁగను జక్కఁదనము;
కఱియనఁగ నల్పుపే; రెఱ్ఱ యెఱుపు పేరు;
పదరియన మఱియనుటకుఁ బరఁగుఁ బేరు.

టీ. చుంచు అనగా పిల్లకొప్పుపేరు. అనగా కూకటిపేరు. పొంకము అనగా చక్కఁదనము పేరు. కరి అనగా నల్పుపేరు. కరికరి అనిన్ని కలదు. యెఱ్ఱ అనగా యెరుపు పేరు. పదరి అనగా మరి అనుటకు పేరు.

2

క. అరియనఁ, గప్పంబనఁగా
నెఱి నప్పనమునకుఁ బేళ్లు నెగడుఁ; దివిరెనా
మఱి హెచ్చైననఁగఁదనరును;
హరువుగఁ [1]బ్రగ్గడన మంతి రచ్చ తెనుఁగునన్.

1. ప్రెగ్గడన – జ, బ.

టీ. అరి అనగా, కప్పంబు అనగా అప్పనమునకు పేర్లు. తివిరె అనగా హెచ్చుకు పేరు. ప్రగ్గడ అనగా మంతిరి పేరు. మంత్రికి మంతిరి తద్భవము.

3

ఆ.వె. మావటీఁడనంగ, మఱి [1]పాదుశాయన
నెనఁగు జోదుపేరు; నియ్యకొనియె
ననఁగ నొప్పుకొనియెనంటకు; నెక్కుఁడు
ననఁగ మిక్కిలనుట కగును పేరు.

1. పాదుషాయన – చ, గ; పాదుశాహునా – ట.

టీ. మావటీడు అనగా, పాదుశా అనగా, జోదు అనగా రౌతుకు పేర్లు. యియ్యకొనియె అనగా వొప్పుకోవడముకు పేరు. యెక్కుడు అనగా మిక్కిలి యనుటకు పేరు.

4

ఆ.వె. గాణలనఁగ మఱియుఁ గడు పాటకుల కొప్పు;
నెఱియు, [1]నోలియనఁగ వరుసయనుట;
[2]చిట్టెననఁగ మఱియుఁ జిట్టిలెననుటయుఁ;
[3]దుంపెసరనఁ బైకి దుముకుటయును.

1. నోజ – క. 2. చిట్లెననఁగ – ప.
3. తుంపెసనుట – క; తుంపెరలన – చ, గ;
తుంపెసలన – త, బ.

టీ. గాణలు అనగా గీతములు పాడేవారికి పేరు. నెరి అనగా, ఓలి అనగా వరుస యనుట; క్రమం. చిట్టెను అనగా, చిట్టిలెను అనగా చిట్లబడెననుట. తుంపెసరు అనగా పైకి దుముకుట. అనగా పైకి యెగయుట.

5

ఆ.వె. ఒప్పమీఱ మఱియు నొనరించెననఁగను
జేసెననుట కొప్పు బేసికంటి!
గొనబుమీఱ [1]దీటుకొనె ననంగను నిండు
కొనియె ననుట కొప్పు కోడెరౌత!

1. దిండు కొనె – జ.

టీ. ఒనరించె అనగా చేసెననుటకు పేరు. దీటుకొనియెను అనగా నిండుకొనియె ననుటకు పేరు. అనగా పూర్ణమయ్యెననుట.

6

తే.గీ. వెలయఁగా వేయనంగను వేగయనుట;
[1]బెడఁగునాఁగ బింకంబులపొడవు; మఱియు
సబ్బిడిదనంగ, నెంతయు జలుదులేని
దనఁగ మెతకరియై నట్టి యతివపేరు.

1. బెడఁగునా భీకరంబుల తొడవు – చ, త, గ;
బెడఁగనఁగ బెట్టిదంబైన తొడవు పేరు – బ.

టీ. వే అనగా వేగయనుటకు పేరు; శీఘ్రం. బెడగు అనగా బింకంబుల పాడవు. అనగా భీకర భాషణములనుట. సబ్బిడిది అనగా, జలుదులేనిది అనగా మెతకరియైనదాని పేర్లు. అనగా మెత్తని స్త్రీ పేర్లు.

7

క. మఱి రాణయనఁగ వేడుక;
నెఱి రాణింపనఁగ వేడ్క నెరపుట భువిలోఁ
బొరిఁ బల్కుబడులలో నిటు
కరమరుదుగ వింతపలుకుగాఁ గానఁదగున్.*

(రాణ = వేడుక. రాణింపు = వేడ్క నెరపుట (వేడ్కసేయుట).)

* ఈ పద్యము అ, జ ప్రతులలో లేదు; క, చ, ట, త, ప, గ, డ, ద, బ – ప్రతులలో నున్నది.

8

తే.గీ. [1]తేఁకువన వేగయనుటయుఁ; దెలియఁ[2]బలువ
నంగ వెక్కసమున కొప్పు నలువు మిగుల;
నానరెనన నయ్యెననుటకు నొప్పుఁబేరు;
గట్టువిలుదాల్ప! మువ్వీళ్లగొట్టువేల్ప!

1. తెగువనఁగ – బ. 2. బలుప.

టీ. తేకువ అనగా శీఘ్రమనుటకు పేరు. బలువు అనగా వెక్కసమునకు పేరు. అనగా బలువైనదనుట. నానరెను అనగా అయ్యెననుటకు పేరు. ఆయెననుట.

9

ఆ.వె. అరయఁగాఁ గడిందియన మిక్కిలనుటయు;
[1]మోవడంబనంగ మోచుటయును;
ఆలవట్టములన నలరుఁ డెక్కెంబులు;
వెల్లవేల్ప! గట్టువిల్లుదాల్ప!

1. మోవడంబనంగ – డ, ద, బ; మోవడియన నొప్పు మోచుటకును – క, జ.

టీ. కడింది అనగా మిక్కిలి యనుటకు పేరు. మోవడి అనగా మోచుటకు పేరు. అనగా ధరించుట. మోవడి పదము దేశియ్యము. ఆలవట్టములు అనగా బెక్కెములకు పేరు. ఆలవట్టము పదము దేశియ్యము. క్వచిత్‌గాను సంస్కృతమునందున్ను వాడుదురు.

Note:- 'ఆలవట్టము' అను పదమునకు శబ్దరత్నాకర, సూ.రా. నిఘంటువులలో "వస్త్రముతో చేసిన గుండ్రని విసన కఱ్ఱ" అను నర్థము మాత్ర మీయబడినది. బ్రౌను నిఘంటువు "బెక్కెము" అను అర్థమునుకూడ ఇచ్చినది.

'ఆలవట్టము = a banner or large fan like a sun or like a fig leaf, carried in processions'. *చూ. బ్రౌను తెలుగు-ఇంగ్లీషు నిఘంటువు, పుట 124.*

10

క. కుదువయనం, దాకట్టనఁ,
బొదలుం జామీననంగఁ, బూఁటయనంగా,
నొదవుం దణకాయనఁగాఁ
బదపడి యప్పిచ్చి చేతఁబట్టిన సొమ్మౌ.*

(కుదువ, తాకట్టు, జామీను, పూఁట, తణకా - ఇచ్చిన యప్పునకు ఆధారముగా నొద్ద నుంచుకొనిన సొమ్మునకు (నగకు) పేళ్లు.)

* *ఈ పద్యము మొదలుకొని (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, సంఖ్యలుగల) ఐదు కందములు చ, గ - అను రెండు ప్రతులలో మాత్రమే కనిపించుచున్నవి.*

11

క. పొంపనఁ, బింపిరియనఁగాఁ
బెంపగు పొంకమునకుఁ బేరు; ప్రేల్మిడియనఁగా
సొంపుగఁ జిటికకు ఁ బేరఁగుఁ;
దుంపరయనఁ జినుకుపేరు తోరముగ భువిన్.

(పొంపు, పింపిరి - పెంపైన పొంకమునకు పేళ్లు. ప్రేల్మిడి = చిటికపేరు. తుంపర = చినుకు పేరు.)

12

క. కొలఁదియనం బరిమాణము;
వెలఁదనఁ బరిశుద్ధమునకు వెలయుం బేరై;
వెలయిచ్చు, టాసఁ బెట్టుట,
విలుచుట, కమ్ముటకుఁ బేళ్లు వెలిమై దాల్పు!

(కొలఁది = పరిమాణము. వెలఁది = పరిశుద్ధమైనది (తెల్లనిది). వెలయిచ్చుట= విలుచుట, ఆసఁబెట్టుట = అమ్ముట.)

13

క. బాళియనఁగ నభిలాషము;
బాలమనఁగ యథోచితంపుఁ బని యెఱుఁగమియౌ;
జోలియనఁ బ్రయోజనమౌ;
జాలియన నధైర్యమనఁగఁ జనుఁ దగియుండున్.

(బాళి = అభిలాష. బాలము = యథోచితమైన పని తెలియకుండుట. జోలి=ప్రయోజనము. జాలి = అధైర్యము.)

14

క. వలిపెములన ధౌతాంశుక
ములు; కనకాభజ్ఞానము మోలిమియనఁగా;
మలఁకయన నృక్కెరయగుఁ;
గలఁకయనఁగ నావిలంబు; కవుడు కపటమౌ.

(వలిపెములు = ఉదికిన తెల్లని వస్త్రములు. మోలిమి = బంగారు పూత. మలఁక = ఏనుఁగు, గుఱ్ఱము మున్నగు వానికి తొడుగు కవచము. కలఁక = కలఁత నొందియుండుట. కవుడు = కపటము.)

15

తే.గీ. కాలరులనంగ నడకలు గలుగు బంట్లు;
తెలియ గిలిగింతలన ముచ్చటలను మేను
చెనకుటకుఁ బేరునై యొప్పుఁ జెలువుమీఱ;
వలిపెమనఁగను దెనుఁగున వలువపేరు.

టీ. కాలరులు అనగా నడకలు గలుగు బంట్లు. అనగా పదాతులు. గిలిగింతలు అనగా ముచ్చటచాతను దేహమును జెనకుటకు పేరు. గిలిగింత పదము కలయిక వేళకు వుపయోగిస్తున్నదని గ్రహించుకునేది. వలిపెము అనగా వలువ పేరు; చీర.

16

తే.గీ. తొడరి [1]బింకంబనఁగఁ దన దొడ్డతనము
[2]నెఱపు గొనమెంచి చూడ; నెన్నికలఁ గనియె
ననఁగఁ బొగడికలను జెందెననుట కొప్పుఁ
దొలుదాలుప! ముమ్మొనవాలుదాల్ప!

1. బింకమనంగను దొడ్డపలుకు – చ, గ.

2. నెఱపుకొని యుబ్బు గొనము నెన్నికలఁ గనియె – ప.

టీ. బింకంబు అనగా తన దొడ్డతనముకు పేరు. అనగా ఘనత. యెన్నికల గనియెను అనగా పొగడికల గనియె ననుటకు పేరు.

17

తే.గీ. తుఱుతునా వేగయనుటకుఁ బరఁగుఁ బేరు;
వాసిగా [1]నెడసెననఁగను బాసె ననుట
కలరుఁ; గింకనఁ బాయని యలుక పేరు;
సత్తువన బల్మి; [2]కమ్మనాఁ జక్కఁదనము.

1. నొసరిలెననఁ బాసెననుట – చ, త, ప, గ, జ, ద.

2. కొమ్మనా – చ, ట, వ, గ, జ, ద.

టీ. తురుతు అనగా వేగ యనుటకు పేరు; శీఘ్రం. యెడసెను అనగా యెడబాసెననుటకు పేరు. కింక అనగా యెడతెగని అలుకపేరు. సత్తువ అనగా బలిమికి పేరు. సత్తువ పదం తద్భవము. కొమ్మ అనగా చక్కదనానకు పేరు.

18

తే.గీ. మచ్చరంబన రోసంబు; మాఱుపయ్యె
నన(గ(గడు(దాఱుమాఱయ్యెననుట కొప్పు;
వెలయ(గ([1]బిరాలయన(గడువేగయనుట;
[2]చెల(గు(గఱకుటోజయన(గ(జెడ్డగొనము.*

1. బిరాల్పయన - వ.

2. చెల(గి కఱుకన నోజన (జెడ్డతనము - బ.

టీ. మచ్చరంబు అనగా రోసముకు పేరు. రోసము అనే పదం తద్భవము. మారుపయ్యెను అనగా ....

(మాఱుపయ్యెను = కడు తాఱుమాఱయ్యెను. బిరాల = కడువేగముగా. కఱకుటోజ = చెడ్డ గుణము.)

* వ-ప్రతిలో గ్రంథము ఈ పద్యముతో సమాప్తమైనది. ఆశ్వాసాంతగద్యయందు "......... సర్వము నేకాశ్వాసము సంపూర్ణం." అని పేర్కొనబడియున్నది.

ఈ పద్యము మొదలుకొని, తృతీయాశ్వాసమున "చెన్నుదల(చి" - అను పద్యమువరకుగల ఏడెనిమిది పద్యముల టీకగలిగిన యొక తాళ పత్రము ప్రతినుండి లుప్తమైనది.

19

తే.గీ. [1]అరయ సోసో(కెనన(గడునంటె ననుట;
పరియయన బావి; యార్చెనా నెరయ(బెద్ద
కూ(కవెట్టెనటంటకు(గొఱలు(బేరు;
[2]తుండెలన ముక్కలకు(బేళ్లు దొడరు భువిని.*

1. అరయ(గా సో(కెనన - త, ద, బ. 2. తుంటెలన - జ.

(సోసో(కెను = కడునంటెను. పరియ = బావి. ఆర్చెను = పెద్దకూ(కపెట్టెను. తుండెలు = ముక్కలు.)

Note:- పైపద్యమునందలి 'పరియ' అను పదము 'పరిన' యొక్క రూపాంతరము కావచ్చు.

'పరిన = *A built-in well in the bed of a river.*'

చూ. బ్రౌను తెలుగు-ఇంగ్లీషు నిఘంటువు, పుట 724.

* *చ, గ - ప్రతులలో ఈ పద్యము లేదు.'*

20

తే.గీ. సారిదిగా మొగ్గతిలియెనా సొమ్మసిలియె
ననుట; పెంచెనా నెదిగించె ననుట కొప్పు;
ముమ్మడనఁగ మూరెట్టిపే రిమ్ము దనరు;
వెలయు చెలువంపుఁదెలితేజి గలుగు రాజ!

(మొగ్గతిలియెను = సొమ్మసిలియెను. పెంచెను = ఎదిగించెను. ముమ్మడి = మూడు రెట్లు.)

21

తే.గీ. పరువడులనంగ సాముల కొఱయుఁ బేరు;
[1]నమరెనాఁగను నొట్రించెననఁ దనరును;
సొలయుటన బల్మిదూలి బుస్సులు గొలుపుట;
మలసెనాఁ దొట్రుపడెనంట కలరుఁ బేరు.

1. అచ్చెరికనాఁగ – ద.

(పరువడులు=సాములు. అమరెన్=ఒట్రించెను.
సొలయుట=బలము తగ్గి నిట్టూర్పులువిడుచుట.
మలసెను=తొట్రుపడెను.)

Note:-1. పరువడి – అనుపదమునకు 'సాములో అడుగు వేయడము' అను నర్థము *కలదని బ్రౌణ్యము పేర్కొనుచున్నది. చూ. పుట 726.*

Note:-2. ఒట్రించు – అను పదమునకు 'మోసపుచ్చు' అను నర్థమున్నట్లు సూ.రా. *నిఘంటువు తెల్పుచున్నది. చూ. ప్రథమ సంపుటము, పుట 906.*

22

తే.గీ. బలిమి రోసంబు [1]గలిగియుఁ బ్రబలుటయును
[2]గావరంబనఁ దగుచుండు గణుతిసేయఁ;
[3]గావరంబనఁదగు బొంకు గడుఁ దలంప;
వెలయు [4]చెలువపుఁదెలితేజి గలుగు రాజ!

1. చెలువము గలిగియుండు – చ, గ.

2. టయును గావరమనఁదగు డంబుమీఱ – చ, గ.

3. కావరమె పొంకమనఁదగి భువిని వెలయు – చ, గ.,

మఱియు (గావరమనఁబొంకమగు (దలంప – జ.,

కప్పురంబనఁగను బొంకు గడుఁదలంప – ద, బ.

4. బలిదంపుఁ దెలి తేజి – చ, గ.

(కావరము = బలము, రోషము గలిగి ప్రబలుట. కావరము = బొంకు.)

23

తే.గీ. పొదలి గీపెట్టెననఁగను రొదయొనర్చె
ననుటకగుఁ బేరు పుడమియందరసి చూడ;
రొదలు పల్కుబడులలోన నొదవి వేరె
వరుసతో వింత రొదయయ్యె వాడికగుచు.*

(గీపెట్టెను = రొదయొనర్చెను. రొదలు = వింత శబ్దము.)

Note:- *గ* – ప్రతిలో 'గీపెట్టెననుట దేశీయము' అని యున్నది.

* ఈ పద్యము ట, డ – ప్రతులలో లేదు.

24

ఆ.వె. [1]బడిని (బ్రజల పలుకుబడినిఁ గూఁకన రొద
కొప్పుఁ బేరు చదల కొప్పు రాజ!
అరయఁ గేక యనఁగ నట్టె [2]చెల్లుచునుండు
రొదకుఁ బుడమియందుఁ బొదిగ మఱియు.

1. పుడమి – చ, గ.   2. పొల్చుచునుండు–జ.

(కూఁక, కేక – రొదకు పేళ్లు.)

Note:- ట, డ – ప్రతులలో పై పద్యమునకు మాఱుగ ఈ క్రింది కందము కలదు.

క. కూఁకన, గీపెట్టెననన్
కేకనఁగా నలరుచుండు గీఁకన వరుసన్
చేకొని రొదపేళ్ళా నివి
దాకొని భువిలోనఁ బెలుచఁ దరుణేందుధరా!

(కూఁక, గీపెట్టెను, కేక, గీఁక - రొదపేళ్లు.)

Note:- *'కేక' యను పదమునకు "నెమలికూఁత" యనియు, 'గీఁక' యనుదానికి "ఏనుఁగు ఘీంకార" మనియు మొదటి యర్థములు.*

గద్య*

ఇది శ్రీమదుమామహేశ్వర వరప్రసాదాసాదిత కవిత్వవైభవ, పైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రనామాత్య తనూభవ లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతంబైన యాంధ్ర భాషారత్నాకరంబను నైఘంటుక శాస్త్రంబునందు ద్వితీయాశ్వాసము.

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* *ఈ గద్య చ, గ - ప్రతులలోనిది. దీని పాఠాంతరములకు చూ. ప్రథమాశ్వాసము చివరి గద్య.*

ఆంధ్రభాషారత్నాకరము
తృతీయాశ్వాసము

1

క. మిన్న [1]గౌనంబుల పైపై
వన్నెలచే మిక్కుటముగ వఱలుట భువిలో
వెన్నఁగఁ డెక్కన నొప్పును
చెన్నుగ మలచూలితోటి చెలఁగెడు మేటీ!

1. గౌనంబులు - గ.

(టెక్కు= గొప్ప గుణములయొక్క పైపై వన్నెలచే మిక్కిలిగా విలసిల్లుట. అనగా గుణముల అతిశయమువలన వ్యక్తి యందు గోచరించు విలసనము.)

2

తే.గీ. [1]చెన్ను దలఁచుచు కర్జంబు చేసి చేసి,
చెలఁగి యీ కర్జమిఁక నేమి సేయవలయు
ననుచు, నటువంటి కర్జమం దాస మదిని
నెగడకుండుటె [2]విసకట జగమునందు.

1. చెన్నుగా కర్జములు చాల చాల చేసి చేసి - బ.

2. విసుకుట - చ,గ.

టీక. ఒక ఫలితమును వుద్దేశించి పనిని చేశి చేశి, నెరవేరనందున, 'ఈ పనిని యిక చేసినేమి?' అని కార్యనిస్పృహచేత నిర్చి నెగడకుండుట- అనగా నిగ్రహించుకోక పోవడము 'విసకట' యని చెప్పబడును.

3

తే.గీ. వరుసఁ దెగువనఁ దెంపు; గీడ్వడియెననఁగ
మోసపడెనంట కగుఁ బేరు; మొనసెననఁగఁ
జెల్లగఁ బొసంగెనంటయో; జెలఁగి పాయ
యనఁగ నిడుపైన కొంచెమై నట్టి పుడమి.

టీ. తెగువ అనగా తెంపు అనియెడు మాట. కీడ్వడియెను అనగా మోసపడెననుటకు పేరు. మొనసెను అనగా పొసగెననుటకు పేరు. పాయ అనగా నిడుపైన కొంచెపు భూమి. అనగా చతుస్సమం లేక సన్నముగా పొడవు కలిగియున్ననేల.

4

తే.గీ. బెడిదమన, బెట్టిదంబన నుడువ నలవి
గాని మిక్కుటమునకుఁ బేరొను భువినిఁ;
గట్టెదురనంగఁ గంటికిఁ గట్టినట్లు
మ్రోల నుండుట కొప్పును చాల భువిని.

టీ. బెడిదము అనగా, బెట్టిదము అనగా చెప్ప శక్యం గాని మిక్కుటమ్ముకు పేరు. అనగా మిక్కిలి ఆధిక్యమునకు పేరు. కట్టెదురు అనగా కంటికి గట్టినట్లు యెదురుగా నుండుట. అనగా పురతః దరీదృశ్యమానమనుట.

5

క. తాళెనన, సైసెనని యనఁ
గా లలి నోర్చె ననుట కగుఁ; గ్రచ్చుకొనియె నా
వీలుగ నిండుకొనియె నను
టొ లేనెల దాల్పు! చొక్కమగు తెలివేల్పా!

టీ. తాళెను అనగా, సైసెను (సైచెను) అనగా వోర్చుకోవడమ్ముకు పేరు. గ్రచ్చుకొనియె అనగా, నిండు కొనియె. అనగా పూర్ణించుట.

6

క. ఉలికెనన బెదరెననుటకు
నలరును; లేయనఁగ లేఁతయగును తలంపన్;
సుళువనఁ, గోపన నేరుపు;
వాలిచెను నాఁ బబలె ననుట కొప్పును పుడమిన్.

టీ. ఉలికెను అనగా బెదరడమ్మునకు పేరు. లే అనగా లేతదనమ్మునకు పేరు. సుళువు అనగా, కోపు అనగా నేర్పరి తనమ్మునకు పేర్లు. పొలిచెను అనగా పబలెననుట. అనగా ప్రకాశించుట. పబలె అను పదం తద్భవం.

7

క. సొరిది యనఁ జక్కఁగా నని
మఱి యాడుట కొప్పు భువిని; మార్కొనెననఁగా
నెఱిఁ దాకెననుట కొప్పును
తఱచుగఁ బొంగట్టు వింటఁ దగు కరకంఠా!

టీ. సొరిది అనగా చక్కఁగా యని పలుకుటకు పేరు. మార్కొనెను అనగా తాకెననుటకు పేరు. అనగా ఎదుర్కొని తగిలెననుట. తాకెననుటకు స్పర్శ అనే అర్థము కూడ కద్దు.

8

ఆ.వె. [1] పెక్కువయ్యెననఁగ మిక్కిలయ్యెనటంట
కలరుఁ; గడలు కొనియెననఁగ నిండు
కొనియెననుట కొప్పుఁ; గొఱలుచు మఱి పెచ్చు
లయ్యెననఁగ మిక్కిలయ్యె ననుట.

1. ఎక్కువయ్యె – క., పెక్కులయ్యె – చ,త,గ.

టీ. పెక్కువయ్యెను అనగా మిక్కిలయ్యె ననుటకు పేరు. కడలుకొనియెను అనగా నిండుకొనెననుటకు పేరు. పెచ్చులయ్యెను అనగా మిక్కిలిన్ననుట. అనగా అధికముగుటకు పేరు.

9

తే.గీ. [1]కోమలనఁ గడలకుఁ బేరు లమరుచుండు;
[2]సద్దనంగను రొదకుఁ బేరెంచి చూడ;
నొరసెననఁ గూడెననుటకు నొప్పుఁ బేరు;
ప్రబలు నెలతాల్ప! జేజేల పాలి వేల్ప!

1. కోమనంగను గడలపేళ్లమరుచుండు – క,ట,డ.
2. నెనఁగు నందన నిరదపే రెంచి చూడ – క,ట,డ.,
నందడనఁగను రొదకుబే రెందున నగు – చ, త, గ.

టీ. కోమలు అనగా కడలకు పేరు. అనగా సూదులు, అగ్రాలనుట. సద్దు అనగా రొదకు పేరు. ఒరసెను అనగా కూడుకొనెననుటకు పేరు.

Note:- 'కోమ' అను పదమునకు "పుట్టయొక్క అగ్రము" అను నర్థము కూడ కలదు.

'కోమ = *The top of an anthill*' చూ. బ్రౌణ్యము, పుట *327*.

10

తే.గీ. రొప్పెనన, రుప్పెననఁగను, రువ్వెననగ,
విసరెనన దూరముననుండి వ్రేసెననుట;
[1]పుడమిలోఁ [2]బీల్చెననఁగను బొంపుదనరఁ
బ్రోది నెగఁ గ్రుక్క [3]పట్టి వే గ్రోలెననుట.

1. పుడమిఁ జీరుట పిల్చుట; పొంపు దనర గ్రుక్కగొనెఁ ద్రావెననఁగను గ్రోలుటయును -త.

2. బీర్చెననఁగను - క. ట, డ.

3. పట్టుచుఁ గ్రోలెననుట - క. ట, డ.

టీ. రొప్పెను అనగా, రుప్పెను అనగా, రువ్వెను అనగా, విసరెను అనగా దూరముననుండి వ్రేసెననుటకు పేర్లు. అనగా దూర భారపాతమునకు పేర్లు. పీల్చెను అన్నాను, యెగగ్రుక్కవట్టెను అన్నాను గ్రోలుటకు పేర్లు. అనగా యెగబీల్చుటకు పేర్లు.

11

తే.గీ. చిలికెననఁ జల్లెననుటకు నలరుఁ బేరు;
తక్కెనాఁ, జొక్కెనాఁగఁ బెంపెక్కు వలపు
[1]తెఱఁగు నెరపెనటంటకు నెరవుగఁ దగు;
[2]నెసఁగెనా నొప్పెననుటకుఁ బొసఁగుఁ బేరు.

1. తెరవు - క, ట, డ, జ.

2. నొనరఁ గొనసాగె ననుటకు గొనబుమీఱ - క, ట, డ.., సొగెనా నొప్పెననుట పొనంగు పేరు - జ.

టీ. చిలికెను అనగా చల్లెననుటకు పేరు. తక్కెను అనగా, చొక్కెను అనగా పెంపెక్కు వలపుయొక్క - అనగా అధికమయ్ని వలపుయొక్క - తెరవు

అనగా మార్గం, నెరపెను అనగా ప్రకట్నసేయుటకు పేరు. ఎసగెను అనగా వొప్పె ననుటకు పేరు. అనగా అంగీకారమనుటకు పేరు.

12

తే.గీ. తెలియ మురిపెముగల జిలిబిలి జిగిబిగి
[1]నగవుసేఁతలు గలిగియుఁ దగుటె త్రుళ్లు;
అరయఁ గొంటెన గడుసుపేరగును భువిని;
గట్టువిలుదాల్ప! ముప్వీళ్ల గొట్టు వేల్ప!

1. నగవులును సేఁతలును గల్గి – చ, గ, ద, బ.

టీ. మురిపెము గల అనగా మృదుమార్గంతో కూడుకున్నటువంటి, జిలిబిలి అనగా, వెలుగుజిలుగు అనగా ప్రకాశమానమయినటువంటి చిక్కులతో కూడుకున్న, జిగి అనగా దార్ఢ్యమున్ను, బిగి అనగా బింకమున్ను కలిగినటువంటి, నగవుసేతలు గలిగి అనగా పరిహాసక్రియలు కలిగి తగుటయే 'త్రుళ్లు' అని చెప్పబడును. 'కొంటె' అనగా గడుసువానికి పేరు.

13

క. పొడి, నుగ్గు, నుఱుము, [1]తుఱుమనఁ
బొడుమనఁగ, దుమారమనఁగ, [2]బుగ్గన దుమ్మౌ;
బడి నూచన, నూఁగనుటయు;
[3]బడిఁ బల్కుబడనుట పేరుఁ బడయుట పుడమిన్.

1. తుమురన – చ, గ, జ.

2. బుగ్గి యనంగా – క, ట, జ, డ.

3 .బెడఁగగు దుమారమునకును బేళ్లగుఁ బుడమిన్ – చ, గ., వడివడిఁ బల్కుటకుఁ బేరు బడిబడి యనఁగన్ – త.

టీ. పొడి అనగా, నుగ్గు అనగా, తుమురు (తురుము) అనగా, పొడుము అనగా, దుమారము అనగా, బుగ్గి అనగా చూర్ణానకు పేరు. నూచ అనగా నూగుపేరు. పల్కుబడి అనగా పేరుబడయుటకు పేరగును.

14

తే.గీ. వెలిచెనాఁగను మఱియును వెడలెననుట;
నలువుగాఁగను లొచ్చయ్యెననఁగఁ దక్కు
వయ్యెననుటకుఁ బేరునై యలరుచుండు;
నూకెననఁ బొడిచెనంటకు నొప్పు భువిని.

టీ. వెలిచెను అనగా బయలువెళ్లెననుటకు పేరు. లొచ్చయ్యెను అనగా తక్కువయ్యెననుటకు పేరు. నూకెను అనగా పొడిచెననుటకు పేరు.

15

ఆ.వె. తెలియ బిట్టనంగ, గళువునా మిక్కిలి
యనుట కొప్పుఁ బుడమి నరసి చూడ;
మినుకునాఁగ మెఱుఁగు; పెనునాఁగ దట్టంబు;
పెనుపనంగఁ జిక్కు దనరు దేవ! *

(బిట్టు, గళువు - మిక్కిలి యనుటకు పేళ్లు. మినుకు = మెఱుఁగు. పెను = దట్టమైనది. పెనుపు = చిక్కు.)

* *ఈ పద్యము త,ద,బ - అను ప్రతులలో మాత్రము కన్పట్టు చున్నది.*

16

తే.గీ. అరయఁ బుడమినిఁ [1]దేగడయనఁగఁ దేట;
బిరుసనఁగ గాంఢ్రతనమున కొరయుఁ బేరు;
అలి నివాళించెననఁగను వెలయఁ జుట్టు
ద్రిప్పెననుటకు బేరునై యొప్పు భువిని.

1. తేగనఁ దేట పేరు - క, ట, డ.

టీ. తేగడ (తేగ) అనగా తేటకు పేరు. బిరుసు అనగా కాంఢ్రతనమ్ము పేరు. అనగా మోటుతనమనుటకు పేరు. నివాళించెను అనగా చుట్టుద్రిప్పుటకు పేరు.

17

క. పొరి పొరి, బడిబడియనఁ గ్ర
మ్మఱ మఱిమఱి యనెడు దంటమాటలు భువిలో
మఱి వెడవెడ, దొడిదొడి యని
పొరి నసఁగను మఱి యనుటకుఁ బొలుపుగఁ జెల్లున్.

టీ. పారిపారి అనగా, బడిబడి అనగా, మరిమరి అనగా, వెడవెడ అనగా, తొడితొడి అనగా యిటువంటి దంట పదాలు మరిన్ని అనుటకు జెల్లును.

18

క. [1]పొది కబ్బంబులఁ బదునెని
[2]మిది వర్ణనలందు నందు మెలఁగు కతలలోఁ
గొదలేక వచ్చు బలువిడి
[3]యదె మిక్కిలి యనఁగ బరఁగు నరనెలదాల్పా!

1. *పొదలిన కబ్బంబులలో - క, చ, ట, త, గ, డ.*
2. *పదునెనిమిది వర్ణనముల పైపై నందున్ - క, ట, త, డ.,*
   పదునెనిమిది వర్ణనలను బ్రబలు కతలలో - చ, గ.
3. *యదిపో మేల్బంతియనఁగ నలరుచునుండున్ - చ, గ.*

టీ. బలువిడి అనగా మిక్కిలి అనుటకు జెల్లును. అనగా శ్రేష్ఠమనుటకు పేరు.

19

క. [1]బరువనఁగా నెఱి భారము;
ఇరులనఁ జీకటులు; [2]మఱియు నీరికలనఁగా
నెఱి గొనలు; చవి యనంగను
తెఱగంటుల బువ్వ; [3]చాలఁ దేఁకువ యనఁగన్.

1. *వరువనఁగాఁ దగుఁ బాఱుట - త.*
2. *మఱియు నెఱకలనంగా - క, ట, డ.*
3. *చాలఁ దెలిసికొనంగన్ - క, చ, ట, త, గ, డ, ద, బ.*

టీ. బరువు అనగా భారమునకు పేరు. యిరులు అనగా చీకటులకు పేరు. యీరికలు (యీరికెలు) అనగా అగ్రాలు. అనగా మొల్కలనుట. చవి అనగా తెరగంటుల బువ్వ. అనగా అమృతమనుట. తేకువ అనగా చాల అనుట. అనగా వెక్కసమునకు పేరు. యీరికెలు, కొనలు - యీరెండు పదాలున్ను దేశియ్యపదాలు.

Note:- 'తేఁకువ' అను పదమునకు "పూర్ణత, సమగ్రత" -అను అర్థములు సూర్యరాయాంధ్ర నిఘంటువులో నీయబడినవి. చూ. చతుర్థసంపుటము, పుట 48.

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ఆ.వె. చౌకళించెననఁగఁ జక్కఁగా నలుదట్ల
మెలఁగెనఁట; వెలుఁగుజిలుఁగులనఁగఁ
జాయలందుఁ [1]బట్టు చాయలు; మఱి వెల్లి
యనఁగ నిండుటకును దనరుఁ బేరు.*

1. బుట్టు చాయలు – క, ట, డ, ద, బ.

టీ. చౌకళించెను అనగా నలువైపుల మెలగెననుట. వెలుగుజిలుగులు అనగా పట్టువస్త్రాలకు పేరు. చాయలు అన్నాను వలువలనుట. వెల్లి అనగా నిండుకొనుటకు జెల్లును. అనగా ప్రవాహవత్సమృద్ధి అని తాత్పర్యం.

* గ–ప్రతిలో ఈ పద్యమువరకు కలదు. దీని తరువాతి పద్యములు గల చివరి యాకు లోపించినది.

21

తే.గీ. పెల్లునా మిక్కుటంబంట; మొల్లమనఁగ
దట్ట; [1]మీలువు నా మది దనరు; వెలసెఁ,
బరఁగెఁ, జెలఁగెనా నంతటఁ బ్రబలెననుట;
వఱలు తెలివేల్పు! ముమ్మొనవాలుదాల్పు!

1. మీలువ – చ.

టీ. పెల్లు అనగా మిక్కుటమునకు పేరు. మొల్లము అనగా దట్టమునకు పేరు. యీలువు (యీలువ) అనగా మది. అనగా మనస్సుకు పేరు. వెలసె అనగా, పరగె అనగా, చెలగె అనగా అంతట ప్రబలెననుట. అనగా ప్రకాశమానముగా వొప్పెననుటకు పేళ్లు.

22

తే.గీ. అమరు నుడుగరలనఁగఁ గట్నముల పేళ్లు;
లెంకలన [1]రాచకర్జాలు పొంకపఱుప
[2]మెలఁగువారల కగుఁ బేరు; మఱియు డాక
యనఁగ దాడికిఁ బేరునై యలరు భువిని.

1. రాచకర్జాలఁ బొంకముగను – క, చ, ట, త, డ, ద, బ.

2. తిరుగువారల కగుఁ బేరు – క, చ, ట, త, డ, ద, బ.

టీ. ఉడుగరలనగా కట్నములక్కు పేరు. లెంకలు అనగా రాజకార్యం పొంకపరచడమందు నేర్పుగలవారికి పేరు. డాక అనగా దాడికి పేరు. అనగా ధాటి.

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క. బడిఁ గడఁగుట నాఁ జెలఁగుట;
పడయుట నాఁ బుచ్చుకొనుట; పరికింపంగాఁ
గడునా మిక్కిలి యనుటకుఁ;
దడవుగఁ బొంగట్టు వింటఁ దగు కళుకంఠా!

టీ. కడగుట అనగా చెలగుట. అనగా ప్రయత్నించుటకు పేరు. పడయుట అనగా పుచ్చుకొనుట. అనగా కైకొనుటకు పేరు. కడు అనగా మిక్కిలికి పేరు.

24

తే.గీ. లలి మిటారంబనంగ [1]బిట్టలవిగాని
సొగసు గల తేట వన్నియ కగును పేరు;
అరయ జోకన సాటి; వాకనఁగ నేఱు
నలరు; జేజేలపాలింట నమరుదంట!

1. బిట్టలముకొనిన – క, ట, డ.

టీ. మిటారము అనగా సొగసు కలిగినటువంటి తేటవన్నియకు పేరు. అనగా అత్యుత్తమమగు సొగసుకలదనుట. జోక అనగా సాటికి పేరు. వాక అనగా వాగు. అనగా నది యనుట. వాక పదము దేశియ్యం.

25

క. కెన్నాఁగను, జెన్నాఁగను
పొన్నుగ గట్టెఱుపు పేరు; పొన్నా, హొన్నా
నెన్నఁగ బంగరు పేరగుఁ
జెన్నుగ మలచూలితోటి చెలఁగెడుమేటీ!

టీ. కెన్ను అనగా, చెన్ను అనగా మిక్కిలి యెర్రదనము పేరు. పొన్ను అన్నాను, హొన్ను అన్నాను బంగారానకు పేళ్లు.

గద్య*

ఇది శ్రీమదుమామహేశ్వర వరప్రసాదాసాదిత కవిత్వవైభవ, పైఁడిపాటి యేకామ్రనామాత్య తనూభవ లక్ష్మణకవి ప్రణీతంబైన యాంధ్ర భాషారత్నాకరంబను నైఘంటుక శాస్త్రంబునందుఁ దృతీయాశ్వాసము.

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* *ఈ గద్య చ, గ - ప్రతులలోనిది. దీని పాఠాంతరములకు చూ. ప్రథమాశ్వాసము చివరి గద్య.*

Reviews

SPOKEN SANSKRIT, The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1990. Pages xiii, 201, Price Rs. 80.00.

The significance of Sanskrit language in the understanding of Indian culture and heritage is avowedly accepted by all. But to popularise and bring Sanskrit close to the elite of different fields of specialisation is still a matter of exercise. The book under review is aimed at to impart training in functional Sanskrit through translation method. There are nineteen lessons of which the first sixteen are composed by Sri V. Swaminatha Acharya and the last three lessons by Sri A.V. Nagaraja Sarma. All these lessons were arranged in the form of dialogues and all of them were put to test in the spoken Sanskrit classes conducted in the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute since June, 1982 and revised time and again to obtain the existing form of perfection. A comprehensive vocabulary covering the fields of action, animals, birds, parts of body, dress, food and drink , film, household articles, news, names of kinship, sports, places of habitation, divisions of time, etc., is given. The exercises built on this vocabulary provide sufficient abilities for the readers to converse in Sanskrit with felicity of expression. Now on the same lines similar lessons are to be formulated depending upon the requirements of different branches of learning and aspirants. Dr. S.S. Janaki, Director of the Institute deserves appreciation for carrying out the experiment through conducting classes for people of various age groups and professions. Hope this book shall be a good example for other enthusiasts to carry on the mission of popularizing Sanskrit which is indeed a need of the hour.

* * *

RE-VISITING ŚAKUNTALAM (A Commentary on Goethe's Śākuntala Epigram) by Giridharilal Chaturvedi. Brijrani Publication, Chatta Bazar, Mathura, 1991. Pages XII, 4, 153. Rs.150.00

This book is a detailed appreciation of the *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* in the light of the 'Śākuntala Epigram' of Goethe by Giridharilal Chaturvedi. The 'Śākuntala Epigram' appeared at a time when the German romantic poets and social philosophers like Herder, von Humboldt, and Schlegel were searching for best literatures in the world reflecting humanism against value based social background. Herder visualised an Indian in those days to be either engrossed in reading literature or absorbed in philosophical discussions. The German translation of the *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* by Forster (1791) from its English translation by Sir William Jones (1790) was drawn to the attention of Goethe, the greatest poet of the day in Germany. Being thrilled and inspired by the social philosophy and higher values than those of aesthetics reflected in the drama, Goethe reacted with a complementary verse - Śākuntala Epigram - which became an indispensable reference in all the Śākuntala-studies both in the East and the West. The 'Śākuntala Epigram' in its turn created a reaction in the minds of litterateurs and critics. For Rabindranath Tagore, 'though brief like the tiny flame of a lamp, it serves to lend at once all illuminating insight into Śākuntalam' (p.3). Keith opined in contrast it as 'the praise, doubtless just in measure, may be easily pressed further than justifiable' (p.6). Giridharilal Chaturvedi has undertaken in this monograph to interpret the Śākuntala epigram precisely with an Indian heart associated with European profoundness. He has shown the *Śākuntalam* as a work of art, a moral code of conduct and dramatic poetry and the meaningfulness of each phrase in the Śākuntala epigram of Goethe.

* * *

PADĀRTHADĪPIKĀ by Vātsya Nārāyaṇa. Ed. with introduction and notes by N.V.P. Unithiri. Department of Sanskrit, Calicut University P.O. 673635, 1988. Pages xiv, 195.

Unithiri's edition of the *Padārthadīpikā* is based on a single palm-leaf manuscript in the private collection of Sri A. V. Krishna Vadhyan Namboodiri. This is a *lakṣaṇagrantha* dealing with external sandhi of the *saṃhitā-pāṭha* of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda* in 140 *kārikas* by Vātsya Nārāyaṇa (A.D. 1667) of Kerala. The author himself wrote a short commentary with profusely illustrated examples. Being a Vedic scholar of the medieval period, he followed the Paninian grammar both in terminology and technic. These rules are in a way supplementary to those of the *Taittirīya-prātiśākhya,* prescribing the division of words in the *pada-pāṭha* in those cases only which are likely to be erred. Thus the rules are given here for the restoration of words ending in *n* (9 - 13), *k, ṭ, t,* (14 - 20), *visarga* (21 - 49), *e, ai* (50 - 12), *a, ā* (73 - 98) and *aniṅgya* (99 - 140). There are several manuals of this type still hidden in the family libraries of traditional scholars, which are to be brought to light, as these works provide clues for the cultural development of our country and efforts to preserve the oral tradition in tact.

* * *

OBSERVATIONAL ASTRONOMY IN INDIA by K.V. Sarma, Department of Sanskrit, University of Calicut, 1990. Calicut University Sanskrit series 5. Pages 4, 57. Price Rs. 10.00.

This monograph is a lecture given under 'Prof. M.S. Menon Endowment' by K.V. Sarma in the Department

लक्ष्मीः- हेमप्रभे! नेतःपरं शक्नोमि तपो निर्वर्तयितुमिति शय्यामधितिष्ठति।

शौरिः- आकर्णदीर्घनयनाञ्चितमास्यमस्या
रक्ताङ्गुळीयकरुचा करपंकजस्य।
आभाति तुल्यरुचिपूर्णशशांकमूर्तेः
पूर्वाचलारुणरुचश्शरदुद्गतस्य।।

(स्वगतम्) सख्य एनामुपचरन्ति
मनस्सन्तापं मे जनयति सुता क्षीरजलधे
रुशीरैराच्छन्नास्तनकलशतापोपशमनैः।
क्व मोहः क्वोशीराः क्व कुचयुगतापोपशमनं
क्व वा वामाक्षीणां प्रकृतिगतकामज्वरभरः।।

किञ्च-

स्फुरत्यन्तः कश्चिच्चिरपरिचितो मोहगरिमा
नवोऽयं सञ्जातः प्रकृतिपरिपाटीपरिचयात्।
यदस्यां स्वान्तं मे परिणमति नाना रसतया
तदेतच्छृङ्गारप्रकृतिकलितं किं जरयति।।

(स्वगतम्) किञ्च, परमावधिरयं प्रेम्णः।
बाहूकाञ्चनचारुमञ्जुललता तुल्यौ प्रसार्याम्बरे
नैराश्यादवधीरणां मयि हरावाशंसमाना भृशम्।
हा नाथेति दयामयेति जगतां भर्तः प्रसीदेति मां
गायन्ती न परं जगत् कलयते नारायणाच्चेतसि।।

ऐश्वर्यं निरवग्रहं त्रिजगतो यन्तास्मि संवर्धिता
स्रष्टाज्ञामनुवर्तते दिविषदो भृत्या महेन्द्रादयः।

BĀRAHMĀSA IN INDIAN LITERATURES (Songs of the twelve months in Indo-Aryan literatures). Tr. by Charlotte Vandeville. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1986. Pages xvi, 139. Price 70.00.

The expression of emotion through song is a natural instinct of human beings irrespective of education, social status and caste. The folk songs, like the language of the primitive people, are the source for understanding the development of cultures of different nations and also for finding out the common cultural core of people speaking different dialects and cognate languages. Indian cultural unity against diversity can easily be demonstrated by the folk songs and thus their study gained importance in the faculties of languages and culture since the nineteenth centrury. In the present monograph Charlotte Vandeville presented eight folk songs sung on the twelve months in the original languages, with apt English translation, from the Indo-Aryan vernaculars: Old Bengali, Old Braj-Rajasthani, Old Rajasthani-Hindi, Old Avadhi, Old Marathi and Old Gujarati. She has made a study of the salient features of the theme and sentiment found common in these folk songs. Love in separation, religious festivals, ways of worshipping a god, didacticism, etc., are found expression in the songs of twelve months.

- M. Srimannarayana Murti.

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   [A work on the grammatical validity of non-Paninian usages.]
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